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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 150
Volume 150, 2025
- Yuya Wakabayashi, Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa:
A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices. 1-26 - Homa Hosseinzadeh Ranjbar, Mehdi Feizi:
Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments. 27-33 - Luca Anderlini, Larry Samuelson, Daniele Terlizzese:
When is trust robust? 34-47 - Shurojit Chatterji, Jordi Massó, Shigehiro Serizawa:
On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem. 48-70 - Tibor Neugebauer, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, Reinhard Selten:
Taming selten's horse with impulse response. 71-92 - Svetlana Boyarchenko, Dominika Machowska, Iryna Topolyan:
Supermodularity and incentive reversal in teams. 93-105 - Laura Doval, Balázs Szentes:
On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets. 106-130 - Mikhail Freer, Khushboo Surana:
Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis. 131-159 - Enriqueta Aragonès, Dimitrios Xefteris:
Ideological consistency and valence. 160-182 - Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar, Jorge Bruno, Renaud Foucart, Sonali Sengupta:
Efficient public good provision between and within groups. 183-190 - Oleg Rubanov:
Asymptotic full revelation in cheap talk with many senders. 191-196 - Zhonghong Kuang, Hangcheng Zhao, Jie Zheng:
Corrigendum to: "Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests". 197 - Ying Chen, Tom Lane, Stuart McDonald:
Endogenous network formation in local public goods: An experimental analysis. 198-214 - Xiaoxiao Hu, Haoran Lei:
The optimality of (stochastic) veto delegation. 215-234
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