We introduce a new noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for network-restricted environments in which players can bargain only with their neighbors. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for efficient equilibria. If the ...

Braess's paradox states that removing a part of a network may improve the players' latency at equilibrium. In this work, we study the approximability of the best subnetwork problem for the class of random $${\mathcal {G}}_{n,p}$$Gn,p instances proven ...

We study how the spectral gap of the normalized Laplacian of a random graph changes when an edge is added to or removed from the graph. There are known examples of graphs where, perhaps counter-intuitively, adding an edge can decrease the spectral gap, ...

Braess's paradox exposes a counterintuitive phenomenon that when travelers selfishly choose their routes in a network, removing links can improve the overall network performance. Under the model of nonatomic selfish routing, we characterize the ...

We introduce a network creation game in which each player (vertex) has a fixed budget to establish links to other players. In this model, each link has a unit price, and each agent tries to minimize its cost, which is either its eccentricity or its ...

In routing games, the selfish behavior of the players may lead to a degradation of the network performance at equilibrium. In more than a few cases however, the equilibrium performance can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the ...

Expander graphs are known to facilitate effective routing and most real-world networks have expansion properties. At the other extreme, it has been shown that in some special graphs, removing certain edges can lead to moreefficient routing. This ...

We consider a repeated congestion game with imperfect monitoring. At each stage, each player chooses to use some facilities and pays a cost that increases with the congestion. Two versions of the model are examined: a public monitoring setting ...

We give several new upper and lower bounds on the worst-case severity of Braess's paradox and the price of anarchy of selfish routing with respect to the maximum latency objective. In single-commodity networks with arbitrary continuous and nondecreasing ...

We study the properties of Braess's paradox in the context of the model of congestion games with flow over time introduced by Koch and Skutella. We compare them to the well known properties of Braess's paradox for Wardrop's model of games with static ...

A selfish routing game is a simple model of selfish behaviors in networks. Braess's paradox is a well-known example of inefficiencies existing in the selfish routing games and it is an important problem to reduce such inefficiencies. To resolve such a ...

We consider a directed network in which every edge possesses a latency function that specifies the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion. Selfish, noncooperative agents constitute the network traffic and wish to travel from a source ...

Braess's Paradox is the counterintuitive but well-known fact that removing edges from a network with "selfish routing" can decrease the latency incurred by traffic in an equilibrium flow. Despite the large amount of research motivated by Braess's ...