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ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Volume 7
Volume 7, Number 1, February 2019
- Lefteris M. Kirousis, Phokion G. Kolaitis, John Livieratos
:
Aggregation of Votes with Multiple Positions on Each Issue. 1:1-1:25 - Yuqing Kong, Grant Schoenebeck
:
An Information Theoretic Framework For Designing Information Elicitation Mechanisms That Reward Truth-telling. 2:1-2:33 - Piotr Faliszewski
, Piotr Skowron
, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon:
Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterization and Hierarchy. 3:1-3:39 - Ittai Abraham, Danny Dolev, Joseph Y. Halpern:
Distributed Protocols for Leader Election: A Game-Theoretic Perspective. 4:1-4:26
Volume 7, Number 2, August 2019
- Patrick Hummel, Uri Nadav:
Bid-Limited Targeting. 5:1-5:33 - Haris Aziz
, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein, Martin Olsen
, Dominik Peters
:
Fractional Hedonic Games. 6:1-6:29 - Ian A. Kash, Peter B. Key, Warut Suksompong:
Simple Pricing Schemes for the Cloud. 7:1-7:27 - Ashish Goel, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Sukolsak Sakshuwong, Tanja Aitamurto:
Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting. 8:1-8:27 - Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass
:
Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games. 9:1-9:19 - Xiaohui Bei
, Jugal Garg, Martin Hoefer, Kurt Mehlhorn:
Earning and Utility Limits in Fisher Markets. 10:1-10:35
Volume 7, Number 3, October 2019
- Yiling Chen, Dirk Bergemann:
Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'16. 11:1 - Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé Moulin, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, Junxing Wang:
The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare. 12:1-12:32 - Ziv Epstein, Alexander Peysakhovich, David G. Rand:
The Good, the Bad, and the Unflinchingly Selfish: Pro-sociality can be Well Predicted Using Payoffs and Three Behavioral Types. 13:1-13:14 - Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. 14:1-14:27 - Vittorio Bilò
, Cosimo Vinci
:
Dynamic Taxes for Polynomial Congestion Games. 15:1-15:36 - Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li:
The Stochastic Matching Problem with (Very) Few Queries. 16:1-16:19 - Tim Roughgarden, Joshua R. Wang:
Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves. 17:1-17:18
Volume 7, Number 4, February 2020
- Sergiu Hart, Philip J. Reny:
The Better Half of Selling Separately. 18:1-18:18 - Kartik Ahuja, Mihaela van der Schaar:
Dynamic Matching and Allocation of Tasks. 19:1-19:27 - Tomer Ezra
, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong:
Pricing Multi-Unit Markets. 20:1-20:29 - Yasushi Kawase, Yutaro Yamaguchi, Yu Yokoi:
Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Sequential Matching Games. 21:1-21:30
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