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In this paper, we consider the study of two classes of mechanism design problems for locating a facility on a wheel graph with $k\ge 4$ vertices, where a vertex is located at the center, which is surrounded by a cycle graph with $k-1$ vertices and ...$\mathrm{}$$\mathrm{}$

Mechanism design over social networks, whose goal is to incentivize agents to diffuse the information of a mechanism to their followers, as well as to report their true preferences, is one of the new trends in market design. In this paper, we reconsider ...

In many real-life scenarios, a group of agents needs to agree on a common action, e.g., on a location for a public facility, while there is some consistency between their preferences, e.g., all preferences are derived from a common metric space. ...$\mathit{}$$\mathit{}$

In the literature of two-sided matching, each agent is assumed to have a complete preference. In practice, however, each agent initially has only partial information and needs to refine it by costly actions (interviews). For one-to-one matching ...

In this paper we investigate the effect of an underlying social network over agents in a well-known multi-agent resource allocation problem; the housing market. We first show that, when a housing market takes place over a social network with more than ...

My research is summarized as mechanism design with uncertainty. Traditional mechanism design focuses on static environments where all the (possibly probabilistic) information about the agents are observable by the mechanism designer. In practice, however, ...

In the literature of mechanism design, market mechanisms have been developed by professionals based on their experience. The concept of automated mechanism design (AMD), initiated by Sandholm (2002), is a ground-breaking computer-aided framework ...

In mechanism design, fairness is one of the central criteria for analyzing mechanisms. Recently, a new fairness concept called envy-freeness of a group toward a group (GtG-EFness) has received attention, which requires that no group of agents ...

In many real-life scenarios, a group of agents needs to agree on a common action, e.g., on a location for a public facility, while there is some consistency between their preferences, e.g., all preferences are derived from a common metric space. The ...

Core-selection is a crucial property of rules in the literature of resource allocation. It is also desirable, from the perspective of mechanism design, to address the incentive of agents to cheat by misreporting their preferences. This paper ...

In this paper, we study the service exchange problem where each agent is willing to provide her service in order to receive in exchange the service of someone else. We assume that agent's preference depends both on the service that she receives and the ...

Facility location is a well-studied problem in social choice literature, where agents' preferences are restricted to be single-peaked. When the number of agents is treated as a variable (e.g., not observable a priori), a social choice function must be ...

In this paper, we propose a fractional preference model for the facility location game with two facilities that serve the similar purpose on a line where each agent has his location information as well as fractional preference to indicate how well they ...

The cake cutting problem is concerned with the fair allocation of a divisible good among agents whose preferences vary over it. Recently, designing strategy-proof cake cutting mechanisms has caught considerable attention from AI and MAS researchers. ...

Sequential allocation is one of the most fundamental models for allocating indivisible items to agents in a decentralized manner, in which agents sequentially pick their favorite items among the remainder based on a pre-defined priority ordering of ...

This paper considers a mechanism design problem for locating two identical facilities on an interval, in which an agent can pretend to be multiple agents. A mechanism selects a pair of locations on the interval according to the declared single-peaked ...

In this paper we study the exchange of indivisible objects where agents' possible preferences over the objects are strict and share a common structure among all of them, which represents a certain level of asymmetry among objects. A typical example of ...

How can we attract developers? What can we do to incentivize developers to write code? We started the study by introducing the population pyramid visualization to software development communities, called software population pyramids, and found a typical ...

How can we attract developers? What can we do to incentivize developers to write code? We started the study by introducing the population pyramid visualization to software development communities, called software population pyramids, and found a typical ...

This paper proposes an alternative automated mechanism design approach called parametric mechanism design via quantifier elimination (PMD-QE), which utilizes QE, a symbolic formula manipulation technique. In PMD-QE, we start from a skeleton of ...