

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS

VOLUME 14

FALL 2017

NUMBER 1

THE MISSING ACCOUNT OF PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LAW

WILLIAM S. LAUFER*

This Article offers a modern, progressive account of corporate criminal law using foundational principles of twentieth century progressivism. The central role of science and advancing technology define the architecture of this account. Some of the intractable challenges of using the criminal law to regulate corporations are reviewed, followed by a recognition of a remarkable convergence of corporate compliance standards, measures, practices, and insights from conventional, plural, and polycentric theories of regulation. This is a convergence of informal corporate social controls offering a potentially powerful opportunity for the promotion of modern progressive interests, practices, and advocacy. Next, the two pillars of progressivism, the instrumental use of science and social control, are discussed. A “compliance conundrum,” it is argued, undermines corporate commitments to compliance science, technology, data analytics, and more effective social controls. This conundrum contributes to a compliance game wherein corporate and regulatory players placate each other with an outcome that often has little to do with greater law abidance. With a glimmer of hope, this Article concludes by considering the unique position of progressives to disrupt the compliance game while promoting corporate criminal justice.

INTRODUCTION	72
I. WHAT IS MISSING IN CORPORATE CRIMINAL LAW? .	80
II. A COMPLIANCE CONVERGENCE	87

* Julian Aresty Professor, Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, Sociology, and Criminology; Director, Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Vik Khanna, Jennifer Arlen, Sally Simpson, John Hagan, Eric Orts, Peter Conti-Brown, Mihailis Diamantis, Ron Levine, Eric Orts, Sherbir Panag, Steve Solow, Kip Schlegel, Eduardo Saad Diniz, and Dominik Brodowski for comments on earlier versions of this article. My appreciation to Serina Vash and The Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement at NYU Law School for posting this Article.

III. WHY A PROGRESSIVE ACCOUNT?	96
A. <i>Progressive Thinking</i>	98
B. <i>Moral Indignation and Desert</i>	106
C. <i>The Compliance Game</i>	110
IV. THE PROMISE OF A PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE CRIMINAL LAW	116
A. <i>The Role of Science and the March of Technology</i>	121
B. <i>Beyond the Compliance Conundrum</i>	125
V. REVISITING THE MODERN PROGRESSIVE AGENDA...	129
A. <i>The Bridge From Old to New</i>	131
B. <i>Taming the Giant Corporation?</i>	137
CONCLUSION	141

INTRODUCTION

This seems to be an ideal time to revisit the normative, doctrinal, and policy-laden foundations of the corporate criminal law. With renewed calls for a repeal of the most costly of corporate regulations and reforms, it is tempting to speculate about the future of corporate compliance and corporate criminal liability.¹ A host of academics continue to worry about the many hard-to-quantify direct and collateral costs of corporate

1. See, e.g., Tom Fox, *TRUMP AND COMPLIANCE: THIS CONVERSATION IS JUST GETTING STARTED* (2016) (discussing the future prospects of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); Robert Hahn, *Playing the Long Game on Regulation*, BROOKINGS (Jan. 13, 2017), <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/playing-the-long-game-on-regulation/>; Bill Coffin, *What's Next for Compliance Under President Trump?*, COMPLIANCE WEEK: COFFIN ON COMPLIANCE (Nov. 14, 2016), <https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/coffin-on-compliance/whats-next-for-compliance-under-president-trump#.WdOnr9N97BI> (speculating on how a Trump presidency will affect the compliance industry); Ben DiPietro, *Does Trump Spell End of Era of Compliance?*, WALL ST. J. (November 21, 2016, 6:00 AM), <https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2016/11/21/does-trump-spell-end-of-era-of-compliance/>; Bruce Carton, *What does President Trump mean for the SEC?*, COMPLIANCE WEEK: ENFORCEMENT ACTION (November 9, 2016), <https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/enforcement-action/what-does-president-trump-mean-for-the-sec#.WdOr-9N97BI>; Ben Rossi, *What Brexit and Trump Mean for Compliance*, INFORMATION AGE (December 6, 2016), <http://www.information-age.com/brexit-trump-mean-compliance-123463516/>; Jacob M. Schlesinger, *Donald Trump Took Aim at Dodd-Frank on the Stump*, WALL ST. J. (November 9, 2016, 11:24 AM), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-took-aim-at-dodd-frank-on-the-stump-1478691726>.

criminal liability.² Regulators and legislators still question whether some financial institutions are too big to prosecute, take to trial, and convict.³ The general public fears that justice for those individuals responsible for the global debt crisis will remain undistributed.⁴ Entity liability, we are told by the Department of Justice, should take a back seat to individual liability unless justice may not be accomplished otherwise.⁵

These conventional intuitions, musings, and fears are found scattered in four relatively distinct ideological camps. First, there are *stalwart advocates* of both individual and entity liability for “corporate” wrongdoing. For some, corporate so-

2. WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2008) (discussing the longstanding ambivalence of “compliance stakeholders” using the blunt instrument of the criminal law with corporations); Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, *Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes*, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997); Jennifer Arlen, *The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability*, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994); Andrew Weissmann, *A New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability*, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319, 1325–26 (2007); V.S. Khanna, *Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?*, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1486 (1996).

3. See REPUBLICAN STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON FIN. SERV., 114TH CONG., TOO BIG TO JAIL: INSIDE THE OBAMA JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S DECISION NOT TO HOLD WALL STREET ACCOUNTABLE (2016); see also Staff of Sen. Elizabeth Warren, *Rigged Justice: 2016: How Weak Enforcement Lets Corporate Offenders Off Easy* (Jan. 2016), http://.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/Rigged_Justice_2016.pdf; BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014).

4. For a recent summary of the government’s enforcement efforts, see Bill Baer, Principal Deputy Assoc. Att’y Gen., Remarks at Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics Conference (September 27, 2016), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-associate-attorney-general-bill-baer-delivers-remarks-society-corporate>. For a discussion of a responsibility remainder more generally, see Amy J. Sepinwall, *Crossing the Fault Line in Corporate Criminal Law*, 40 J. CORP. L. 102 (2015).

5. See SALLY Q. YATES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CORPORATE WRONGDOING (2015) [hereinafter YATES MEMORANDUM]. For a post-Yates Memorandum eulogy see Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, *The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines on Prosecuting White Collar Crime*, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51 (2015); for a pre-Yates look at the perverse effects of pushing liability down the corporate hierarchy see William S. Laufer, *Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors*, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 653 (2002). An early and prescient call for individual liability may be found in BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1993). See also Reinier H. Kraakman, *Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls*, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) (discussing enterprise versus individual liability).

cial controls are seen as a condition precedent to achieving justice with wayward and rogue capitalists.⁶ This camp is agnostic to the idea of corporate personhood, embraces the discretionary use of parallel individual and entity liability, and is not motivated by any particular penal philosophy.⁷ What matters is accountability for those responsible in the form of criminal liability.⁸

A second faction of sharply witted neoconservatives and right-of-center *corporate libertarians* regularly call on Congress to roll back the litany of federal criminal provisions and laws, including burdensome corporate regulations with criminal penalties.⁹ The allergy of some committed conservatives to the illogical metaphysics of a corporate criminal law is expressed with a genuine disbelief about anthropomorphizing the firm.¹⁰ Their core concern, though, has nothing to do with complex questions of corporate ontology. It is all about unjustifiable externalities. This century-old fiction of corporate criminal liability was crafted at a time when there was no rec-

6. See generally LAUFER, *supra* note 2; Sara Sun Beale, *A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability*, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481 (2009); Samuel W. Buell, *The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability*, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 494–97 (2006).

7. Steven Walt & William S. Laufer, *Why Personhood Doesn't Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions*, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263, 278 (1991).

8. See Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, *The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability*, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468 (1988); Lawrence Friedman, *In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability*, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 833 (2000).

9. For a discussion of “corporate libertarians,” see DAVID C. KORTEN, *WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD* (3d ed. 2015). For a variation of this theme, see John Hasnas, *The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability*, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009); John Hasnas, *Managing the Risks of Legal Compliance: Conflicting Demands of Law and Ethics*, 39 LOY. U. CHIC. L.J. 507 (2008); John Hasnas, *Up from Flatland: Business Ethics in the Age of Divergence*, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 399 (2007); John Hasnas, *Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime*, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579 (2005). These voices join a chorus of academics raising concerns with over-criminalization. See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, *OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW* (Oxford Univ. Press 2008); Sara Sun Beale, *Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction*, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995); Kathleen F. Brickey, *Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law*, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995).

10. See Donald R. Cressey, *The Poverty of Theory in Corporate Crime Research*, in *ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH* 31 (W.S. Laufer and F. Adler eds., 1989).

ognizable regulatory state and misfeasance in railroad travel across state lines was the pressing federal concern.¹¹ Today, over-criminalization is of far greater concern than ensuring threshold levels of criminalization.¹²

A third group seeks justice for wrongdoing in corporations, but rejects the idea of corporate moral agency.¹³ These commentators, though, set their normative sights on the attribution of moral agency to corporate functionaries who are the

11. The outcome of this conservative and neoliberal position is a familiar and somewhat old abolitionist rant. See Gerhard O.W. Mueller, *Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability*, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21 (1957) (“Many weeds have grown on the acre of jurisprudence which has been allotted to the criminal law. Among these weeds is . . . corporate criminal liability . . . Nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew.”); Jeffrey S. Parker, *Doctrine for Destruction: The Case of Corporate Criminal Liability*, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 381 (1996). For a discussion of the interstate expansion of the railroads and early calls for federal incorporation, see J. Newton Baker, *Regulation of Industrial Corporations*, 22 YALE L.J. 306 (1913); Frederick H. Cooke, *State and Federal Control of Corporations*, 23 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1910) (discussing the relative benefits of state versus federal control); Max Thelen, *Federal Incorporation of Railroads*, 5 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (1917) (arguing against existing plans and proposals for a federal incorporation law); H. L. Wilgus, *Need of a National Incorporation Law*, 2 MICH. L. REV. 358 (1904) (arguing in favor of a national incorporation law); William E. Church, *The Tramp Corporation*, 11 AM. LAW. 13 (1903) (discussing the concern over issues of state sovereignty and unbridled corporate power). Not so coincidentally, turn of the century progressives were thinking of how science could inform better management. See William J. Cunningham, *Scientific Management in the Operation of Railroads*, 25 Q.J. OF ECON., 539 (1911); HORACE B. DRURY, *SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT: A HISTORY AND CRITICISM* (1915); SAMUEL HABER, *EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890–1920* (1964).

12. See Husak, *supra* note 9; Sara Sun Beale, *The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization*, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747 (2005); Lisa H. Nicholson, *Sarbanes–Oxley’s Purported Over-Criminalization of Corporate Offenders*, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 43 (2007). For some historical antecedents, see Sanford H. Kadish, *The Crisis of Overcriminalization*, 37 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157 (1967). For a critique of the criminalization of businesses, see JAMES V. DELONG, *The New “Criminal” Classes: Legal Sanctions and Business Managers*, in *GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING* 9 (G. Healy ed., 2004).

13. Manuel Velasquez, *Debunking Corporate Moral Responsibility*, 45 BUS. ETHICS Q. 531 (2003); DAVID RÖNNEGARD, *THE FALLACY OF CORPORATE MORAL AGENCY* (2015).

most deserving.¹⁴ Moral agency should not attach to any agent positioned in the corporate hierarchy. For *normative thinkers*, the criminal law reaches only high-level managers, responsible corporate officers, or blameworthy members of the board of directors.¹⁵

The final contingent includes a small cadre of *critical criminologists* who see important relations between the state and the private sector that compromise regulatory decision-making, distort the construction of what is labeled criminal, and misattribute who, ultimately, is justly to blame for corporate wrongdoing.¹⁶ This often maligned collection of intellectual disobedients is long on critiques of positive theories, short on practical regulatory solutions, and quite justifiably motivated by fiery rhetoric.¹⁷

This Article explores an overlooked and largely missing progressive account of corporate criminal liability. This account builds a bridge between some of the foundational principles of twentieth century progressivism and its varied contemporary iterations. The structure of the bridge consists of compliance principles and regulatory instruments—an artifact of how corporate criminal law is translated into regulatory practice. The central role of science, scientific management, and associated social controls define the bridge's architecture. The hope is that these connections might inspire a new generation of *modern progressives* to assume these foundational principles in combating regulatory convention and taming wrongdo-

14. See, e.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, *Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime*, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411 (2012).

15. See, e.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, *Responsible Shares and Shared Responsibility: In Defense of Responsible Corporate Officer Liability*, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 371 (2014).

16. See Dawn L. Rothe and David O. Friedrichs, *The State of the Criminology of Crimes of the State*, 33 SOC. JUST. 147 (2006); STATE-CORPORATE CRIME: WRONGDOING AT THE INTERSECTION OF BUSINESS & GOVERNMENT (Raymond J. Michalowski & Ronald C. Kramer eds., 2006); Dawn L. Rothe et al., *That Was Then, This Is Now, What About Tomorrow? Future Directions in State Crime Studies*, 17 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 3 (2009). For a general review of critical criminology, see FRED A. ADLER, GERHARD O.W. MUELLER & WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CRIMINOLOGY (9th ed. 2018).

17. See, e.g., Ronald C. Kramer, Raymond J. Michalowski, D. & David Kauzlarich, *The Origins and Development of the Concept and Theory of State-Corporate Crime*, 48 CRIME & DELINQ. 263 (2002); David O. Friedrichs, *State-Corporate Crime in a Globalized World: Myth or Major Challenge?*, in CONTROVERSIES IN WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (Gary W. Potter ed., 2002).

ing corporations.¹⁸ Far less ambitious and important, it seems fair to say that the scholarly playing field is less-than-level without the recognition of some progressive principles, if not advocacy.

The construction of this bridge is, admittedly, treacherous.¹⁹ There is wide ranging historical criticism of the ideas and positions of progressivism, and the real contours of the “progressive movement.”²⁰ One should be cautious in looking for solid ground from the early 1900s that might support the weight of a “modern” progressivism. It is jarring to see that some widely-held progressive policies were both regressive and reactionary.²¹ If given the latitude to parse progressivism, a focus on the place of science, science management, social control, and the power of law to address social welfare resonate

18. Some progressives find important parallels and differences between an old and possibly new progressivism. *See, e.g.*, Paul Glastris, *Why a Second Progressive Era Is Emerging—and How Not to Blow It*, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan./Feb., 2015), <http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/janfeb-2015/why-a-second-progressive-era-is-emerging-and-how-not-to-blow-it/> (“As many observers have noted, there are arresting parallels between our age and the 1890s, the dawn of the Progressive Era.”). A share of the inspiration for the more modern account of progressivism in this Article comes from Ralph Nader, Mark Green, Joel Seligman, and Christopher Stone. *See, e.g.*, THE CONSUMER AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY (Ralph Nader ed., 1973); CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA (Ralph Nader & Mark J. Green eds., 1973); RALPH NADER, MARK J. GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION: HOW THE LARGEST CORPORATIONS CONTROL OUR LIVES (1976); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975).

19. *See, e.g.*, MICHAEL E. MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920 (2003).

20. For some of the more pointed criticism, *see* Daniel T. Rodgers, *In Search of Progressivism*, 10 REVIEWS IN AM. HIST. 113 (1982); Peter G. Filene, *An Obituary for “The Progressive Movement”*, 22 AM. Q. 20 (1970); John D. Buenker, *The Progressive Era: A Search for a Synthesis*, 51 MID-AM. 175 (1969); John D. Buenker, John C. Burnham & Robert M. Crunden, PROGRESSIVISM (1977); Arthur S. Link, *What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920’s?*, 64 AM. HIST. REV. 833 (1959). For a neo-progressive take, *see* Cass R. Sunstein, *A New Progressivism*, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 197 (2006).

21. In forthcoming work, Prof. Hovenkamp offers an appropriately critical take on the role of race in the old progressive movement. *See* Herbert Hovenkamp, *Racism and Public Law in the Progressive Era*, ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).

today in ways that make this bridge so very irresistible.²² It is also powerfully attractive because of the reticence of present-day progressives to embrace their intellectual heritage while pursuing legal, regulatory, and government reforms that would result in greater corporate responsibility and accountability.²³ Modern progressive voices on how the criminal law may tame corporate wrongdoing are rarely if ever heard, and vastly overshadowed by a coherent and well-conceived slate of progressive reforms to corporate governance.²⁴

Part I of this Article explores the missing account of progressivism in the substance and practice of corporate criminal law. This is followed by a recognition of a remarkable convergence of corporate compliance technology, standards, measures, practices, and insights from conventional, plural, and polycentric theories of regulation. This is a convergence of informal corporate social controls that offers a significant opportunity for the adoption of progressive interests, practices, and advocacy.

22. The essence of the progressive movement in law is well captured by Herbert Hovenkamp. See Herbert Hovenkamp, *The Mind and Heart of Progressive Legal Thought*, 81 IOWA L. REV. 149, 150 (1995).

23. See Glastris, *supra* note 18 (“But for the most part today’s left-leaning progressives are almost entirely focused on politics, economic justice, social issues, and the influence of money in politics. These are important subjects. But the vast complex of government is largely a black box to these folks.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, *Appraising the Progressive State*, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1079–84 (2017).

24. A range of progressive reforms are regularly offered in an effort to “crack down” on corporate crime. Virtually all progressive proposals, however, neglect a consideration of corporate criminal law, and are a grab bag of largely untested interventions. For a representative list of proposals see, e.g., Nader Proposes Crackdown on Corporate Crime, Fraud and Abuse, OREGON PROGRESSIVE PARTY: CORPORATE CRIME (Sept. 24, 2010, at 9:20 PM), http://progparty.org/issues/market/corporate_crime. Governance reforms range from dismantling shareholder supremacy, ending Delaware’s dominance, and limiting limited liability to limiting corporate intervention into political affairs. See Kent Greenfield & Daniel Greenwood, *An Incomplete List of Possible Progressive Reforms in Corporate Governance* (Dec. 2005), https://people.hofstra.edu/Daniel_J_Greenwood/opinion/Progressive%20Corporate%20Law%20Reform%20Proposals.pdf; see also KENT GREENFIELD, *THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES* (2008); Kent Greenfield & D. Gordon Smith, *Debate: Saving the World with Corporate Law*, 57 EMORY L.J. 947 (2007); cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, *Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship*, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997).

Part II provides some reasons for the consideration of progressive ideals in corporate criminal law, from our collective failure to express moral indignation over corporate wrongdoing to the value of justifying this body of law in theories of desert. Next, the two pillars of twentieth-century progressivism, the instrumental use of science and social control, are explored. Measures of both corporate and government control have dominated progressive proposals for reform.²⁵ Progressive principles borrowed from the last century should support the consolidation of more rigorous compliance measures, measurement, and standards into formal regulatory policies. Progressive thinking about new models of regulatory-regulated engagement also are reviewed with an appreciation for the many challenges accompanying the coordinated delegation of regulation to firms.²⁶

A “compliance conundrum,” it is argued, undermines corporate commitments to compliance science, technology, cooperation, and more effective social controls. This conundrum reflects a deeply imbedded conflict in firms over how to diligently identify deviance, recognize the inevitability of a base rate of wrongdoing, honor disclosure requirements and, at the same time, avoid entity liability. This conundrum facilitates a “compliance game,” a regulatory status quo where both corporate and government players are, at times, equally captured. The result is that all stakeholders placate each other with compliance expenditures that are largely incidental to ensuring compliance. This game is marked by disincentives for firms to take the measurement of compliance seriously, and a regulatory lethargy to resort to and require anything resembling compliance science. This game is profitable for many stakeholders, including an ever-burgeoning legion of compliance,

25. See BENJAMIN PARKE DEWITT, *THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT: A NON-PARTISAN COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF CURRENT TENDENCIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS* 113–61 (1915) (discussing how progressive’s view the rise and concentration of American business, along with the role of government).

26. Inspiration for this discussion of novel informal social controls comes from the work of Grabosky, Parker, Gunningham, Kagan, Coglianese, Orts, and other leading regulatory theorists. For concerns with the delegation of regulatory discretion to private firms, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, *Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State*, 56 *DUKE L. J.* 377, 386 (2006); cf. Cass Sunstein, *Administrative Substante*, 1991 *DUKE L.J.* 607, 627 (1991).

regulatory, and legal risk professionals. It does, however, take casualties, including the legitimacy of formal social controls that regulate firms, particularly for corporations of scale and power. Ultimately, the most significant loss is one of justice undone, or undistributed corporate criminal justice.²⁷ With a glimmer of hope and small dose of optimism, this Article concludes by considering the unique position of modern progressives to promote corporate criminal justice by disrupting the compliance game and addressing the conundrum.

I.

WHAT IS MISSING IN CORPORATE CRIMINAL LAW?

In the entrenched and divergent accounts of corporate criminal law there is a need for a reasonable counter to entity liability naysayers, an alternative to abolitionism that offers more than simple and unfounded hypotheses of how the criminal law deters corporations.²⁸ Also missing in these divergent accounts—from the positions of stalwart advocates to normative thinkers—is an antidote to the kind of corporate regulation that encourages compliance expenditures to run wild and unaccounted for as untested proxies of organizational due diligence.²⁹ Absent is a desert-based account that captures the

27. For more on the notion of an “undistributed” justice, see Laufer, *infra* note 29.

28. It is remarkable and yet true that systematic reviews of corporate crime deterrence research reveal no systematic evidence of effectiveness. See Sally S. Simpson et al., *CORPORATE CRIME DETERRENCE: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW* 28–29 (2014); Natalie Schell-Busey et al., *What Works? A Systematic Review of Corporate Crime Deterrence*, 15 *CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y* 387 (2016); Peter C. Yeager, *The Elusive Deterrence of Corporate Crime*, 15 *CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y* 439 (2016); cf. Miriam H. Baer, *Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud*, 94 *VA. L. REV.* 1295 (2008). For an excellent consideration of how deterrence might be achieved with a commitment to responsive regulatory regimes, see Christine Parker, *The “Compliance” Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement*, 40 *L. & SOC’Y REV.* 591 (2006). For a fascinating empirical consideration of the motives to commit fraud, with significant consequences for thinking about the possible power of deterrence, see Utpal Bhattacharya & Cassandra D. Marshall, *Do They Do it for the Money?* 18 *J. OF CORP. FIN.* 92 (2012).

29. See, e.g., Alnoor Bhimani, *Risk Management, Corporate Governance and Management Accounting: Emerging Interdependencies*, 20 *MGMT. ACCT. RES.* 2 (2009); Mark L. Frigo & Richard J. Anderson, *A Strategic Framework for Governance, Risk and Compliance*, 90 *STRATEGIC MGMT.* 20 (2009); Norman Marks, *Defining GRC*, 67 *INTERNAL AUDITOR* 25 (2010); Michael Rasmussen, *An Enter-*

moral indignation that stakeholders have, or should have, with the corporate malfeasance of large and powerful private sector institutions.³⁰ It is also difficult to find any regulatory approach, including those taken by creative “new governance” theories, with even a marginal chance of being integrated into existing “hard law” practices.³¹

As concerning, there is no coherent justification for why criminal justice expenditures so generously support the policing, processing, and confining of people of color from urban populations of the disenfranchised and disaffiliated poor.³²

prise GRC framework, 66 INTERNAL AUDITOR 61 (2009); ANTHONY TARANTINO, GOVERNANCE, RISK, AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK (Wiley 2008); OPEN COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS GROUP, GRC CAPABILITY MODEL “RED BOOK 3.0” (2015), <https://go.oceg.org/grc-capability-model-red-book>. Governmental prescriptions, it is argued, encourage the kind of due diligence imagery, rhetoric, and posturing that staves off the regulatory scrutiny necessary to fairly and justly oversee firm behavior. See, e.g., William S. Laufer, *Integrity, Diligence, and the Limits of Good Corporate Citizenship*, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 157 (1996).

30. See William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, *Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of Vicarious Liability*, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285 (2000) (arguing for the importance of a desert-based account).

31. Priority should be given to the correspondence between conceptions of corporate fault, as enterprise wrongdoing, and the commitment to corporate compliance expected, encouraged, and rewarded by prosecutors and regulators. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, *Governing Corporate Compliance*, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009) (describing “new governance” as conceptually quite different from the “hard law” approaches taken by the DOJ in its discretionary use of the corporate criminal law); cf. Peter N. Grabosky, *Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance*, 8 GOVERNANCE 527 (1995); Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, *Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals*, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003); CARY COGLIANESE, *Policies to Promote Systemic Environmental Management*, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001); Neil Gunningham, *From Compliance to Best Practice in OHS: The Role of Specification, Performance, and System-Based Standards*, 9 AUSTRALIAN J. LAB. L. 221 (1996). For a discussion of the principles behind new governance approaches, see BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, FOSTERING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY THROUGH SELF- AND CO-REGULATION: SECTOR SPECIFIC INITIATIVES AS COMPLEMENTS TO PUBLIC REGULATION 17 (2013).

32. See, e.g., JOHN HAGAN, WHO ARE THE CRIMINALS?: THE POLITICS OF CRIME POLICY FROM THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT TO THE AGE OF REAGAN (2nd ed. 2012); Pamela Irving Jackson & Leo Carroll, *Race and the War on Crime: The Sociopolitical Determinants of Municipal Police Expenditures in 90 Non-Southern U.S. Cities*, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 290 (1981); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, *The Law of Implicit Bias*, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006); Darryl K. Brown, *Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability*, 149 U. PA. L.

Government expenditures are decidedly tilted toward aggressively pursuing the poor and away from giving priority to bringing institutional offenders of scale and means to justice.³³ This is not to suggest that local and municipal policing expenditures are not needed or unjustifiable. The point is simply that the scarcity of local, state, and federal resources to investigate, pursue, and combat corporate deviance, relative to street crime, requires a far more thoughtful and careful explanation. Such tilted expenditures should not go unchallenged.³⁴

Beyond government expenditures, advances in urban policing strategies, supported by sophisticated mapping and extensive data from evidence-based and place-based criminology, have no equivalent in the identification, investigation, and prediction of corporate offenses and offenders.³⁵ The failure to learn and heed lessons from the science on intelligence-led policing street crime is conspicuous.³⁶ This same point may be

REV. 1295 (2001); James D. Unnever et al., *Public Support for Getting Tough on Corporate Crime: Racial and Political Divides*, 45 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 163 (2008); JEFFREY REIMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON, *THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON: IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE* (11th ed. 2016); JEROME G. MILLER, *SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM* (1st ed. 1996).

33. Local and state criminal justice expenditures dwarf federal expenditures across the criminal process. See, e.g., *Justice System Direct and Intergovernmental Expenditures*, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (2004), <http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t14.pdf>. Backing in and out of state and federal data yield the same result: a simply overwhelming expenditure of criminal justice resources on street crime relative to corporate crime.

34. WILLIAM J. CHAMBLISS, *POWER, POLITICS, AND CRIME* (2001) (discussing class and race-based reasons for an expansion of the criminal justice bureaucracy); REIMAN & LEIGHTON, *supra* note 32 (reviewing the ways in which resources are disparate).

35. See, e.g., Wim Bernasco & Richard Block, *Where Offenders Choose to Attack: A Discrete Choice Model of Robberies in Chicago*, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 93 (2009); Wim Bernasco & Paul Nieuwbeerta, *How Do Residential Burglars Select Target Areas? A New Approach to the Analysis of Criminal Location Choice*, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 296 (2005); Adam Boessen & John R. Hipp, *Close-Ups and the Scale of Ecology: Land Uses and the Geography of Social Context and Crime*, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 399 (2015); Anthony Braga & Ronald V. Clarke, *Explaining High-Risk Concentrations of Crime in the City: Social Disorganization, Crime Opportunities, and Important Next Steps*, 51 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 480 (2014); Paul J. Brantingham, *Crime Diversity*, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 553 (2016); David L. Weisburd, *The Law of Crime Concentration and the Criminology of Place*, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 133 (2015).

36. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, *EVIDENCE-BASED POLICING* (1998); DAVID WEISBURD, ELIZABETH R. GROFF, & SUE-MING YANG, *THE CRIMINOLOGY OF*

made about all evidence-based advances at each and every stage of the criminal process, including the successful interventions, treatments, reforms, and strategies chronicled in the Campbell Collaboration's systematic reviews of experimental research.³⁷

Lost in nearly any consideration of corporate criminal law is a rigorous victimology of corporate wrongdoing. There are distinct costs in failing to recognize the many stakeholders of corporate wrongdoing; what role victim/stakeholder harm should play in a deterrence- or desert-driven criminal justice system; and what advances in the field of victimology, more generally, may offer the corporate criminal law. Evidence and principles from corporate victimology must be an inextricable part of the corporate criminal law.

Finally, corporate criminal law remains decidedly personal, even in its vicarious form. The substantive law, however, lags behind our understanding of the complexity of organizational life and organizational science. Moreover, policies associated with its use remain ill-conceived, and there is at best a half-hearted embrace of compliance science by those inside and outside of the firm entrusted with policing and ensuring the compliance function. Resisting the kind of compliance science that recognizes and supports the idea of an enterprise fault is at the core of what is missing in all accounts.³⁸ The hesitance to see advances in compliance science and technology as an opportunity to more fairly regulate, to be bound by reasonable and measured social controls, and to aspire to more creative innovations in regulation has roots in a long-standing ambivalence with respect to the attribution of fault to corporations. This ambivalence is quite defining for each and every compliance stakeholder.³⁹

PLACE: STREET SEGMENTS AND OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE CRIME PROBLEM (2012); PAUL J. BRANTINGHAM & PATRICIA L. BRANTINGHAM, PATTERNS IN CRIME (1984); JOHN E. ECK ET AL., MAPPING CRIME: UNDERSTANDING HOT SPOTS (2005).

37. See *The Campbell Collaboration Online Library*, CAMPBELL COLLABORATION, <https://campbellcollaboration.org/library.html>.

38. See Peter C. Yeager, *Science, Values and Politics: An Insider's Reflections on Corporate Crime Research*, 51 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 5 (2009). For an excellent discussion of compliance theories and motivation, see Julien Etienne, *Compliance Theory: A Goal Framing Approach*, 33 L. & POL'Y 305 (2011).

39. See LAUFER, *supra* note 2.

Shining light on what is missing in corporate criminal law highlights limitations in doctrine, philosophy, and practice. It is not an exaggeration to say that this body of law is without a firm and coherent normative foundation.⁴⁰ The criminal law that is applied to corporations is nothing more than a patchwork of largely disregarded black letter principles of vicarious fault tacked together with an inconsistent set of prescriptive prosecutorial and sentencing guidelines.⁴¹ The discretionary use of these guidelines by prosecutors determines charging and, thus, plea agreements, sentencing outcomes, and post-sentencing practices.⁴² That prosecutorial discretion governs the entire criminal process is concerning for a host of reasons, not the least of which is that courts rarely have an opportunity to rule on substantive points of corporate criminal law, while legislatures fail to touch and mature its general part. Practitioners and academics thirst for federal and state decisional law that will begin to recognize basic fault principles. What they get instead is a corporate criminal law that is all too often conflated into canned compliance programs, practices, and functions that are played as a multi-stakeholder game.⁴³ When black letter law is applied, it is done so differently for firms

40. See Laufer & Strudler, *supra* note 30.

41. See, e.g., LAUFER, *supra* note 2, at xiii (“We are left with century-old liability rules that are resurrected for reasons of prosecutorial convenience or symbolic need. The only substantive reform came in piecemeal fashion or through the back door of sentencing and prosecutorial guidelines.”). For cases following *Hudson*, see William S. Laufer, *Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance*, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1341 (1999) [hereinafter Laufer, *Corporate Liability*]. Most recently, the Department of Justice backed off from the issuance of memoranda and informal policy statements on corporate compliance, diligence, and liability. The stated objective is to move away from “management by memo” to a more systematic incorporation of formal policies directly into the United States Attorneys’ Manual. See, Rod J. Rosenstein, *Keynote Address on Corporate Enforcement Policy*, NYU Program on Corporate Compliance & Enforcement Keynote Address, New York, (October 6, 2017), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2017/10/06/nyu-program-on-corporate-compliance-enforcement-keynote-address-october-6-2017/; Rod J. Rosenstein, *Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein Delivers the Morning Keynote Address at the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform*, Washington, DC (October 25, 2017), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-morning-keynote-address-us-chamber-institute>.

42. For a very insightful review of post-sentencing reforms, see Brandon L. Garrett, *Structural Reform Prosecution*, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007).

43. See *infra* notes 152–73.

that are small versus those of any scale whose prosecution may bring about significant collateral consequences, or even systemic risk.⁴⁴ That the playing field is still not level for small and big firms alike should strongly exercise both old and more modern progressives.

Unfortunately for those looking for regulatory accountability, there are few good alternatives to wholly embracing or completely rejecting this unorthodox patchwork of criminal liability.⁴⁵ For those seeking to account for the decentered and plural nature of corporate regulation with new governance approaches, regulators offer no hint of relinquishing their formal grip on a brand of discretionary oversight and treatment of organizational actors that is often arbitrary, largely symbolic, and frequently determined by firm size and power.⁴⁶ For those looking to account for the influence of our complex political economy on the administration of corporate criminal law, there are sadly no reasonable alternatives.⁴⁷ And there is literally nothing in public law for those interested in a new and more expansive regulatory architecture to accommodate the players and stakeholders of our interconnected global markets, e.g., models of private regulation, collaborative governance, and regulatory capitalism.⁴⁸ There is little choice but to hold on to the faint promise that regulators will coordinate with their counterparts around the world.⁴⁹

44. GARRETT, *supra* note 3; WILLIAM S. LAUFER, *THE COMPLIANCE GAME IN REGULAÇÃO DO ABUSO NO AMBITO CORPORATIVO: O PAPEL DO DIREITO PENAL NA CRISE FINANCEIRA* (EDUARDO SAAD-DINIZ et al. eds., 2015).

45. Cf. Orly Lobel, *The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Theory*, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Coglianese & Lazer, *supra* note 31; Cristie Ford, *Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement*, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757 (2005).

46. Baer, *supra* note 31; Cristie Ford, *New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation*, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2008).

47. See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, *Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis*, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 95 (2004) (arguably the first and most important treatment of this complex relationship).

48. See Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, *What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability*, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89 (2004); Ronald C. Slye, *Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability*, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 955 (2008).

49. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIV., *THE FRAUD SECTION'S FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENF'T PLAN AND GUIDANCE 2* (2016) ("The Department is strengthening its coordination with foreign counterparts in the effort to hold corrupt individuals and companies accountable. Law en-

Sadly, without obvious alternatives, regulatory and compliance costs continue to grow in ways disconnected from—or not sufficiently connected to—legal requirements, regulatory risks, and actual compliance failures.⁵⁰ Conservative beltway think tanks estimate that the costs of federal regulations to the private sector exceed \$1.8 trillion annually.⁵¹ They reason that if federal regulation was its own economy, it would be the tenth largest in the world. And this excludes the regulatory administrative and policing costs that add an additional \$59.5 billion.⁵² For those who see regulatory compliance costs as another tax, the regulatory spending “tax” is greater than individual income and corporate income taxes combined.⁵³ Even assuming significant measurement error in these estimates, few dispute the enormity of the regulatory burden on businesses.⁵⁴

forcement around the globe has increasingly been working collaboratively to combat bribery schemes that cross national borders.”); *see also* Brandon L. Garrett, *Globalized Corporate Prosecutions*, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775 (2011).

50. *See* STACEY ENGLISH & SUSANNAH HAMMOND, *COST OF COMPLIANCE 2016* 6 (2016), <https://risk.thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/risk/report/cost-compliance-2016.pdf>; Julian R. Franks, Stephen M. Schaefer & Michael D. Staunton, *The Direct and Compliance Costs of Financial Regulation*, 21 J. BANKING & FIN. 1547, 1550 (1997); Gregory Eliehausen, *The Cost of Bank Regulation: A Review of the Evidence*, 84 FED. RES. BULL. 252, 252 (1998); Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern & Peter Nelson, *On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates*, 19 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297 (2000); James A. Millar & B. Wade Bowen, *Small and Large Firm Regulatory Costs: The Case of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act*, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE 161, 163 (2011). For a right critique of regulatory costs, *see* James L. Gattuso & Diane Katz, *Regulation: Killing Opportunity*, BACKGROUND (Heritage Found.), Oct. 31, 2014, at 1.

51. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., *TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 2* (2016). For the official government report on federal regulatory costs, *see* OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, *2016 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 9–10* (2016). For an overall critique of regulatory cost estimates, *see* Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, *The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis*, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233 (1991); James R. Chelius & Robert S. Smith, *Firm Size and Regulatory Compliance Costs: The Case of Workers’ Compensation Insurance*, 6 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 193 (1987).

52. CREWS, *supra* note 51, at 16–18.

53. *Id.* at 12.

54. *See, e.g.,* Dieter Helm, *Regulatory Reform, Capture, and the Regulatory Burden*, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 169, 169 (2006); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, *REGULATORY BURDEN: MEASUREMENT CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS RAISED BY SELECTED COMPANIES* (1996).

With a steep linear increase in compliance and regulatory risk staffing, particularly in the financial industry, one may ask: how much responsibility should the private sector assume for self-policing and self-regulation without good compliance science?⁵⁵ Any answer to this question must attend to increasing concerns over individual liability for compliance and regulatory staff and, ultimately, the risks of an over-controlled compliance state in the private sector.⁵⁶

II.

A COMPLIANCE CONVERGENCE

This is an admittedly harsh critique of corporate criminal regulation. It would be unfair as well and quite incomplete, but for some more favorable reflection on how the corporate compliance industry has grown in response to certain regulatory reforms, threats of more aggressive corporate prosecutions, the availability of technology-driven risk and compliance applications, and the impressive marketing efforts by a large “business ethics” industry.⁵⁷ For example, the dramatic rise of both FinTech and RegTech applications and solutions lead to speculation about a transformative if not paradigmatic shift in technology-driven compliance, e.g., the digitalization of compliance.⁵⁸ The vast disruptive potential of the next generation

55. Corporate compliance staffing levels are at an historic high. For example, by 2015, JP Morgan had a compliance and regulatory staff of more than 43,000. *See Regulations, Regulators and the High Cost of Banking Compliance*, PYMNTS (May 31, 2016), <http://www.pymnts.com/news/security-and-risk/2016/banks-spend-and-hire-in-new-regulatory-environment/>. For this same period, the number of JP Morgan’s compliance and regulatory staff exceeded the number of officers in the U.S. Custom’s and Boarder Protection, and was three times the number of agents in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

56. *See* English & Hammond, *supra* note 50, at 9 (“What is certain is that greater personal liability will become reality in 2016 in many jurisdictions.”).

57. *See, e.g.*, MICHAEL THOITS, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS (2009), <https://www.rims.org/resources/ERM/Documents/ERM%20Technology%20Solutions.pdf> (discussing the range of ERM solutions); Paul L. Walker, William G. Shenkir & Thomas L. Barton, *ERM in Practice*, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Aug. 2003, at 51, 55; John Farrell, *A Broad View of Section 404*, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Aug. 2003, at 88, 88 (2003).

58. For a discussion of the varied technologies that support the financial and regulatory communities, *see, e.g.*, Philip Treleaven, *Financial Regulation of FinTech*, J. FIN. PERSP., Winter 2015, at 114, 118–19; Thomas Philippon, *The FinTech Opportunity* 15–17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper

of these technologies, across a wide range of business and regulatory functions, is only now coming into focus.⁵⁹ Advances in distributed ledger technology (e.g., DLT or blockchain) are producing some very promising hand-shaking experiments between and among banks with endless applications to domestic and international corporate regulation.⁶⁰ This includes, at least in theory, an era of increasingly sophisticated regulator-based systems, successful co-regulated systems, and even well-integrated supra-regulator systems.⁶¹

Regulators are recognizing the need for new resources to oversee FinTech and RegTech technologies while, at the same time, considering how both might enhance their own examination, compliance, and enforcement capabilities.⁶² The rede-

No. 22476, 2016), <http://nber.org/papers/w22476>.; C. Andrew Gerlach, Rebecca J. Simmons & Stephen H. Lam, *U.S. Regulation of FinTech—Recent Developments and Challenges*, CAPCO INST. J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION, Nov. 2016, at 87, 88; Lawrence G. Baxter, *Adaptive Financial Regulation and RegTech: A Concept Article on Realistic Protection for Victims of Bank Failures*, 66 DUKE L.J. 567, 598–99 (2016).

59. Iris H-Y Chiu, *FinTech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products, Intermediation and Markets-Policy Implications for Financial Regulators*, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 55, 56 (2016) (discussing the potential disruption).

60. DLT or Blockchain is distributed ledger technology that stores a tamper-proof, permanent ledger of transaction data. For a discussion of some creative applications, see Carlo R.W. de Meijer, *Blockchain and the Securities Industry: Towards a New Ecosystem*, 8 J. SEC. OPERATIONS & CUSTODY 322, 324 (2016); Richard T. Ainsworth & Andrew Shact, *Blockchain (Distributed Ledger Technology) Solves VAT Fraud* (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 16–41, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=28534 28; *Cash Cows—How Blockchain is Transforming Trade Finance*, BARCLAYS (Nov. 1, 2016), <https://www.home.barclays/news/2016/11/how-blockchain-is-transforming-trade-finance.html>; Kim S. Nash, *IBM Pushes Blockchain into the Supply Chain*, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2016, 5:20 PM), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/ibm-pushes-blockchain-into-the-supply-chain-1468528824>; James Langton, *Major Banks Complete Blockchain Test*, INV. EXECUTIVE (Jan. 21, 2016, 2:20 PM), <http://www.investmentexecutive.com/-/major-banks-complete-blockchain-test>.

61. Javier Sebastian Cermeño, *Blockchain in Financial Services: Regulatory Landscape and Future Challenges for its Commercial Application* 6–10 (BBVA Research, Working Paper No. 16/20, 2016); LAURENT PROBST, LAURENT FRIDERES, BENOÎT CAMBIER & CHRISTIAN MARTINEZ-DIAZ, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, BLOCKCHAIN (2016).

62. Michael del Castillo, *Blockchain Won't Just Change Regulation, It Could Reshape the SEC*, COINDESK (Nov. 15, 2016), <https://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-wont-just-change-regulation-change-sec/> (discussing how the SEC's Distributed Ledger Technology Working Group (DLTWG) views the

sign and integration of compliance technologies across a wide range of business processes are more than promising.⁶³ Not known for hyperbole, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has publicly commented that “FinTech innovation has the potential to transform virtually every aspect of our nation’s financial markets.”⁶⁴ Of course, all of the obvious regulatory challenges accompany rapidly evolving and disruptive technologies, e.g., regulatory inertia, lack of standardization, and limited network capacity.⁶⁵

At the same time as the FinTech and GenTech disruption, there is an increasing reliance on sophisticated governance, risk, and compliance (“GRC”) solutions by firms in many sectors and markets. Big data across divisions, departments, and risk areas are only now beginning to be systematically aggregated, disaggregated, and mined. Innovative open-source GRC models and metrics are now more commonly adopted and promoted across industries. And technology from both arti-

demands of blockchain on regulators and how this technology might contribute to regulatory capacity); see also Michael del Castillo, *How the SEC’s Blockchain Lead is Defining Future Regulation*, COINDESK (Nov. 17, 2016), <https://www.coindesk.com/what-secs-involvement-means-blockchain-distributed-ledger-bitcoin/>.

63. This includes the creation of uniform compliance risk categories; better regulatory risk identification; standardized compliance risk taxonomy; automated monitoring of compliance standards; and monitoring change and application. See ERNST & YOUNG, *INNOVATING WITH REGTECH: TURNING REGULATORY COMPLIANCE INTO A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE* (2016), [http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Innovating-with-RegTech/\\$FILE/EY-Innovating-with-RegTech.pdf](http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Innovating-with-RegTech/$FILE/EY-Innovating-with-RegTech.pdf).

64. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, *SEC to Hold Forum to Discuss Fintech Innovation in the Financial Services Industry* (Sept. 27, 2016); see also Cliff Moyce, *How Blockchain Can Revolutionize Regulatory Compliance*, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Aug. 10, 2016), <http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/blockchain-regulatory-compliance/> (Blockchain applications will reach “trade reporting; clearing, confirmation, validation and settlement; recordkeeping; monitoring and surveillance; risk management; audit; management and financial accounting; and regulatory compliance (including—but by no means limited to—financial crime prevention).”).

65. Moyce, *supra* note 64; see also Peter Yeoh, *Innovations in Financial Services: Regulatory Implications*, 37 BUS. L. REV. 190, 192–93 (2016). For a recent report by the EU on the challenges posed by blockchain, see EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY, *DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY & CYBERSECURITY* (2016), <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/blockchain-security>.

cial intelligence and the cognitive sciences are beginning to shape and re-shape GRC modeling.⁶⁶

It is a fair prediction that some iteration of today's GRC thinking will lead to the integration of firm, industry, and regulatory standards tomorrow.⁶⁷ The emergence of more sophisticated machine learning approaches and cognitive GRC models hold particular promise as an enterprise, cross-functional platform for real-time monitoring of regulatory changes, minimizing operational risks, and managing risks from both vendors and multi-tier supply-chain partners.⁶⁸ Combining institutional frameworks with agent-based simulations (institutional agent-based models) and pairing AI robots with key compliance professionals offer a window into the complex dynamics

66. Estimates regarding the size and growth of the GRC market vary widely. Industry forecasts, however, remain very positive. *See, e.g., The GRC Market is Expanding at an Exponential Rate*, LOCKPATH: THE LOCKPATH BLOG (June 29, 2015), <https://www.lockpath.com/blog/the-grc-market-is-expanding-at-an-exponential-rate/> ("With over 600 GRC solutions on the market currently, it seems that predictions show that the GRC market would hit \$31.77 billion by the year 2020 with global compliance market spend reaching \$2.6 billion in 2015 alone"); John Verver, *Big Data and GRC*, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS, June 21, 2013. For a wise critique of the GRC movement, one that promotes a more active role for regulators in crafting the GRC model, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, *Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age*, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 677 (2010). Next generation GRC models focus on increasingly open frameworks, more fluid implementation, and systems integration of additional stakeholders. *See* MICHAEL VOLKOV, *THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS* (2013).

67. *See infra* note 77 for a discussion of GRC in relation to international standards.

68. *See, e.g., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: CUTTING-EDGE APPLICATIONS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT, PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION AND ECONOMICS* (Christian L. Dunis, Peter W. Middleton, Konstantinos Theofilatos & Andreas Karathanasopoulos eds., 2016) (an excellent collection of papers on artificial intelligence and neural networking applications for a wide range of topics in finance); Heiko Thimm, *ICT Support of Environmental Compliance—Approaches and Future Perspectives*, in *ADVANCES AND NEW TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATICS* 323 (Volker Wohlgemuth, Frank Fuchs-Kittowski & Jochen Wittmann eds., 2017); Carole Switzer, *Accelerating the Evolution of GRC*, COMPLIANCE WK. (June 28, 2016), <https://www.complianceweek.com/news/news-article/accelerating-the-evolution-of-grc#.WdAAQhOPLGI> (exploring the transformative power of cognitive GRC); *cf.* Sean Lyons, *Corporate Defence: Are Stakeholders Interests Adequately Defended?* 1 J. OF OPERATIONAL RISK 67 (2006) (questioning the value of risk management strategies for the firm).

of regulation that was unimaginable until only recently.⁶⁹ An increasing commitment to leading-edge compliance data analytics gives large financial institutions and hedge funds of all sizes surveillance and monitoring solutions that were science fiction until only recently. Augmented and virtual reality extensions to compliance offerings also offer new ways of delivering risk management practices, and new revenue streams for accountancies, consultancies, and law firms.⁷⁰

Contemporaneous with FinTech, RegTech, the dramatic rise in the use of compliance data analytics, and advances in GRC, is a recognition that social science research on compliance may offer value in developing effective corporate crime policy.⁷¹ While evidence-based research on corporate criminal regulation is still exceedingly difficult to find, there is an impressive stream of scholarship by psychologists, sociologists, and criminologists on the many motives that encourage or discourage compliance inside and outside of complex organizations.⁷² In spite of long-standing and near insurmountable

69. See, e.g., Tina Balke, Marina De Vos & Julian Padget, *I-ABM: Combining Institutional Frameworks and Agent-Based Modelling for the Design of Enforcement Policies*, 21 *ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE L.* 371 (2013); Samson Esayas & Tobias Mahler, *Modelling Compliance Risk: A Structured Approach*, 23 *ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE L.* 271 (2015); see also Anant Kale, *Artificial Intelligence: The New Super Power for Compliance*, *CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS*, (Aug. 31, 2016), <http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/artificial-intelligence-new-superpower-business-compliance/>.

70. See, e.g., Emilia Duarte, Francisco Rebelo & Michael S. Wogalter, *Virtual Reality and Its Potential for Evaluating Warning Compliance*, 20 *HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS IN MANUFACTURING & SERV. INDUSTRIES* 526 (2010).

71. But see Christine Parker & Sharon Gilad, *Internal Corporate Compliance Management Systems: Structure, Culture and Agency*, in *EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION* (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011). These authors seriously question the application of compliance research. They write that: "There is considerable disagreement as to whether a wide range of corporations would ever have the motivation and capacity to implement effective compliance systems and whether such systems could be effective even if corporations were willing and able to implement them." *Id.* at 189.

72. David Hess, *Ethical Infrastructures and Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from the Empirical Evidence*, 12 *N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.* 317 (2016); see also Parker & Gilad, *supra* note 71, for research on motives from Kagan, Gunningham, Thornton, Simpson, Rorie, and Tyler. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, *Reducing Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values*, 51 *AM. CRIM. L. REV.* 267 (2014); Marie A. McKendall & John A. Wagner, III, *Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and Corporate Illegality*, 8 *ORG. SCI.* 624

challenges with access to good white collar and corporate crime data, there is also an emerging literature on the internal and external characteristics of firms that are most associated with law abidance.⁷³ A separate but related body of work, even more developed, explores organizational responses to innovations in regulation.⁷⁴ Some of the better quantitative research on environmental compliance, for example, is framed around a groundswell of new governance and new regulatory models that push plural and decentered concepts.⁷⁵ From systems-

(1997); Lynne M. Vieraitis, Nicole L. Piquero, Alex R. Piquero, Stephen G. Tibbetts & Michael Blankenship, *Do Women and Men Differ in Their Neutralizations of Corporate Crime?*, 37 CRIM. JUST. REVIEW 478 (2012); Wayne B. Gray & Ronald J. Shadbegian, *When and Why Do Plants Comply? Paper Mills in the 1980s*, 27 L. & POL'Y 238 (2005); Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, *Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance*, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 307 (2004).

73. For an excellent discussion of the difficulties of securing white collar crime research data, see SALLY S. SIMPSON & PETER CLEARY YEAGER, BUILDING A COMPREHENSIVE WHITE-COLLAR VIOLATIONS DATA SYSTEM 5 (2015); MARSHALL CLINARD & PETER YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 97–98 (1980) (discussing data limitations). The literature on organizational capabilities and characteristics assembled by Parker and Gilad, *supra* note 71, reflects the diversity of scholarship. It is worth highlighting Parker and Gilad's contribution on structure, culture, and agency. This is perhaps the best writing on the complex prospects of regulator-mandated compliance systems. *See also* Lori Snyder Benneer, *Are Management-Based Regulations Effective? Evidence from State Pollution Prevention Programs*, 26 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 327, 328 (2007); Gary R. Weaver & Linda Klebe Treviño, *Compliance and Values Oriented Ethics Programs: Influences on Employees' Attitudes and Behavior*, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 315 (1999). Researchers are increasingly looking at changes in actual behavior of agents following the initiation of, or changes in, an integrity initiative. *See* Danielle E. Warren, Joseph P. Gaspar & William S. Laufer, *Is Formal Ethics Training Merely Cosmetic? A Study of Ethics Training and Ethical Organizational Culture*, 24 BUS. ETHICS Q. 85 (2014) (in a study of bank employees, two years after a single ethics training session, there were sustained positive effects on indicators of an ethical organizational culture).

74. *See generally* CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY (2002). For the most notable industry and subject matter specific research, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE, TO PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY (1985); VALERIE BRAITHWAITE, DEFIANCE IN TAXATION AND GOVERNANCE: RESISTING AND DISMISSING AUTHORITY IN A DEMOCRACY (2009); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, TONI MAKKAÏ & VALERIE BRAITHWAITE, REGULATING AGED CARE: RITUALISM AND THE NEW PYRAMID (2007); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1984).

75. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, *Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State*, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011); Neil Gunningham & Cam-

and principle-based regulation to smart regulation, meta-regulation, and regulatory excellence (RegX), the important role of third parties and non-state actors have helped reconceive thinking about conventional regulator–regulated relationships.⁷⁶

When you add together recently introduced international enterprise-wide governance, risk, and compliance standards to this mix, such as those from the International Organization for Standardization (e.g., ISO19600, ISO31000, and ISO38500), and the Enterprise Risk Management standards from the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO ERM), there is an impressive convergence. There is, quite simply, a gestalt of models, measures, metrics, data, analytics, standards, committed compliance professionals, relevant compliance scholarship, and vast firm resources dedicated to promoting compliance and good governance while minimizing enterprise risk and liability.⁷⁷ This is an opportunistic convergence of formal and informal social controls across the entire firm—from corporate strategy, organizational processes, and available technology to culture, leadership, and people. It is, in some ways, a challenge for a new, transformative promise of the scientific state. If there is

eron Holley, *Next-Generation Environmental Regulation: Law, Regulation, and Governance*, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 273, 274 (2016).

76. For an excellent collection of some of the best research on regulatory policy making, enforcement, responses to regulation, and next generation thinking about regulation, see *REGULATION AND REGULATORY PROCESSES* (Cary Coglianese & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2007). For a recent extension of Cary Coglianese's work, see *CARY COGLIANESE, LISTENING, LEARNING, AND LEADING: A FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY EXCELLENCE* (2015); *ACHIEVING REGULATORY EXCELLENCE* (Cary Coglianese ed., 2016) (a series of outstanding contributions to the conception, applications, and limitations of regulatory excellence).

77. See, e.g., ROBERT R. MOELLER, *COSO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE, RISK, AND COMPLIANCE PROCESSES* (2d ed. 2011); ISO, *INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO 19600, COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS—GUIDELINES* (2014); Sylvie Bleker & Dick Hortensius, *ISO 19600: The Development of a Global Standard on Compliance Management*, J. BUS. COMPLIANCE, Feb. 2014; ISO, *INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO 31000, RISK MANAGEMENT—PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON IMPLEMENTATION* (2009); ISO, *INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 38500, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY* (2008); Hesham Bin-Abbas & Saad Haj Bakry, *Assessment of IT Governance in Organizations: A Simple Integrated Approach*, 32 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 261 (2014).

any progress made in accessing a vast array of white collar crime and organizational crime data from federal and state agencies, this also may be a critical turning point in the scientific study of corporate crime.⁷⁸

How architects of the corporate criminal law should embrace this convergence in ways that recognize the importance of private and public sector social control is a central challenge to the development of a progressive account.⁷⁹ This challenge would be “insurmountable” if conceived narrowly as a task for the state to assume the role of the new age experimentalists and decipher which specific variables, proxies, or metrics are part of a general prescription that should be offered to the private sector as effective compliance or organizational due diligence.⁸⁰ Instead, the burden must be shared across all compliance stakeholders to meet the challenges of this compliance convergence with a far more developed capacity that addresses regulatory needs, capabilities, and requirements. This is actually a co-regulatory challenge that will inevitably require different exchanges, revised instruments and analytics, and increasingly lower costs through the cross-

78. SIMPSON & YEAGER, *supra* note 73, at 3 (“Despite its voluminous collections of data on conventional crimes and the legal responses to them, the Nation has long lacked systematic data on white-collar offenses and the sanctions employed against them.”); *see also* Marshall B. Clinard & Peter C. Yeager, *Corporate Crime: Issues in Research*, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 255 (1978) (reviewing the dearth of corporate crime research).

79. As Daniel Richman astutely noted in his brief response to Brandon Garrett’s work on structural reforms,

I suppose that in theory, one could envision the Justice Department presiding over a lovely experimentalist regime in which the ‘informal exchange of information amongst independent monitors, prosecutors, regulators, and industry experts will, over time, create a narrow set of accepted best remedial practices.’ Figuring out what ‘works’—that is, how to measure compliance—is not just a technical challenge here, however. It is a fundamental confounding problem in the whole area of white collar enforcement.

Daniel Richman, *Institutional Competence and Organizational Prosecutions*, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 115, 119 (2007).

80. *Id.* at 120 (“Finding appropriate performance metrics is hard enough for those engaged in (or opposing) structural reform in prisons, schools, or other such institutions. In the white collar area, the challenge may be insurmountable.”); *cf.* Simpson et al., *supra* note 28 (finding the challenge for any coherent corporate criminal justice policy in the dearth of evidence-based data).

enterprise integration of regulatory technology. It is also a challenge that will benefit from the lessons learned in maturing other regulatory settings, such as the many successful self-regulatory organizations (e.g., Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA); Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), and American Arbitration Association (AAA)), along with sector-specific co-regulation of environmental protection, health and product safety, and climate protection.⁸¹ Finally, much can be learned from the many noteworthy co-regulatory successes in combating cybercrime, and ensuring cybersecurity and national security.⁸²

This convergence in compliance thinking, standards, analytics, and metrics is certainly not provincial. The development and sharing of increasingly sophisticated and elaborate compliance models across Europe and Australia, for example, suggest that there is an emerging convention in regulatory technology and models, both in jurisdictions that have and those that lack the same threats from command and control approaches to entity liability.⁸³ Many of our old concerns still define foreign civil, administrative, and criminal regulation of corporations, including “paper compliance” programs, piecemeal and unpredictable changes to government guidance that tease the regulated with incentives and disincentives, and an absence of contemporaneous decisional and statutory laws to

81. See, e.g., BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, FOSTERING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY THROUGH SELF- AND CO-REGULATION (2012); CAMERON HOLLEY, NEIL GUNNINGHAM & CLIFFORD SHEARING, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (2013). What little is known about exchange-based conceptions of compliance will help as well. See Weaver & Treviño, *supra* note 73; see also Gary R. Weaver, *Ethics Programs in Global Businesses: Culture's Role in Managing Ethics*, 30 J. BUS. ETHICS 3 (2001); LAUFER, *supra* note 2.

82. See, e.g., TATIANA TROPINA & CORMAC CALLANAN, SELF- AND CO-REGULATION IN CYBERCRIME, CYBERSECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY (2015).

83. See, e.g., 2 CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS: TOWARDS A COMMON MODEL IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Antonio Fiorella ed., 2012); ULRICH SIEBER & MARC ENGELHART, COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS FOR THE PREVENTION OF ECONOMIC CRIMES: AN EMPIRICAL SURVEY OF GERMAN COMPANIES (2014); EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY I (James Gobert & Ana-Maria Pascal eds., 2011); CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND COMPLIANCE (Luis Artoyo Zapatero & Antonio Fiorella eds., 2012); DENNIS BOCK, CRIMINAL COMPLIANCE (2011); Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, *The ACCC Enforcement and Compliance Survey: Report of Preliminary Findings* (Dec. 2005) (ANU Centre for Competition and Consumer Policy Working Paper).

provide and interpret clearly-stated principles.⁸⁴ Notably, many of the most significant concerns with advancing financial and regulatory technology were raised first by regulatory bodies and non-governmental organizations outside the United States.⁸⁵

In countries with a less developed rule of law, there are also lessons to be learned from successful public, private, and non-state regulation and enforcement.⁸⁶ The challenges of bringing leading compliance solutions to companies and government agencies at different strata in the economic pyramid are discussed below. Seldom do we think about how governance, risk, and compliance solutions might apply, for example, to municipalities or state-owned enterprises in developing countries. The fair melding of private and public interests in a diverse set of enterprises across cultures would be of great interest to progressives, so long as the outcome is more corporate criminal justice.

III.

WHY A PROGRESSIVE ACCOUNT?

In some ways, not much has changed from the time of the Progressive Party platform of 1912.⁸⁷ Concerns over concentrated wealth are well over a hundred years old. Monopolies

84. See, e.g., Adán Nieto Martín, *Cosmetic Use and Lack of Precision in Compliance Programs: Any Solution?*, 3 EUCRIM 124, 124 (2012); EDUARDO SAAD-DINIZ, INIMIGO E PESSOA NO DIREITO PENAL (2012); Marc Engelhart, *Corporate Criminal Liability from a Comparative Perspective*, in REGULATING CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 53–76 (Dominik Brodowski et al. eds., 2014).

85. See Douglas W. Arner, János Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, *FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation*, 37 NW. J. OF INT'L. L. & BUS. 373 (2017).

86. Helle Weeke, Steve Parker & Edmund Malesky, *The Dynamics of Vietnam's Business Environment: Complying with Obligations Abroad and Competing at Home*, 12 DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVES 1 (2009); Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, *Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program*, 43 ACAD. OF MGMT. J., 698, 698 (2000). One of the most important lessons, for example, is that cooperation between regulators and the regulated in the design of instruments significantly improves law abidance. See Markus Taussig & Edmund Malesky, *The Danger of Not Listening: How Broad-Based Business Participation in Government Design of Regulations Can Increase Compliance and Benefit Society* (Feb. 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript).

87. See AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM 273–87 (Ronald J. Pestritto & William J. Atto eds., 2008) for the text of the platform.

were said to be fueled by inordinate greed, unbridled corporate power, and seemingly limitless growth.⁸⁸ Like today, progressives a century ago were concerned with the functioning and fairness of institutions of corporate social control, and how much regulatory discretion is left to the boundless imagination of the private sector. Modern progressives also recognize the ascendant power and stature of corporations, and the limitations of the market to produce fair and just outcomes. Like their ideological predecessors, they seek some semblance of responsibility, some accountability, and some long overdue legal reforms.⁸⁹ In playing off the Wall Street/Main Street dichotomy today, progressives' remain exercised by concentrated wealth extremes, unfair business tax provisions, and a wide range of unattended social, environmental, economic, and racial injustices.⁹⁰ They want to undermine corporate hegemony, break the corporate stranglehold on Capitol Hill, and abolish the idea of corporate personhood. Progressives also want more corporate wrongdoers debarred from government contracts; limited from exploiting offshore tax loopholes; subjected to expanded transparency and disclosure requirements about environmental, human rights, and worker safety records; and forced to reign in executive compensation.⁹¹

88. These concerns were long-lasting. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, *THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY* (2016).

89. Recent efforts to infuse the 2016 Democratic Party Platform with progressive ideology turn on improved corporate citizenship, enhanced shareholder activism, increased executive accountability, and more institutional commitment to sustainability. DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMMITTEE, *2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM* (2016).

90. See Nikiforos T. Laopodis & Bansil L. Sawhney, *Dynamic Interactions Between Main Street and Wall Street*, 42 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 803, 805 (2002); Anna Lamin & Srilata Zaheer, *Wall Street vs. Main Street: Firm Strategies for Defending Legitimacy and Their Impact on Different Stakeholders*, 23 ORG. SCI. 47 (2012); Kevin M. DeLuca, Sean Lawson & Ye Sun, *Occupy Wall Street on the Public Screens of Social Media: The Many Framings of the Birth of a Protest Movement*, 5 COMM., CULTURE & CRITIQUE 483, 483 (2012). See NEIL BAROFSKY, *BAILOUT: HOW WASHINGTON ABANDONED MAIN STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET* (2012) and ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, *TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES* (2010) for a treatment of this dichotomy in the popular press.

91. See Nader Proposes Crackdown on Corporate Crime, Fraud and Abuse, OREGON PROGRESSIVE PARTY (Sept. 24, 2010, 9:20 PM), http://progparty.org/issues/market/corporate_crime.

A modest outline of progressive corporate criminal law is offered below as a catalyst both to combat the regulatory status quo, and, far less ambitiously, to build capacity into the modern progressive account. This outline is a blend of old progressive principles set in today's compliance environment, with an appreciation of the concerns of modern progressives. Part of the inspiration for a progressive account comes from the failure of the state to recognize the convergence of new enterprise-wide standards, metrics, analytics, new regulatory models, and asymmetric private sector investment in compliance products and services. Inspiration for this account may also be traced to how the moral reprehensibility of corporate crime is so often washed clean, as well as profound concerns with the ways in which corporate criminal justice system is successfully gamed.⁹² It may be washed and gamed, at least in part, because of the absence of any systematic recognition of corporate victims and victimization. As suggested earlier, it is as remarkable as it is disturbing that there is no field of corporate victimology.

A. *Progressive Thinking*

The recent history of the progressive movement defies simple description.⁹³ Indeed, it is difficult to catalogue the diverse political and social factions of modern progressivism.⁹⁴ Those who claim to represent the progressive vision, issues, beliefs, and values of today often capture only a fraction of the

92. See William S. Laufer, *Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing*, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 253, 255 (2003) (discussing ways in which reputations of firms are laundered).

93. See, e.g., Yonathan Amselem, *The Formlessness of Progressivism*, MISES INST., (Dec. 30, 2015, 12:00 AM), <https://mises.org/library/formlessness-progressivism> ("Progressives are often good people with good intentions. However, modern Progressivism has evolved into something so shapeless and amorphous as to amount to little more than a belief in "things that sound nice."); see also Glastris, *supra* note 18, at 1 ("As many observers have noted, there are arresting parallels between our age and the 1890s, the dawn of the Progressive Era.")

94. It is much easier to distinguish old and modern progressives, and modern and post-modern progressives. For a right of center critique of the latter, see KIM R. HOLMES, *THE CLOSING OF THE LIBERAL MIND: HOW GROUPTHINK AND INTOLERANCE DEFINE THE LEFT* 92 (2016).

significant variance in prevailing theory and dogma.⁹⁵ At times, progressive accounts of law also fail to neatly converge.⁹⁶ That said, progressive ideology coalesces around issues of social justice, environmental sustainability, fair wages, and equitable workplace regulations. Even more prominent and relevant here, are concerns with the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a corporate oligarchy.⁹⁷ Progressives are united behind the idea that our democracy and democratic institutions are compromised by elites and powerful interest groups who think and act in ways that are disconnected from the realities of non-elites.⁹⁸

In recent years the ideology of progressivism, like liberalism and socialism, has also become a regular target of dismissive political barbs. The modern welfare state may be the greatest achievement of the progressive movement, but subscribing to welfare-state politics does, indeed, embolden foes and exact costs.⁹⁹ Some progressives, we are told, employ a thinly veiled guise for promoting a radical and, arguably, unjustifiable expansion of the role of government in our lives. In other cases, there is no veil, as with the stated desire to break up the big banks, along with the freethinking demonization of Wall Street and its resident institutions. Other progressives are said to be “boutique liberals” who depart from the shared understanding of our Founders about the text of the constitution,

95. See, e.g., AL YATES & ANNE BARTLEY, *PROGRESSIVE THINKING: A SYNTHESIS OF AMERICAN PROGRESSIVE VALUES, BELIEFS, AND POSITIONS* (2012); Elizabeth Sanders, *Rediscovering the Progressive Era*, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1281 (2011).

96. See KENT GREENFIELD, *THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES* 34 (2006); Kellye Y. Testy, *Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements*, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (2002) (exploring the connection between progressivism and corporate social responsibility); Hovenkamp, *supra* note 22, at 153.

97. Bernie Sanders, *Democracy or Oligarchy*, THE PROGRESSIVE (Aug. 7, 2014), <http://www.progressive.org/news/2014/08/187809/democracy-or-oligarchy> (“The major issue of our time is whether the United States of America retains its democratic foundation or whether we devolve into an oligarchic form of society where a handful of billionaires have almost absolute control over the political and economic life of the nation.”).

98. For a fascinating discussion of concentrated wealth and political orientation, see Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, *Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens*, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564 (2014). See also David Vogel, *The Power of Business in America: A Re-appraisal*, 13 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 19 (1983).

99. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, *supra* note 22.

and are committed to communitarianism, or something worse.¹⁰⁰ Progressives are cast, fairly or not, as an unruly band of politically left ideologues. We have clearly come a long way from Rousseau and Hegel, Wilson and Roosevelt.¹⁰¹

The kind of progressive corporate criminal law presented below is not a fair reflection of these positions or a reasonable target of this critique. The boundaries around this body of law are inspired by the brand of progressivism and institutionalism that marked a distinct shift from laissez-faire policies to a very limited and directed government engagement in the early 1900s.¹⁰² In 1904, it was Thorstein Veblen's call for new thinking about institutional economics that coalesced in academic writing about the changing nature of the business firm, its growth, its scale, and its power.¹⁰³ Soon thereafter, J. M. Clark extended turn-of-the-century social control theory to the business firm, offering a path for new institutions to complement the power and suasion of the market—new institutions that would guide the social direction of a maturing administrative state.¹⁰⁴ Progressives and institutionalists, economists and sociologists, stepped in where “existing legal and social institutions . . . were outmoded and inadequate to the task of the social control of modern, large-scale industry.”¹⁰⁵ This disconnect between functioning institutions of social control and corporations of scale and power should be the hard target of modern-day progressives. Disparate groups and factions in the larger progressive collective should target the emasculation and gaming of the corporate criminal law in regulatory practice.

100. See, e.g., *id.*

101. *Id.*

102. See GREENFIELD, *supra* note 96; Dalia Tsuk, *Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law*, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1864 (2003); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).

103. Stephen Edgell & Rick Tilman, *The Intellectual Antecedents of Thorstein Veblen: A Reappraisal*, 23 J. ECON. ISSUES 1003, 1004 (1989); John A. Hobson, *The Economics of Thorstein Veblen*, 52 POL. SCI. Q. 139 (1937).

104. JOHN M. CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1939); cf. Don S. Kirschner, *The Ambiguous Legacy: Social Justice and Social Control in the Progressive Era*, 2 HIST. REFLECTIONS/RÉFLEXIONS HISTORIQUES 69 (1975) (raising justifiable concerns with the conventional progressive account).

105. Malcolm Rutherford, *Institutional Economics: Then and Now*, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 173, 174 (2001).

The ingredients of twentieth century theories of institutional economics are largely pragmatic and policy-driven, with strong commitments to controlling the growth of big business and curbing corruption.¹⁰⁶ At the same time, both Progressivism and Institutionalism share important theoretical foundations. Institutions are not only central to the ordering of an economy, but are also dynamic, changing, and in need of appropriately gauged social controls that benefit from scientific and, in particular, experimental scrutiny.¹⁰⁷ The institutionalist creed, according to historians, is to construct institutions and related policies that are responsive to the challenges of social control. And this response must come from more than simple anecdotes, naïve theorizing, or political expediency.¹⁰⁸ For institutionalists, a positivist account requires that science mold and meld with the very institutional arrangements that order and govern markets.¹⁰⁹ The legacy of Ross's social realism and Taylor's call for science management have found new life.¹¹⁰

106. MICHAEL MCGERR, *A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920* 147–81 (2003) (discussing, in some depth, the reaction of progressives to the emergence of powerful large-scale enterprises). See Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, *Progressive Party Platform of 1912*, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 5, 1912), <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29617> (for the text of the 1912 Progressive Party Platform relating to business enterprises).

107. Malcolm Rutherford, *Science and Social Control: The Institutional Movement in American Economics, 1918–1947*, 3 ERASMUS J. FOR PHIL. & ECON. 47, 47 (2010); Edward A. Ross, *The Sociological Frontier of Economics*, 13 Q.J. ECON. 386 (1899).

108. For a detailed and careful history of the emergence of social science in the progressive period, see Dorothy Ross, *THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE* (1991).

109. Thomas C. Leonard, *Progressive Era Origins of the Regulatory State and the Economist as Expert*, 47 HIST. POL. ECON. 49, 66 (2015) (“Progressives enthusiastically and rapidly seized on industrial efficiency as an exemplar, imagining that scientific management could increase efficiency not just on the shop floors of factories but in all corners of an industrial society plagued by waste, conflict, and injustice.”).

110. See Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto, *An Institutional Economic Reconstruction of Scientific Management: On the Lost Theoretical Logic of Taylorism*, 32 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 105, 114 (2007) (“This paper points toward a high contemporary relevance of scientific management—and of institutional economics. They can well advise us on organizational problems, especially in “modern” interaction contexts that are defined by diversity and pluralism.”).

The brand of progressivism promoted here takes the shape of a positivist account that looks to replace intuitions and politically-driven ideologies in crafting enterprise compliance and governance prescriptions with measured and just government *and* corporate controls.¹¹¹ To achieve this ideal, progressives look to the formality of social controls (along a continuum from informal to formal), the level of controls (across agent, firm, industry, and public sector levels), the responsibility for social controls (exploring the increasing privatization of regulation), and the locus of control (recognizing how the effects of social controls differ in private, state-owned, government entities).¹¹² To make the construction of this century-old bridge a bit more realistic, this brand of progressivism should recognize (1) the generally narrow motivations of the private sector to fend off anything but informal social controls, and (2) the limited capacity of government functionaries to assume responsibility for defining, crafting, and escalating these controls.

The history and heritage of this positive account lead to some zealously guarded positions. For example, neoconservatives make much of the regulatory burden as an unjustifiable incursion on the private sector.¹¹³ Modern progressives would likewise bemoan current spending levels on defensive corporate self-regulation or preventive law, but do so because there is simply so little evidence that current compliance expenditures make firms and their agents more compliant. Expenditures may protect the entity from liability, but that is, of course, quite different. Corporate libertarians would dismantle and abolish entity liability if permitted. Modern progressives would likely see corporate wrongdoing as reducible to individual fault. At the same time, though, they should concede that organizational fault is a fair proxy for corporate wrongdoing (at least in some cases), and look to how an enterprise-wide

111. For a lengthy discussion of progressivism in relation to both corporation and government control, see BENJAMIN P. DEWITT, *THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT: A NON-PARTISAN COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF CURRENT TENDENCIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS* 113–61 (Transaction Publishers 2013) (1915).

112. See William S. Laufer & Diana C. Robertson, *Corporate Ethics Initiatives as Social Control*, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS 1029, 1029 (1997).

113. See, e.g., James L. Gattuso & Diane Katz, *Red Tape Rising 2016: Obama Regs Top \$100 Billion Annually*, BACKGROUNDERS (Heritage Found.), May 23, 2016, at 1.

regulatory architecture might house the ingredients of fair and just corporate social controls.¹¹⁴

Recent moves constraining the discretion of federal prosecutors to individual rather than entity liability, modern progressives might add, risk a higher level of undistributed justice where evidence of individual agent culpability is lacking or is difficult, if not impossible, to secure. Moreover, shifts in formal policies about discretionary determinations of fault should be accompanied by more thoughtful and measured compliance standards that accommodate regulatory policy changes and embrace new technology.

Politicians and criminal justice functionaries pontificate about the need for corporate entities to adhere to prescriptive compliance and governance routines. Modern progressives would say, though, that regulators are long on moral rhetoric and short on due diligence expectations grounded in planning, process, and outcome factors that are measurable, e.g., using combinations of management-based, performance-based, or technology-based measures and metrics.¹¹⁵

Modern progressives should marvel at the stalemate between the government's failure to embrace evidence of compliance effectiveness as "due diligence," and the private sector's reluctance to make those kinds of compliance investments that will inevitably result in the need to "voluntarily" disclose non-compliance. Finally, modern progressives should spend significant political capital looking for ways to level the regulatory playing field for small firms vis-à-vis their more powerful counterparts.¹¹⁶ That there are multiple tracks of adjudi-

114. For the historical debate between and among progressives on entity liability, see Mark M. Hager, *Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational Real Entity Theory*, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575 (1988–1989).

115. For a brief discussion of collaborative associations between government and business in progressive history, see McGERR, *supra* note 106, at 315. Alternatively, as noted later, co-regulatory or collaborative systems should be proposed. Specific diligence expectations are "owed" regulated firms because certain legislative reforms and discretionary guidelines simply require companies to have such programs, policies, and practices. Further, prosecutors and regulators push incentives that drive firm compliance expenditures and investment, often without restraint, and rarely with any comparable government expenditures that builds regulatory capacity.

116. Hovenkamp, *supra* note 22, at 153 ("Progressives did though coalesce around the idea that the market was squarely to blame for noncompetitive business practices and an unfair transfer of wealth toward the rich. The fo-

cation associated with firm size requires more than a passing reference to collateral consequences or systemic risks.¹¹⁷

This roughly-conceived, modern account of progressivism highlights the failure of any significant corporate criminal law reform during a remarkable century of progress from our emerging interstate economy at the turn of the last century, to a truly global marketplace at the turn of this century.¹¹⁸ The conspicuous absence of legislative reform, including long-abandoned federal recodification efforts, should be of particular concern for modern progressives.¹¹⁹

Perhaps most important, progressivism recognizes the “transformative promise of the scientific state,” such that government will be both an instrument and object of reform.¹²⁰ Unfortunately, one is hard-pressed to find a constituency with the motivation and capacity for this transformative process. Inside the modern progressive community, voices of discontent about corporate fault are seldom raised and rarely heard. Of course, Wall Street abuses are an integral part of the progressive rallying cry. But with the stated desire to abolish corporate personhood, little to nothing is said about why liability rules and standards of culpability are not fashioned around corporate persons, i.e. around the enterprise as an enterprise.¹²¹

cus centers around the limitations of the market and its remedy, the administrative state, and a playing field for big and small firms that lacked fairness and rules.”).

117. See LAUFER, *supra* note 44 (discussing the compliance game).

118. See generally Julie R. O’Sullivan, *The Federal Criminal “Code” is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study*, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2006); Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, *What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability*, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 97–98 (2004).

119. For a discussion of the failure of federal criminal law reform, see Louis B. Schwartz, *Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics, and Prospects*, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1977); Barbara Ann Stolz, *Interest Groups and Criminal Law: The Case of Federal Criminal Code Revision*, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 91 (1984); NAT’L COMM’N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIM. LAWS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS (1971) (the National Commission on the Reform of the Federal Criminal Code, known as the Brown Commission, completed its work in 1969). See also STAFF MEMORANDA ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMES INVOLVING CORPORATIONS AND OTHER ARTIFICIAL ENTITIES 172 (1969); Commentary, *Corporate Criminal Liability*, 68 NW. U. L. REV. 870 (1973).

120. Leonard, *supra* note 109.

121. See *infra* notes 236–50.

Even less is said about how the construct of corporate compliance is so narrowly conceived, and related expenditures are too often seen as a good or best available proxy for compliance.

The fact that conceptions of entity liability are today moved to the margins with little fanfare and with so few objections is easily explained. Elsewhere, I argue that corporate criminal liability is a failure not because of confusing metaphysics, or because evidence of criminal wrongdoing is so well-guarded that it is difficult to obtain, or because of the obvious externalities of this blunt instrument of social control. The present regime of corporate criminal liability fails because there is no bounded constituency backing both a general and a specific part of corporate criminal law that is willing to address the inauthenticity of both the regulated and regulators as they play a game over compliance and compliance expenditures.¹²²

Modern progressives, as a constituency, need not take on that role.¹²³ But it is one that progressives may rightly and quite effectively assume. It would take a strong embrace of the remarkable convergence in compliance thinking, advancing technology, emerging methods, and consensus-building standards—a strategic embrace aimed at bringing about a commensurate engagement by prosecutors and regulators. It would take a reluctant acceptance of corporate personhood for the purposes of facilitating attributions of criminal liability not only to blameworthy individuals, but to entities as well.

Modern progressives would have to muster enough moral indignation over corporate crime, enough outrage to make the case that corporate persons, large and small, also deserve their fair share of accountability.¹²⁴ There would have to be a

122. See LAUFER, *supra* note 2.

123. For an idea as to how much change may result, see Clayton M. Christensen et al., *Disruptive Innovation for Social Change*, 84 HARV. BUS. REV. 94 (2006).

124. One might say that modern progressives need to be driven by “a fierce discontent.” See MICHAEL MCGERR, *A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA* 176 (1st ed. 2003) (quoting Theodore Roosevelt, “So far as this movement of agitation throughout the country takes the form of a fierce discontent with evil, of a firm determination to punish the authors of evil, whether in industry or politics, the feeling is to be heartily welcomed as a sign of healthy life.”). For a discussion of how indignation might fuel changes in law, see Jack Katz, *The*

call for a reallocation of criminal justice expenditures to ensure that the administration of justice is fairly and justly distributed to all persons, human and corporate. And the victims of organizational wrongdoing must be recognized by a more formal corporate victimology. Alas, this is not too tall an order for a movement once wholly committed to scientism in the name of measured informal and formal social controls.¹²⁵

B. *Moral Indignation and Desert*

The ideological core of a corporate criminal law progressivism reflects a more formal orientation, one that sits comfortably with new governance theories and to the political left of other theories of criminal justice that unabashedly promote comprehensive consequentialist ends. This includes, for example, the republican idea of justice, brilliantly fashioned with well-dressed utilitarian desiderata.¹²⁶ Unlike some rival neo-classical approaches and models, progressive corporate criminal law champions a brand of economic arrangements and regulatory practices that are “ethically defensible.”¹²⁷ The ultimate question for twentieth century progressives, according to Professor Clark, was a moral one.¹²⁸ At minimum, economic activity should be consistent with, rather than at odds with, the public interest. The invisible hand, according to older progressives, becomes noticeably visible with corporations of significant scale and power.¹²⁹

The limited and oddly shaped conception of orthodox economics was the target of progressives nearly a century ago. It remains so today. An economics of irresponsibility is a simple product of the primacy of excessive “individualism,” “private interest,” and a commitment to “laissez-faire.”¹³⁰ “All industry

Social Movement Against White-Collar Crime, in CRIMINOLOGY REVIEW YEARBOOK 161 (1980).

125. Given the antecedents of racism in the history of progressive thought and dogma, one might be snide and say that this is their destiny. See Hovenkamp, *supra* note 22.

126. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILLIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1st ed. 1992).

127. Leonard, *supra* note 109, at 70.

128. Clark, *supra* note 104, at 72.

129. As Rutherford notes, early theorists were concerned with corporate abuses of the day. See Rutherford, *supra* note 105, at 175.

130. Dell P. Champlin & Janet T. Knedler, *J.M. Clark and the Economics of Responsibility*, 38 J. ECON. ISSUES 545, 545 (2004).

and trade,” both old and modern progressives would argue, “is primarily affected with a public interest.”¹³¹ Criminal violations by businesses compromise this public interest and breach this trust. This breach by both organizations and individuals reflects an actionable immorality.¹³² Corporate wrongdoing engenders the kind of collective repugnance associated with offenders who have moral agency.¹³³ Corporate criminals are deserving of blame, and any wrongdoer left behind represents undistributed justice, part of an unpaid debt to society.¹³⁴ Modern progressives look to the promise of deterrence in responsive regulation, supporting the suasion of informal social controls. This progressive reincarnation, however, comes from a desert-based deontological world, where fault ultimately determines liability and a punishment proportional to wrongdoing ensures that justice is done.¹³⁵

The genius behind neoconservative accounts of corporate liability is the promise of justice without resort to the force of a “criminal” justice. Administrative and civil regulatory regimes, it is argued, will do justice. We are told that the direct and collateral consequences of corporate criminal liability are injustices to a wide range of innocents, from shareholders to debtholders to employees. Beyond the failed metaphysics of a corporate criminal law, this is an antiquated formal social control with externalities that are nearly impossible to measure. Those promoting the use of corporate criminal law are simply corporate bashing.¹³⁶ Modern progressives would respond that this promise of justice done without the criminal law is simply illusory. Even if you put the idea of a “benign big gun” aside, assuming effective regulation without any formal responsive threat is a grand, if not magnanimous, concession to corporat-

131. See Leonard, *supra* note 109.

132. William S. Laufer, *Where Is the Moral Indignation Over Corporate Crime?*, in REGULATING CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 19, 21 (Dominik Brodowski et al. eds., 2014) (“The construct of moral indignation reflects, at least in part, a deeply-felt emotion one has over the commission of an immoral act.”).

133. David Copp, *On the Agency of Certain Collective Entities: An Argument from “Normative Autonomy”*, 30 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 194, 195–96 (2006).

134. Laufer & Strudler, *supra* note 30.

135. KIP SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS (1990).

136. Martin H. Redish & Peter B. Siegal, *Constitutional Adjudication, Free Expression, and the Fashionable Art of Corporation Bashing*, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1447 (2012).

ism.¹³⁷ It is also a disturbing mismeasurement of moral indignation for corporate wrongdoing.¹³⁸

Criminal justice functionaries use condemnatory rhetoric about corporate malfeasance, offering compelling but inauthentic outrage on behalf of the state.¹³⁹ And beneath the dismissive and patronizing arrogance about justice done is a clearly conceived deference to big business, markets, risk-taking, entrepreneurship, and unbridled capitalism.¹⁴⁰ After all, even the most serious corporate offenders are condemned by muted plea agreements that do little more than impose additional compliance costs. Corporations spend more and more compliance dollars, and are “monitored” until called to arms, once again, as the steady and obedient servants of economic growth.

As progressives know all too well, outrage, fear, anger, and genuine indignation abound for street criminals.¹⁴¹ “Bad guys” are seen as the justifiable targets of aggressive and concentrated law enforcement and, once processed, mass punishment.¹⁴² Our race- and class-based images of who are “bad” are as obvious as they are indelible.¹⁴³ When we think of innova-

137. See RALPH NADER, *GETTING STEAMED TO OVERCOME CORPORATISM: BUILD IT TOGETHER TO WIN* (2011) (reviewing the decay in capitalism and corresponding betrayal of corporatism).

138. Laufer, *supra* note 132, at 20.

139. *Id.* at 24 (“Functionaries use moral rhetoric to convey a definite outrage at the temerity of such privileged wrongdoing. The message that justice must be done is conveyed with a pretense and sense of righteousness that mimics the emotions felt over an immoral act.”).

140. *Id.* at 25.

141. Research reveals that indignation is often mediated by complex heuristics, framing effects, social dynamics, and other psychological factors (e.g., the “outrage heuristic,” “moral framing,” and “rhetorical asymmetry”). See Cass R. Sunstein, *Some Effects of Moral Indignation on Law*, 33 VT. L. REV. 405 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, Ilana Ritov & David Schkade, *Predictably Incoherent Judgments*, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (2002); Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman, & Matthew L. Spitzer, *Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards*, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995).

142. See Laufer, *supra* note 132.

143. Research on the salience of race as a heuristic for determining the blameworthiness of the defendant and the perniciousness of the crime is as telling and remarkable, as it is shocking. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns & Sheri Lynn Johnson, *Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes*, 17 PSYCH. SCI. 383 (2006); Brown, *supra* note 32, at 1302.

tive law enforcement strategies, for example, our minds turn to “hot spots” and place-based policing in disenfranchised, poor neighborhoods; aggressive stop and frisk policies that target people of color; and the increasing militarization of municipal police resources.¹⁴⁴ But when thinking of innovative law enforcement strategies, who first thinks of innovations in state-of-the-art forensic accounting methods; the intricate mining of employee, customer, and client data; new algorithms and data analytics that deconstruct patterns of possible wrongdoing; and, more generally, the ingredients of successful experiments in private regulation?

When we think about how the debt owed to society from street crime may be repaid, we accept the idea of incarceration with reflection. We unabashedly use mass incarceration, ignoring the simple function of race, ethnicity, gender, age and education.¹⁴⁵ Who thinks of innovations in the design, content, and implementation of “corporate punishment”?¹⁴⁶ It should not be so trite to say that corporate punishment must resemble a true message of moral condemnation, rather than an itemized cost, optimal penalty, or additional revenue stream for a league of corporate gatekeepers.¹⁴⁷ Modern progressives should ask why corporate wrongdoing does not engender the kind of moral outrage and indignation that would support a fair regime of corporate criminal justice when lay perceptions of the seriousness of corporate crime rivals serious street crime.¹⁴⁸ In the absence of affective outrage, anger, disap-

144. See FRED A ADLER, GERHARD O. W. MUELLER & WILLIAM S. LAUFER, *CRIMINOLOGY* 182–200 (9th ed. 2018).

145. For a recent review of the problem of mass incarceration, see Malitta Engstrom, Alexandra Wimberly & Nancy Franke, *Mass Incarceration: What’s at Stake and What to Do*, in *SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE* (John L. Jackson, Jr., ed. 2017).

146. Steven Walt & William S. Laufer, *Corporate Criminal Liability and the Comparative Mix of Sanctions*, in *WHITE COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED* 309, 315 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd, eds. 1992) (discussing the many sentencing alternatives to criminal fines).

147. *Id.* at 312.

148. See Cedric Michel, John K. Cochran & Kathleen M. Heide, *Public Knowledge About White-Collar Crime: An Exploratory Study*, 65 *CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE* 67 (2016); cf. JOHN HAGAN, *WHO ARE THE CRIMINALS?: THE POLITICS OF CRIME POLICY FROM THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT TO THE AGE OF REAGAN* (2012); William S. Laufer, *Commentary*, 42 *CONTEMP. SOC.* 679 (2013) (reviewing JOHN HAGAN, *WHO ARE THE CRIMINALS?* (2012)).

proval, and indignation, government functionaries successfully placate stakeholders with scripted retributive text, and yet leave in place the risk-taking, innovation, and entrepreneurship associated with propelling the economy forward. All along, firms are positioned in equally inauthentic ways, placating and pandering to regulators with an apparent moral outrage over an agent's "rogue behavior."¹⁴⁹ In both cases, this is fairly called "faux" indignation, and it should boil the blood of modern progressives.¹⁵⁰

Without hesitation, modern progressives must look elsewhere for justice. They may find moral fault in organizational wrongdoing and justify their left-leaning rhetoric as a matter of desert. Liability rules that focus exclusively on vicarious liability disregard blameworthy features of the corporate form as well as those characteristics and attributes that should, in certain cases, absolve the entity from liability. Overlooking evidence of corporate intentionality also risks a compromise of desert principles.¹⁵¹ And modern progressives should worry that far too much justice is already undistributed with a regulatory status quo that is comfortably, efficiently, and deftly gamed by captured and uncaptured stakeholders.

C. *The Compliance Game*

Game theoretic models of compliance practices inspire some thinking about how firms and government functionaries strategically position themselves. Researchers, for example, have used game theory to explore the endogeneity of honesty in tax compliance, i.e., those factors that explain why taxpayers pay in full. Perceptions about the fairness of the tax code and whether other taxpayers are somehow better able to "play the

149. LAUFER, *supra* note 2.

150. See William S. Laufer, *Corporate Inauthenticity and the Finding of Fault*, in *LA RESPONSABILITÀ PENALE DEGLI ENTI* 23 (F. Centronze & M. Mantovani eds., 2016) ("What makes this indignation faux? The text is calculated and crafted in ways that reveal an inauthenticity. The moral emotions and affect that capture indignation are missing. The anger and fear that combine in a very real way with street crime are simply not there. Faux indignation is, plain and simple, a convenient moral placeholder. And holding a place for moral indignation, as we shall see, is indispensable for regulatory equilibrium.").

151. See Laufer & Strudler, *supra* note 30 (arguing for the place of corporate intentionality in a conception of corporate deservedness).

system” are explanatory. Taxpayer reactions to government activities, policies, and personnel are also important.¹⁵²

Others look at the tax compliance game by exploring the relative decision-making strategies of all tax stakeholders, e.g., taxpayers, elected government officials, appointed tax authorities, and tax accountants. These strategies are grounded in a wide range of economic and psychological factors. Tax payments depend, in part, on policies being perceived as legitimate: free riders must be eliminated, and the non-cooperative must be brought back into the fold with threats of command and control regulation.¹⁵³ Finally, there is significant potential for firms to free-ride in intra-industry collective action settings, i.e., individual firms may benefit from the compliance of others without regard to their own behavior. The result of this problem may be an obstacle to successful self-regulation. Game theory research reveals that overcoming free-riding problems turns on compliance motives as well as other strategic interactions.¹⁵⁴

As mentioned earlier in this Article, there is a very active regulatory game played around corporate criminal compliance. To appreciate the premise of the game, though, it is necessary to go back in time. In the immediate aftermath of the passage of the Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations in 1991, a cottage industry of business ethicists, consultancies, accountancies, along with a significant number of white collar defense lawyers, coalesced around the marketing of corporate compliance programs and services.¹⁵⁵ The market was pitched with a coordinated campaign to ensure that companies were

152. Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, *Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game*, 25 RAND J. ECON. 1, 4 (1994).

153. James Alm, Erich Kirchler & Stephan Muehlbacher, *Combining Psychology and Economics in the Analysis of Compliance: From Enforcement to Cooperation*, 42 ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 133, 148 (2012) (“It is thus necessary to apply strategies based on both economic and psychological arguments to promote mutual trust and cooperation.”).

154. See Simon Ashby, Swee-Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann, *Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance*, 11 INT'L J. ECONS. BUS. 91 (2004).

155. AM. LAW INST.-AM. BAR ASS'N COMM. ON CONTINUING PROF'L EDUC., *ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: ORGANIZING FOR CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: THE NEXT STEPS* (1994) (an excellent compendium of due diligence strategies from the white collar bar—in many ways indistinguishable from today's strategic prescriptions).

“in compliance” with the Guidelines.¹⁵⁶ By 1994, the boundaries of the field of corporate compliance were already set.¹⁵⁷ From state-of-the-art compliance training techniques and checklists for effective compliance programs, to compliance program methodology and a nascent compliance science, an industry was born that catered to every conceivable private regulatory need.¹⁵⁸

Remarkably, “custom” and even “proprietary” compliance products, programs, and solutions bought and sold until very recently were virtually indistinguishable.¹⁵⁹ This commodification of compliance, coupled with the failure of regulators to develop any significant capacity to evaluate compliance programs and practices, supported a complex brew of incentives and disincentives that lends itself to a multi-stakeholder compliance game.¹⁶⁰ The ultimate objective of this game, however, is not economic corporate criminal justice. The incentives and disincentives are not designed to change corporate behavior, improve corporate culture, or facilitate corporate decision-making.¹⁶¹

This compliance game is really a match of institutional appearances with some distinct characteristics, including the fact that the largest firms are spared prosecution due to perceived or at least expressed systemic risk; firms—of any size and scale—whose prosecution does not pose a risk are offered a crafted plea agreement; symbolic prosecutions of high profile defendants are sought, episodically, to assuage concerns over market fairness; and small firms, those with limited access to

156. See LAUFER *supra* note 2.

157. For a discussion of the emergence of the ethics industry, see Stuart Auerbach, *Company Lawyers in Shadows at Seminar on Crime*, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1977, at A4, and George P. Stamas & Joanne F. Catanese, *Compliance Programs Create a Shield from Corporate Wrongs*, 37 LEGAL TIMES (Feb. 24, 1997). See also William S. Laufer, *Integrity, Diligence, and the Limits of Good Corporate Citizenship*, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 157 (1996).

158. William S. Laufer, *Illusions of Compliance and Governance*, 6 CORP. GOVERNANCE 239 (2006) (reviewing the compliance industry).

159. William S. Laufer, *Compliance and Evidence: Some Optimism from a Perennial Pessimist*, in DIE VERFASSUNG MODERNER STRAFRECHTSPFLEGE: ERINNERUNG AN JOACHIM VOGEL (K. Tiedemann, U. Sieber, H. Satzger, C. Burchard & D. Brodowski eds., 2016), http://www.nomos-shop.de/_assets/downloads/9783848733699_lESE01.pdf.

160. See Laufer *supra* note 44.

161. *Id.*

counsel, are far, far more likely to be prosecuted to conviction. Ultimately, stakeholders in this game seek to protect and enhance their positions without disturbing the equilibrium and, remarkably, without concern for whether their efforts actually affect rates of offending behavior.

This is a game that seeks optimal compliance expenditures to minimize liability risks, gives all players moral and legal cover, placates constituencies with the appearance of legitimacy, and offers beautifully crafted images of leadership and governance with integrity. This game is aligned with a regulatory system that possesses a very limited capacity for determining the effectiveness and genuineness of compliance, and even less commitment to aggressively using the corporate criminal law.¹⁶² This game encourages mind-numbing levels of documentation, from due diligence forms and internal audits to training attendance records and integrity affidavits.¹⁶³ The more content in this documentation regime, the more paper; the more paper, the less liability exposure for the firm. The quality of the representations in this regime is largely untested, by design.

Perhaps most important, this game is the centerpiece of a highly profitable and growing compliance and business ethics industry. Shining a much less favorable light, it is also an industry with a potentially exploitive value proposition. At their core, the rules of the game assume that neither firms nor regulators have or want to have evidence of compliance effectiveness. The game further assumes that there is no interest in exploring whether the compliance machine actually affects behavior, organizational decision-making, planning, programming, or corporate culture.¹⁶⁴ Both parties seem inextricably captured by their opponent.

Prosecutors and regulators speak about the expectations of firm disclosures and cooperation but know about all the ob-

162. There is no shortage of commentary on compliance essentials. *See, e.g.*, RICHARD M. STEINBERG, *THE GAME CHANGES: 10 ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR TRULY EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS* (2012).

163. *See, e.g.*, Richard Medina & Joe Fenner, *Controlling Your Documents*, 39 *INFO. MGMT.* 20 (2005).

164. For an interesting take on corporate culture and corporate crime, see John Conley & William M. O'Bart, *Crime and Custom in Corporate Society: A Cultural Perspective on Corporate Misconduct*, 60 *LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.* 5 (1997).

vious conflicts.¹⁶⁵ Prosecutors speak about guidelines, but their discretion is too constrained by limited resources, limits in the priority given to the investigation of corporate fraud, and significant challenges in obtaining evidence of serious corporate wrongdoing at the officer or board level, even with all the incentivizing of whistleblowing. The result: with countless billions spent on some of the most impressive accountancies, consultancies, and law firms, it is practically impossible for regulators to make meaningful distinctions between and among ethical leaders and laggards, as well as compliant and non-compliant firms.¹⁶⁶ And if one looks at the history of this game, it is hard not to see interested stakeholders pushing compliance spending forward in extreme and, at times, perverse ways.

Modern progressives must think about how this game may be disrupted and how the rules governing the regulatory status quo may be changed. The promise of progressivism is great, because this game turns on the relative power and suasion of informal social controls. This is a game about *governance*, where boards and senior management are kept too far apart, and the former know far too little about day-to-day compliance issues and challenges; *culture and values*, where the tone of corporate leadership is indiscernible to mid-level managers and employees; *risk management*, where the idea of risk is reduced to protecting the firm from its own employees; *policies and procedures*, where policies and codes are perfunctory and disconnected from operations; *communication and training*, where training programs are decontextualized, if not vacuous; *monitoring and reporting*, where firms are over-controlled and reporting channels are limited; *escalation, investigation, and discipline*, where fear of retaliation is met with the reality of retaliation; *issues management*, where matters raised with compliance and audit are routinely neglected; and *ongoing improvements*, where investment in the appearance of compliance and risk management highlight the compliance function.¹⁶⁷

165. See, e.g., Ronald H. Levine, *Government Contests Assertion of Attorney-Client Privilege in Assessing Cooperation*, WHITE COLLAR POSTS (Jan. 5, 2017), <http://www.postschell.com/publications/1318-government-contests-assertion-attorney-client-privilege-assessing-cooperation>.

166. See William S. Laufer, *Corporate Culpability and the Limits of Law*, 6 BUS. ETHICS Q. 311 (1996).

167. See Richard M. Steinberg, *The Game Changes: 10 Essential Elements for Truly Effective Compliance Programs*, 46 EDPACS, no. 5, Nov. 2012, at 1.

Modern progressives must be mindful that the path out of the compliance game, inevitable as it appears to be, will likely cross with another inevitability: the inauthenticity of organizational and regulatory action.¹⁶⁸ Corporate inauthenticity may be benign where the words from public affairs slightly outpace reality.¹⁶⁹ Inside and outside of the compliance game, though, inauthenticity may be non-trivial. The problem of inauthenticity is most concerning where significant regulatory responsibility is delegated and then shared with the firm, or where independent assessments of certain corporate representations are unavailable to both guardians and gatekeepers.¹⁷⁰

Just as the ethics industry markets compliance in the form of commodities, the ingredients of both corporate pretense and posture are also bought and sold in a profitable consultants' marketplace. Ethical intangibles are sold as tangibles in a world that increasingly looks for evidence of a good return on values, broadly defined.¹⁷¹ The selling of this instrumental brand of responsibility moves some stakeholders to invest in ways that result in a muddle of inauthenticity. Simply put, this muddle complicates and often confounds the very idea of self-regulation and co-regulation. And, to be fair, lack of authenticity may frustrate genuine efforts by government functionaries to be both measured and just.

In leading a constituency advocating for greater corporate accountability, modern progressives should also assume the responsibility of inspiring firms to align their behavior, and the

168. Corporations may be said to fall along a behavioral continuum from opacity (i.e., where firms are characteristically obscure, elusive, and dense) to transparency (i.e., organizations that are open with communications, frank, candid, and forthcoming), sincerity (i.e., firms that act, as a means to an end, without pretense and dissimulation), and finally authenticity (i.e., companies that, as an end in itself, align their decisions, policies, and actions with actual desires, motivations, and intentions). See Laufer, *supra* note 132.

169. Laufer, *supra* note 132, at 26 ("Lurking behind the corporate scandals that now seem common place on Wall Street is an inauthenticity, a disconnect between what corporations say they do and what they actually do, that leads to public displays by top management of naive surprise when the public hears the news of a criminal investigation or indictment.")

170. *Id.*

171. Chris Kelly, Paul Kocourek, Nancy McGaw & Judith Samuelson, *Deriving Values from Corporate Values*, THE ASPEN INST. (2005), <https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/bsp/VALUE%2520SURVEY%2520FINAL.pdf> (discussing the concept of return on values (ROV)).

value they offer stakeholders, with principles.¹⁷² Countless examples of both misfeasance and malfeasance over the past century reveal the difference between a genuine commitment to ethics, integrity, and compliance, and the appearance, rhetoric, and spin of ethicality.¹⁷³ This spin masks corporate efforts to avoid detection, deflects the need for more formal regulation, minimizes compliance and governance costs and, at times, facilitates the laundering of questionable corporate decisions. In the end, the prospects of a modern progressive agenda disrupting and changing the rules of the compliance game may be challenged by something as simply conniving as a corporation's inauthenticity.

IV.

THE PROMISE OF A PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE CRIMINAL LAW

Critics would be fair to point out that there may be something instrumental in the resort to a progressive account of corporate criminal law. Having a modern progressive account at the table with the conventional guard, stalwart advocates, corporate libertarians, and normative thinkers is long overdue. The modern progressive case is much more than a call for empiricism or a resort to the latest LegalTech or RegTech solutions to support the convergent growth and unprecedented investment in the compliance industry. It is also more than a vision of government regulation as both an "instrument" and "object" of reform. The conspicuous intransigence in this neglected body of law, marked by the failure of any constituency to step forward to disrupt the compliance game, results in a certain kind of injustice, i.e., undistributed justice. Seeking recognition for this compromise of desert principles motivates a call to modern progressivism. Simply stated, the scales of justice must be balanced between corporate wrongdoing and our measured indignation.

172. See, e.g., R. EDWARD FREEMAN & ELLEN R. AUSTER, *BRIDGING THE VALUES GAP: HOW AUTHENTIC ORGANIZATIONS BRING VALUES TO LIFE* (2015); S. H. Cady, J. V. Wheeler, J. DeWolf & M. Brodke, *Mission, Vision, and Values: What Do They Say?*, 29 *ORG. DEV. J.*, Spring 2011, at 63 (2011); Timothy L. Fort, *Steps for Building Ethics Programs*, 1 *HASTINGS BUS. L. J.* 194 (2005).

173. See Lynn Sharpe Paine, *Managing for Organizational Integrity*, 72 *HARV. BUS. REV.* 106 (1994) (distinguishing between law- and ethics-driven compliance programs).

Progressives today are well-suited to answer such a call, as answering involves resolving questions about the perennial tensions between regulatory power and increasing corporate power; about the social control of business and the turn-of-the-twentieth-century notion of excessive individualism; and about the economics of responsibility versus deference to the business community and its markets. How to regulate corporations fairly, justly, and without the specter of regulatory overreach is a trite, old, but exceedingly important *progressive* question. That this question still defines the ongoing dissonance over how to conceive, practice, and enforce corporate criminal law is a powerful argument for modern progressives to come forward and make their case.

The progressive sentiment that corporations are more than simple profit engines for shareholders is promoted with a realization that the social control of businesses is increasingly plural, decentered, and the responsibility of both state and non-state actors. Markets reflect a growing complexity, well-captured by Braithwaite's notion of "regulatory capitalism."¹⁷⁴ This complexity is more than a rudimentary migration away from command and control regulation in the developed world.¹⁷⁵ Instead, commentators argue that with regulatory capitalism "a new division of labor between state and society (e.g., privatization) is accompanied by an increase in delegation, proliferation of new technologies of regulation, formalization of inter-institutional and intra-institutional relations, and the proliferation of mechanisms of self-regulation in the shadow of the state."¹⁷⁶

This division promotes some creative thinking about new ways of regulating, and about some possible modern progressive positions.¹⁷⁷ After all, the role of science in new govern-

174. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, *REGULATORY CAPITALISM: HOW IT WORKS, IDEAS FOR MAKING IT WORK BETTER* (2008); David Levi-Faur, *The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism*, 598 *THE ANNS. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI.* 12 (2005).

175. Julia Black, *Decentering Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a "Post-Regulatory" World*, 54 *CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.* 103 (2001).

176. Levi-Faur, *supra* note 174, at 13.

177. Consider, for example, the move toward a shared or collaborative approach to regulation with the work of Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, *A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism*, 98 *COLUM. L. REV.* 267 (1998).

ance theory, dogma, and practice should be at the core of their case. So, too, is the commitment of governance theorists to a new institutional design, one that “relies on information-based and information-forcing techniques: specifically, reasoning, transparent processes, benchmarking and outcome analysis, and shared information.”¹⁷⁸ But these kinds of idealized regulatory ingredients and designs are challenged by a fixed institutional architecture and the deeply embedded interests reflected in the existing oversight and administration of the corporate criminal law.¹⁷⁹ There is no simple solution here.¹⁸⁰

Thinking about how science and the accelerated advance of regulatory technology may inform policies and practices is no longer what it once was. Plural and decentered conceptions of all variants of informal and formal constraint should move modern progressives to, for example, rethink how to conceptualize, operationalize, and measure compliance and reconsider what motivates compliance. Should compliance be conceived and measured as a complex enterprise problem between and among state and non-state regulatory stakeholders? If so, what kind of social controls will accommodate and fairly

178. For an outstanding exposition of the new governance approach, and the obvious challenges for extant regulatory practice, see Cristie Ford, *New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial Regulation*, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 441 (2010).

179. Baer, *supra* note 31 (wrestling with how hard law approaches connect to new governance models).

180. Responsive and reflexive regulatory structures attempt to take into account business incentives and internal business incentives, along with decision-making processes. See Neil Gunningham, *Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement: Responsive Regulation and Beyond*, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION (C. Parker & V. L. Nielsen eds., 2011); Eric Orts, *Reflexive Environmental Law*, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995); Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, *Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks*, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155 (1998); Gunther Teubner, *Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law*, 17 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 239 (1983); see also Christine Parker, *Twenty Years of Responsive Regulation: An Appreciation and Appraisal*, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 2 (2003); cf. Peter J. May & Robert S. Wood, *At the Regulatory Front Lines: Inspectors' Enforcement Styles and Regulatory Compliance*, 13 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 117 (2003). For a discussion of Smart Regulation, see NEIL GUNNINGHAM, PETER N. GRABOSKY & DARREN SINCLAIR, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998). For an interesting extension of Smart Regulation, see Peter Van Gossom, Bas Arts & Kris Verheyen, *From “Smart Regulation” to “Regulatory Arrangements”*, 43 POL. SCI. 245 (2010).

reflect the complexity of global business regulation in countries with and without a mature rule of law? The complexity of global business and markets would challenge the imagination of twentieth century progressive thinkers.¹⁸¹ A modern account of the progressive corporate criminal law must at least begin to capture this complexity and respond in measured ways.

With the benefits of contemporary knowledge, century-old progressives would likely embrace research on how corporate structure, agency, and culture informs any theory of “meta-regulation.”¹⁸² Formal compliance systems would be evaluated for their content and structure (but in the larger context of the strategies, perceptions, and motivations of agents), the position of agents, and the overall culture of the firm.¹⁸³ Reference would be made to the nodes that Parker identified as critical for corporations to successfully respond to regulatory demands: top management attention and response, development of professional compliance management, and employees’ internalization of compliance and communication.¹⁸⁴

Modern progressives would also address other challenges in regulating corporations.¹⁸⁵ There are significant concerns over the risks and costs of regulatory delegation to private firms and, in particular, how private firms might misuse this

181. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, *GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION* (2000) (an encyclopedic treatment from vast interview data of the move from national to global regulation).

182. PARKER, *supra* note 74.

183. Dick Hobbs, *The Firm: Organizational Logic and Criminal Culture on a Shifting Terrain*, 41 *BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY* 549 (2001); Linda Trevino, *A Cultural Perspective on Changing and Developing Organizational Ethics*, 4 *RES. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE & DEV.* 195 (1990); Linda Trevino, *Ethical Decision Making in Organizations: A Person–Situation Interactionist Model*, 11 *ACAD. MGMT. REV.* 601 (1986); Bart Victor & John B. Cullen, *The Organizational Bases of Ethical Work Climates*, 33 *ADMIN. SCI. Q.* 101 (1988).

184. *See* PARKER, *supra* note 74.

185. These considerations are an extrapolation of progressive dogma. *See* Allan G. Cruchy, *Government Intervention and the Social Control of Business: The Neoinstitutionalist Position*, 8 *J. ECON. ISSUES* 235, 238 (1974) (“Effective social control of business must take account of the efficiency, the power, and the value aspects of the problem of how to fit private business into the advanced industrial society if the issue is to be dealt with adequately.”).

discretion.¹⁸⁶ The idea of enforced self-regulation raises concerns over privatizing a public function.¹⁸⁷ In fact, it raises another conundrum worthy of progressive contemplation. As Bamberger writes, there is a need to rely on the private sector for risk assessment and management.¹⁸⁸ Failures of assessment and management, however, carry significant costs to both regulators and the regulated—and neither are well-equipped to minimize those costs.¹⁸⁹

Modern progressives would, nevertheless, embrace compliance science and technology so that firms, regulators, and prosecutors move, as one, toward the objective of assessing organizational diligence and adjudicating non-compliance. At the same time, they would work toward the social control of corporations by state and non-state actors in measured and proportional ways. Progressives also would recognize the immense and unique power of the giants of industry, within and across all borders, to serve both private and public interests.¹⁹⁰ And, finally, they would seek to maintain the trust and legitimacy of the criminal process, the sine qua non of regulatory regimes, by fairly allocating criminal justice resources toward all offenders, human and corporate.¹⁹¹ These reincarnate considerations, organized around some of the challenges posed by compliance science and social controls, are reflected below in thinking about a progressive corporate criminal law.

186. Kenneth A. Bamberger, *Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decision-making, and Accountability in the Administrative State*, 56 DUKE L. J. 377 (2006).

187. Gillian E. Metzger, *Privatization as Delegation*, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1370–71 (2003); cf. John Braithwaite, *Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control*, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1982). For an excellent exploration of self-regulatory practices in securities firms, see DAVID P. McCaffrey & DAVID W. HART, *WALL STREET POLICES ITSELF: HOW SECURITIES FIRMS MANAGE THE LEGAL HAZARDS OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES* (1998).

188. Bamberger, *supra* note 186.

189. *Id.*

190. See, e.g., William S. Laufer, *The Importance of Cynicism and Humility: Anti-Corruption Partnerships and the Private Sector*, 8 DEV. OUTREACH 18 (2006).

191. This is a trend that is not only unjustifiable, but misses an opportunity for the United States to serve as an example to a host of countries that look for guidance during periods of law reform. See Raymond J. Michalowski & Ronald C. Kramer, *The Space Between Laws: The Problem of Corporate Crime in a Transnational Context*, 34 SOC. PROBS. 34 (1987).

A. *The Role of Science and the March of Technology*

How science is situated in historical thinking about progressivism is defining.¹⁹² Economic institutions, policies, and practices—our economic order—should be founded on a scientific order that requires systematic observation and measurement. There is a carefully documented history that the scientific aspirations of progressives and institutionalists were also inextricably connected to the social control of business. The institutional arrangements that exert constraint on the economic order must not be based solely on expediency, symbolism, ideology, and politics. Science and the scientific method are coextensive with sound regulatory policies and practices.¹⁹³

It is with this historical background that we ask how science informs, influences, and molds corporate criminal law relative to the regulatory investment in compliance. This is every bit a rhetorical question, because so much more compliance science is necessary to support and, at the same time, to justify the costs of corporate social controls, from the least formal (e.g., corporate codes of conduct and corporate culture) to the most formal (e.g., criminal law).¹⁹⁴ This includes research on holistic and plural models of business compliance. It includes moving from conceptual and experimental models of machine learning applications to regulation, and the promised value, more generally, of LegalTech and RegTech. It also includes research that explores descriptive and inferential questions that, according to Parker and Nielsen, span four levels of analysis: (1) motives of agents (e.g., economic, social, and normative motives in support of an agent's or firm's decision or decision-making), (2) organizational capacities, characteristics, and responses to regulation (e.g. internal firm resources, knowledge, leadership, and available technology), (3) how regulatory enforcement strategies and styles move organizations and their agents to respond (e.g., how regulatory insti-

192. See Rutherford, *supra* note 107, at 49 (“The concern with proper scientific methods was a concern to make economics more empirical and investigational, and to avoid the speculative and untestable nature of much orthodox theorizing.”).

193. See, e.g., Rutherford, *supra* note 107; Clark, *supra* note 104, at 221.

194. These questions could be asked more broadly of all regulatory efforts with corporations. See Laufer & Robertson, *supra* note 112, at 1030.

tutions affect firm compliance), and (4) the effects of the external environment (i.e., social, political, and economic environment) on both regulators and the regulated.¹⁹⁵

The advent of enterprise models of compliance also invites compliance research across the entire organization. A rigorous internal (company) and external (government) management-based system of regulation should generate a large, impressive, and long-overdue body of research on corporate compliance that is both endogenous (i.e., exploring the construction and meaning of compliance as both an independent and as a dependent variable) and exogenous (i.e., using pre-existing, pre-defined constructions and meanings of compliance to address specific descriptive and causal research questions).¹⁹⁶ Both kinds of research directly address concerns over the metrics used for measuring effectiveness across a wide range of regulatory approaches.¹⁹⁷

Perhaps most important, as seasoned compliance officers know all too well, successful implementation of formal compliance systems will require more than evidence of effective metrics and measures.¹⁹⁸ The recipe for successful compliance programs, research reveals, will hinge on “top management attention and motivation to implement a compliance system; the existence and strategies of specialized or professional compliance managers; and the way in which compliance systems are communicated to and experienced by the teams and individual workers that make up the organization.”¹⁹⁹ Perceptions,

195. Christine Parker & Vibeke L. Nielsen, *The Challenge of Empirical Research on Business Compliance and Regulatory Capitalism*, 5 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 45 (2009) (further classifying exogenous research as operationalizing compliance by reference to attitudes and motivations; by reference to policy goals; as compliance behavior; and by observation of regulatory compliance behavior).

196. *Id.*

197. These metrics are the ingredients of meta-regulation, attempts to operationalize self-regulation. See PARKER, *supra* note 74; Christine Parker & Vibeke L. Nielsen, *Corporate Compliance Systems: Could They Make Any Difference?*, 41 ADMIN. & SOC. 3 (2008).

198. In addition to corporate cultures that resist compliance programming, there are concerns with “avoidance, resistance, ritualism and creative compliance.” See Christine Parker & Sharon Gilad, *Internal Corporate Compliance Management Systems: Structure, Culture and Agency*, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 175 (2011).

199. *Id.* at 172–73.

motivations, and actions of compliance stakeholders do, indeed, matter.²⁰⁰ So, too, do the expectations of society and external stakeholders.²⁰¹

Conceptual models of corporate compliance that span individual, organizational, regulatory, and institutional levels reveal the complexity of the research enterprise—and how much more scholarship is needed.²⁰² In particular, there is a great need to develop and test theories of regulation or components of theories. This is, admittedly, a challenge for a wide range of reasons, including the lack of data and the complexity of regulatory instruments.²⁰³ While modern progressives would strongly support meeting these challenges, they would, at the same time, look beyond the conventional challenges and explanations for what is known and not known about compliance.

Systematic evaluation research on corporate crime deterrence, what little there is of it, suggests the possible perils of making regulatory policies without well-executed randomized controlled experiments, good longitudinal data, time series

200. *Id.* at 173. *See, e.g.*, Tom R. Tyler, *Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law*, 133 SWISS J. ECON. & STAT. 219, 220–22 (1997); Neil Gunningham, Dorothy Thornton & Robert A. Kagan, *Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection*, 27 LAW & POL'Y 289 (2005); Søren C. Winter & Peter J. May, *Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations*, 20 J. OF POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 675 (2001); Peter J. May, *Compliance Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases*, 38 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 41 (2004); Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, *Praise, Pride and Corporate Compliance*, 21 INT'L J. SOC. L. 73 (1993); Peter J. May, *Compliance Motivations: Perspectives of Farmers, Homebuilders, and Marine Facilities*, 27 LAW & POL'Y 317 (2005); Leigh Raymond & Timothy N. Cason, *Can Affirmative Motivations Improve Compliance in Emissions Trading Programs?*, 39 POL'Y STUD. J. 39, 659 (2011); Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, *Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost*, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1 (1999).

201. *See* Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, *Social License and Environment Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance*, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307 (2004).

202. *See, e.g.*, Parker & Nielsen, *supra* note 195, at 5.

203. Some of the challenges and difficulties posed by empirical research on compliance are addressed by Parker and Nielsen, *supra* note 195, at 6 (challenges and difficulties include access to data; complexity, range, and interrelatedness of compliance constructs; and the impracticality of testing grand theories). *See also* Sally Simpson, *White-Collar Crime: A Review of Recent Developments and Promising Directions for Future Research*, 39 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 1 (2013).

analyses, and case studies that provide rich qualitative data. In the only meta-review of corporate regulation, it seems as if regulatory policies produce as much defiance as compliance. And the more rigorous the method and design of the research project, the less of a deterrent effect obtained. Notably, those firms who adhered to multiple legal interventions (i.e., enforcement, monitoring, and inspections) were more likely to be deterred, whereas firms experiencing single intervention strategies were less likely to be so deterred.²⁰⁴

All conclusions found in this meta-review were cast as quite tentative, though, because of limited data and scarcity of rigorous research. The authors were more confident in concluding that there is simply insufficient evidence that law actually deters corporate offending.²⁰⁵ One commentator writing about the meta-review hoped that this analysis would be “a loud wake-up call for corporate crime researchers to start getting their methodological, conceptual, and analytical house in order.”²⁰⁶ Another commentator was equally as grim in calling for better impact assessment research with replications. Studies are needed across institutional and organizational contexts. The status quo, commentators note, is literally regulating in the dark.²⁰⁷

204. Natalie Schell-Busey et al., *What Works? A Systematic Review of Corporate Crime Deterrence*, 15 CRIM. & PUB. POL'Y 387, 410 (2016).

205. *Id.* at 410 (“We need to undertake more focused and high-quality (particularly randomized experiments or quasi-experiments) focused on program-specific interventions (with replications). Until then, the answer to the question of what works, what doesn’t, and what’s promising in the area of corporate deterrence will remain elusive.”).

206. Ray Paternoster, *Deterring Corporate Crime: Evidence and Outlook*, 15 CRIM. & PUB. POL'Y. 383, 384 (2016); see also John Braithwaite, *In Search of Donald Campbell: Mix and Multimethods*, 15 CRIM. & PUB. POL'Y 417 (2016) (discussing some reasonable expectations of corporate criminology).

207. The idea of regulating in the dark was first discussed by Roberta Romano, *Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript Assessment of the Iron Law of Financial Regulation*, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25 (2014); Roberto Romano, *Regulating in the Dark*, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012). For an incisive critique of corporate crime research, see Peter Cleary Yeager, *The Elusive Deterrence of Corporate Crime*, 15 CRIM. & PUB. POL'Y 439 (2016).

B. *Beyond the Compliance Conundrum*

Judging the effectiveness of compliance efforts on organizations is said to be one of the more elusive if not daunting regulatory challenges.²⁰⁸ This challenge is certainly recognized by the modern progressive account. As noted earlier, this embrace of empirics is confounded by increasing concerns in the private sector that a more careful, technology-driven and, indeed, scientific consideration of compliance would result in expectations of “voluntary” disclosures to regulators and prosecutors. This is what I call a true *compliance conundrum*.²⁰⁹

That there is such a conundrum should not come as a surprise to regulators and prosecutors. The standard refrain continues to be: in the absence of clear guidance from government functionaries as to what are, in fact, effective compliance systems and compliance programs, generating and applying a science of compliance will be shunned by those general counsel, corporate counsel, and white collar criminal defense counsel who are even minimally risk-adverse.²¹⁰ Shunned, even though all stakeholders know that ever-increasing compliance costs, to be justified, must be supported by well-conceived internal plans that meet or exceed regulatory criteria and expectations. Shunned, even though regulators and prosecutors admit that their proxies for compliance effectiveness are most often no better than intuitive and experiential—that their confidence in a firm actually exercising due diligence, good governance, and reasonable risk management is, in fact, faith-filled. Simply stated, the choice is not so difficult if it is between disclosure and cooperation with law enforcement, or the in-

208. See, e.g., Vibeke L. Nielsen & Christine Parker, *Mixed Motives: Economic, Social, and Normative Motivations in Business Compliance*, 34 LAW & POL'Y 428 (2012). Adan Nieto Martin, *supra* note 84, paints a nuanced portrait of the complications associated with ensuring against cosmetic compliance (e.g., lack of legal certainty for regulated firms and lack of trust of compliance programs by regulators). Martin then offers a critique of the remedies against cosmetic compliance, including certification and standardization.

209. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, *Compliance Officers: More Jobs, More Responsibility, More Liability*, 29 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 169 (2015).

210. Even more than shunned, there is a distinct risk that regulation will be gamed. See, e.g., Bamberger, *supra* note 186; see also Donald C. Langevoort, *Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms)*, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997).

house handling of inculpatory evidence from those who do compliance data analytics.

Regulatory and administrative law scholars would find this conundrum to be part of a larger problem of the delegation of regulatory discretion.²¹¹ This delegation, some conclude, often makes a mess of compliance norms, expectations, and incentives. There is simply insufficient guidance for the regulated, combined with a lack of recognition of sound compliance programs that effectively reveal non-compliance. Add to this the reticence of prosecutors to get into the business of making nuanced judgments about the effectiveness and completeness of integrity, ethics, and compliance efforts. One is hard-pressed to find a genuine desire for regulatory capacity-building in government agencies and departments, at least one even remotely comparable to the convergence of investments by private sector compliance stakeholders.

The recent announcement of a compliance counsel appointed to the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice is a surprising admission that expertise in compliance metrics were until only recently missing in the discretionary calculus of federal prosecutors. Unless modern progressives seize the opportunity that this convergence provides, it is fair to conclude that intuition and experiential evidence will continue to guide prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors are simply not compliance professionals, as we are told by the Department of Justice, and the best that can be done is to ask a seasoned Main Justice compliance professional for a “reality check.”²¹² This reality check will be determined by such a professional with reference to some very familiar due diligence factors. These include the need to be reasonably proactive and reactive, the importance of organizational climate, and communication and enforcement of standards, among others.²¹³

211. See Bamberger, *supra* note 186, at 388.

212. See Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at SIFMA Compliance and Legal Society, New York Regional Seminar (Nov. 2, 2015), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-speaks-sifma-compliance-and-legal-society> (“Our goal is to have someone who can provide what I’ll call a ‘reality check.’”).

213. These factors are derived from the pillars of diligence first announced in the Defense Industry Initiative (DII), subsequently enshrined in Chapter Eight of the Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, and ulti-

Due diligence factors broadly offer guidance but, without more, are intuitions and hypotheses about the behavior of persons and organizations that leave firms conflicted about pursuing systematic evaluations.²¹⁴ In the end, these factors are an invitation to make additional investments in a wide range of compliance solutions that, most often, are critically evaluated for their efficacy only when there is a notable event of non-compliance that inadvertently or advertently comes to the attention of regulators or prosecutors.²¹⁵

Modest suggestions for addressing the conundrum should acknowledge the complexity of compliance regimes in large institutions, including the iterative process of determining a regulator's discretionary expectations for corporate compliance; the regulatory challenges of monitoring firm compliance over time; the challenge of training employees to conform to articulated legal risks; and the increasing suasion of self-regulatory associations.²¹⁶ All suggestions should also address how this conundrum, along with any trading of regulator/regulated favors, figures in the long-awaited partnership between the government and corporations.²¹⁷ First conceived as the "good corporate citizen" movement more than two decades ago, this partnership was designed to reasonably share regulatory burdens by firms and criminal justice functionaries. For this partnership to be successful, regulators would shoulder the burden of providing clear guidance as to the kind and quality of compliance metrics required for measuring the ethi-

mately spun off into a series of iterative memoranda from the Department of Justice, i.e., the Holder, McNulty, Thompson, and Filip Memoranda.

214. For a discussion of the history of compliance beginning with the Defense Industry Initiative (DII), see Laufer, *supra* note 2.

215. Miriam Baer captures the process well in writing that extant practice ". . . is at best an illusory delegation of responsibility whereby the government commands firms *ex ante* to implement 'effective' compliance programs, but offers little practical guidance for determining effectiveness, and intentionally leaves them very little room for discretion in the event that such programs uncover violations of law." Baer, *supra* note 31, at 954.

216. See Parker & Nielsen, *supra* note 195, at 49; see also Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, *Regulatory Convergence in Nongovernmental Regimes? Cross-National Adoption of ISO 14001 Certifications*, 66 J. OF POL. 885 (2004).

217. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SYMPOSIUM OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA: STRENGTHENING THE "GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION (Sept. 7-8, 1995). For a critical take on this movement, see, e.g., Laufer *supra* note 29.

cal and legal risks assumed by the firms they regulate, i.e., going beyond the simple prescription that firms must invest in sophisticated risk assessments; maintain clear policies, standards, and procedures; engage in effective training and communication; regularly test compliance monitoring and auditing; perform thorough internal and external investigations; and promote a culture of compliance.²¹⁸

What these suggestions miss, however, are the distinct limitations of seeing compliance exclusively in performance terms with specific outcome metrics. In fact, any focus on performance metrics alone *fuels* the compliance conundrum, exploiting the lack of systematic compliance science and data, and neglecting the fact that a firm's compliance with the law is often not entirely reducible to any narrow construction of compliance performance at a single level of analysis. As Parker and Nielsen write, it is wrong to assume that changes in behavior are necessarily the product of new or changing compliance systems.²¹⁹

Researchers must control for other structural, agency, and cultural co-variates.²²⁰ Researchers must also look to successful efforts to “regulate from the inside” using environmental management systems and other technologies that support self-regulatory efforts.²²¹ Much research highlights the value of management-based regulation as a complement to technology-based (i.e., firms must adopt specific technologies or methods to comply), performance-based (i.e., firm must achieve specific level of compliance), and other conventional and market-

218. Of these, creating an ethical corporate culture is most challenging. See, e.g., AMBER L. SELIGSON & LAURIE CHOI, CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICAL CULTURE 7–8 (2006) (ethical culture may be captured by 18 factors).

219. See Parker and Nielsen, *supra* note 195. See also Warren et al., *supra* note 73 (surveying bank employees before and after the introduction of formal ethics training—an important component of formal ethics programs—to examine the effects of training on ethical organizational culture.)

220. See Neal Shover & Andy Hochstetler, *Cultural Explanation and Organizational Crime*, 37 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2002).

221. For a discussion of the successes and challenges of these management systems, see REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001).

based instruments.²²² Advances in the regulation of environmental pollution, food safety, and industrial safety using management-based regulation are notable.²²³ Environmental management systems and other flexible and light-handed regulatory approaches offer a least-cost solution with incentives to meet—and in some cases exceed—that which is required by law.²²⁴

Proponents still ponder, though, just how prescriptive they should be about the plan and its implementation, how to monitor a firm's compliance, what the consequences for non-compliance should be, and exactly how this kind of regulation should be subject to the latest evaluation science. Long overdue answers to these questions are needed to combat the compliance conundrum and integrate new approaches into the broader progressive agenda.²²⁵ And, alas, the fast-paced movement of regulatory and legal technology holds much promise.

V.

REVISITING THE MODERN PROGRESSIVE AGENDA

The modern progressive agenda is often broadly defined by the pursuit of individual freedom; freedom from undue government interference; the opportunity to work toward economic and civic success; taking personal responsibility, and a sense of responsibility to others.²²⁶ Modern progressive issues revolve around jobs and the economy; taxes and deficits;

222. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, *Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals*, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 691, 714 (2003).

223. See, e.g., CARY COGLIANESE & JENNIFER NASH, *LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE* (2006). For a discussion of the limitations of management-based regulatory approaches, see Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, *Organizational Trust and the Limits of Management-Based Regulation*, 43 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 865 (2009).

224. See, e.g., CARY COGLIANESE & JENNIFER NASH, *Environmental Management Systems and the New Policy Agenda*, in *REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS?* (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001).

225. For early calls for corporate monitoring from a special seat on the board, see CHRISTOPHER STONE, *WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR* 174–83 (1975).

226. See AL YATES & ANNE BARTLEY, *PROGRESSIVE THINKING: A SYNTHESIS OF PROGRESSIVE VALUES, BELIEFS, AND POSITIONS* (2012).

health care, social security and Medicare; education; immigration; environmental, climate and energy policy; reproductive rights and health; money in politics; and gay rights and marriage equality.²²⁷

Matters of corporate responsibility, accountability, and justice are the subject of vociferous advocacy over what it means to break up the big banks, to separate commercial and investment banking by bringing back a replica of the Glass-Steagall Act (Banking Act of 1933), to enact financial speculation taxes, to limit executive compensation, and to use principles and practices of collective civil disobedience in order to “occupy” Wall Street.²²⁸ This advocacy attaches to the core progressive idea of “taming the giant corporation” that dominated progressive dogma in the 1970s and 1980s. Calls from Ralph Nader for federal incorporation laws, and Christopher Stone for general and special public directors, inspired a share of the new progressive agenda.²²⁹

In recognition of the harm flowing from serious wrongdoing on the part of the largest businesses, progressives see corporations as artificial entities whose domination and unconstrained power has now crept into every aspect of life. This power has a damaging hold on the political process. We live in a near corporate state, modern progressives say, where our most significant issue should be how to best constrain, disable, and disassemble the largest private institutions that have so successfully aggregated corporate power. Something must be done to address the disconnect between the interests of Wall Street and a law-abiding, honorable if not selfless Main Street.

If this generation of progressives will be the constituency supporting a measured and just corporate criminal law, they will have to know where to best direct government and corporate controls. This means balancing the value of abolishing corporate personhood with the importance of personhood for

227. See John Nichols, *Elizabeth Warren Offers Democrats More Than a 2016 Candidacy—She Offers a 2014 Agenda*, THE NATION (July 19, 2014), <https://www.thenation.com/article/elizabeth-warren-offers-democrats-more-2016-candidacy-she-offers-2014-agenda/> (“We believe that Wall Street needs stronger rules and tougher enforcement, and we’re willing to fight for it.”).

228. See *id.*

229. See NADER, *supra* note 137; STONE, *supra* note 225. For an older progressive take, see Melvin I. Urofsky, *Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era*, 26 AM. J. L. HIST. 160 (1982).

the attribution of criminal liability. This also means sharing the power of informal social controls between regulators and the regulated, as co-regulators, using leading enterprise technology; accepting the increasing delegation and, thus, privatization of public regulation with increasingly plural and decentered models of regulation; and recognizing how a progressive corporate criminal law will apply to enterprises of all sizes and ownership statuses.

It also means thinking about how modern progressive advocacy is affected by criminal justice strategies that, according to some, make black lives all but incidental.²³⁰ Neoconservative policing strategies characterized by containment, surveillance, pacification, and deception may meet law enforcement objectives but, at the same time, risk racial injustice.²³¹ Aggressive urban police policies and practices, modern progressives might argue, target precious criminal justice resources, a reasonable percentage of which could and should be used to combat corporate wrongdoing by companies of all sizes. Our malevolent portrait of street criminals and the “badness” of street-level wrongdoing contribute to a concentration of criminal justice attention and resources away from more aggressive investigation and prosecution of corporations.²³² These and other challenges to the modern progressive agenda are briefly detailed below, concluding with a reflection on how the rules of the compliance game would change with a little nudge from modern progressives.

A. *The Bridge From Old to New*

Casting a dark shadow on the ethics and integrity of big business may successfully connect old and new ideologies.²³³ It is a very satisfying rant for all of the obvious reasons. At the

230. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, *THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLOR-BLINDNESS* (2010); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, *CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS* (2014).

231. Alex S. Vitale & Brian J. Jefferson, *The Emergence of Command and Control Policing in Neoliberal New York*, in *POLICING THE PLANET: WHY THE POLICING CRISIS LED TO BLACK LIVES MATTER* 157–72 (J. Camp & C. Heatherton, ed., 2016).

232. See, e.g., Doron Teichman, *The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition*, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831 (2005).

233. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., *The Beginnings of “Big Business” in American Industry*, 33 BUS. HIST. REV. 1 (1959).

same time, assuming that all businesses beget evil is a lazy and distorted caricature. Progressives of old did much to unpack the value that different forms of constraint have on creating and successfully sustaining order within firms. Asking how social controls promote pro-social corporate behavior falls within the province of modern progressives as well.²³⁴

Progressives today have a significant stake in how compliance requirements are conceived, integrated into organizations, and evaluated for efficacy and effectiveness. Their failure to be true to their history by actively exploring the disconnect between functioning institutions of social control and powerful corporations diminishes the legitimacy of their calls for dismantling large financial institutions. Modern progressives should be leading this convergence of compliance solutions to reduce corporate deviance, and to disrupt the perennial game of compliance. Modern progressives also should be studying how this convergence may, at times, produce overly controlled and rigid workplaces.²³⁵ And modern progressives should be exploring how the use of both informal and formal social controls may more meaningfully connect to the characterization of corporations as moral agents and as persons.

In an effort to undo the grant of corporate constitutional rights, modern progressives regularly and consistently attack the very idea of personhood.²³⁶ Corporate personhood unfairly transforms the concept of property and unjustly limits liability. In the view of modern progressives, the idea of corporate personhood is inextricably tied to the evils associated with globalization, the dominance of corporate power, unjust wealth concentration, and an all-encompassing neoliberal disingenuousness.²³⁷ Modern progressives also worry about how

234. So, too, is charting a progressive course of corporate social responsibility. See Greenfield, *supra* note 96.

235. See Laufer & Robertson, *supra* note 112.

236. Matthew Rothschild, *Corporations Aren't Persons*, THE PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 2, 2010, <http://www.progressive.org/mrapril10.html> ("We need to slay the dragon of corporate personhood once and for all."). For a wonderful discussion of the history of these rights, see Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, *The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights*, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653 (2015).

237. This extends to the evils of corporate political influence in this post-Citizens United era. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., *Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending*, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 924–28 (2013); Michael D. Guttentag, *On Requiring Public Companies to Disclose Political Spend-*

large corporations epitomize corruption in modern form.²³⁸ Modern progressives join populists, and others to the left, in recoiling at our corporate economy and corporate society.²³⁹ Some go so far as to think that we are inching toward fascism with the rise of corporate control over the legislative and now executive branch, significantly diminishing civic power.

The deeply-held views of modern progressives on personhood in this post-*Citizen's United* period complicate any substantive reform of corporate criminal law.²⁴⁰ So, too, does the defining role of personhood in reproductive rights, more generally. Personhood statutes and initiatives are weapons of abortion foes.²⁴¹ All of these invectives beg the question: How can corporate personhood be abolished as a matter of progressive principles, while simultaneously accepting that part of the criminal law that generally looks to, if not requires, the very qualities and characteristics associated with personhood?²⁴² With the narrow exception of strict liability offenses, the fault requirements of federal and state criminal codes extend a distinct human form and logic to the *persona ficta* of a corporation.²⁴³ The corporate person is, in essence, more than a simple construction or empty metaphor.²⁴⁴ For progressives it is a facilitative legal fiction that allows criminal law principles to be attributed to culpable and thus deserving entities. Abolishing personhood may be the perfect way to avenge corporate evils. At the same time, though, undermining this fiction would

ing, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 593 (2014); Richard L. Hasen, *Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence*, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011); Amy J. Sepinwall, *Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of Corporate Citizenship*, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575 (2012).

238. William S. Laufer, *Modern Forms of Corruption and Moral Stains*, 12 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 373 (2014).

239. For a discussion of big business and "Corporate" America, see MCGERR *supra* note 19, at 147–81.

240. See Amy J. Sepinwall, *Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of Corporate Citizenship*, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575 (2012).

241. Lee Rubin Collins & Susan L. Crockin, *Fighting 'Personhood' Initiatives in the United States*, in 24 REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 689 (2012).

242. See Walt & Laufer, *supra* note 7.

243. See, e.g., STONE, *supra* note 18 at 3.

244. See Donald R. Cressey, *The Poverty of Theory in Corporate Crime Research*, in 1 ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH 31 (William S. Laufer & Freda Adler eds., 1989).

likely diminish the role and suasion of the most formal of social controls to address this evil.²⁴⁵

Modern progressives face a difficult dilemma. Take away the person, and principles of corporate criminal law must be formally recast. Abolish personhood and one might have to reconstruct any responsive regulatory architecture, straining to find a place for the benign big gun.²⁴⁶ The analytic challenge is exceptionally difficult if one is committed to a consistent conception of personhood across the criminal law.²⁴⁷ How should modern progressives inherit the old progressive's consternation over organizational personhood? Practically, there is no need to ask whether the progressive call for strengthening the regulatory system may be satisfied while at the same time abolishing the fictional form that allows for liability. Modern progressives benefit from parallel fault standards that allow for prosecutions of either human or corporate persons, or both.²⁴⁸ The Yates Memorandum distracts attention from well-

245. For a comparable argument, see Kent Greenfield, *Let Us Now Praise Corporate Persons*, WASH. MONTHLY, January/February 2015, <http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/janfeb-2015/let-us-now-praise-corporate-persons/> ("But the attack on corporate personhood is a mistake. And it may, ironically, be playing into the hands of the financial and managerial elite. What's the best way to control corporate power? More corporate personhood, not less.").

246. In fairness, while some courts find personhood to be incidental, most corporate criminal prosecutions assume certain relational properties commonly associated with personhood. See, e.g., *State v. Knutson*, 537 N.W.2d 420, 427 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (" . . . it is not in virtue of being a person that criminal liability attaches. It is in virtue of possessing the complex relational property of causing harm—voluntarily—with a wrongful state of mind—without excuse."); see also Walt & Laufer, *supra* note 7.

247. This raises the more general question of why the "personhood" epithet must be employed consistently. Perhaps different parts of the criminal law might apply to corporations differently because the interests at stake are different? Why create a useful heuristic (personhood) and then use it in many different contexts where it may not be useful? Both are good questions that are not answered by the tendency of courts and legislatures to reflexively resort to personhood heuristics or person-based analogies.

248. See, e.g., John Dewey, *The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality*, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 658 (1926) ("[B]efore anything can be a jural person it must intrinsically possess certain properties, the existence of which is necessary to constitute anything a person."). The strategic use of parallel civil and criminal proceedings has been discussed at length. See *Developments in the Law—Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions*, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1311, 1333–40 (1979).

settled principles that prosecutors have the discretion to proceed in parallel or proceed separately.²⁴⁹ Strategic considerations account for variations in prosecutorial behavior, with a distinct preference for individual cases evident well before the Yates Memo.²⁵⁰

Changes to the general part of the corporate criminal law over the past century are nearly impossible to find. In place of successful corporate criminal law reform, a legion of strange bedfellows have battled over corporate metaphysics, moral agency, and what it means for a company to have a “soul” and be culpable or liable.²⁵¹ These battles are undeniably engag-

249. See Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 28, 2008), <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf> (“Where a decision is made to charge a corporation, it does not necessarily follow that individual directors, officers, employees, or shareholders should not also be charged. Prosecution of a corporation is not a substitute for the prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within or without the corporation.”). It is interesting to note that outside of the United States, there is an ongoing debate over the implications of *ne bis in idem* in proceeding against both “legal” and human persons. See Dominik Brodowski, *Minimum Procedural Rights for Corporations in Corporate Criminal Procedure*, in REGULATING CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 211–225 (Dominik Brodowski, Manuel Espinoza de los Monteros de la Parra, Klaus Tiedemann, Joachim Vogel eds., 2014).

250. Memorandum from Mark Filip, *supra* note 249. The Yates Memo signals that liability risk for firms should be conceived in terms of an individual agent’s non-compliance. No prosecution of a corporation will result unless there is *prima facie* evidence of an agent’s fault. The result for compliance officers is simple: Focusing resources on organizational fault is unresponsive to this regulatory prescription. To be responsive, firms should focus attention on the acts and omissions of individual agents. The compliance function is justifiably tied to regulatory prescriptions. Elsewhere, it was argued that changes in requirement of the general part of the corporate criminal law invite congruence or consistency problems. See William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, *Corporate Crime and Making Amends*, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1307, 1311 (2007).

251. See generally ERIC W. ORTS & N. CRAIG SMITH, *THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS* (2017); PETER A. FRENCH, *COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY* (1984); MARGARET GILBERT, *SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY* (2000); Philip Pettit, *Responsibility Incorporated*, 117 ETHICS 171 (2007); Susan Wolf, *The Legal and Moral Responsibility of Organizations*, in 27 CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS 267, 268 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985).

ing, and so very longstanding.²⁵² With no metrics for progress created, and no inspired law reform to show, however, statutory and decisional law is left to rest in a state of doctrinal decay.

It is also true that a wide range of proposed entity fault standards that show promise for more meaningful and genuine determinations of fault were left on the table. These determinations turn on connections between the decisions, actions, and inactions of agents, and the quality and characteristics of the firm.²⁵³ More relevant to the progressive case, these “genuine” fault standards tend to facilitate reasonable attributions of fault.

Modern progressives should seize the opportunity for greater corporate accountability and push for the adoption of culpability and liability standards that conceive of fault as (1) an entity’s acts and intentionality, (2) a function of an agent’s status in the corporate hierarchy, (3) a collection of intentions, (4) or the nature of an agent’s relationship to the principal. Constructive corporate fault, corporate character and culture theory, and proactive/reactive fault are also candidates for liability and culpability standards that are organizational in nature.²⁵⁴

Progressives might, for example, adopt a corporate liability standard that conceives of fault as an entity’s acts and intentionality or perhaps a function of an agent’s relationship to the principal. This approach is consistent with a constructive corporate liability.²⁵⁵ A constructive corporate liability and culpability exists where there is proof of: (1) an illegal corporate act, and (2) a concurrent corporate criminal state of mind. The former requirement may be satisfied by evidence of a pri-

252. See Max Radin, *The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality*, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 643 (1932). For a recent treatment on agency questions, see ORTS & SMITH, *supra* note 251.

253. See *infra* notes 255–256.

254. William S. Laufer, *Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds*, 43 EMORY L.J. 648, 678 (1994) (detailing different conceptions of “genuine corporate fault”); see also Pamela H. Bucy, *Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability*, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1121 (1991); Ann Foerschler, Comment, *Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward a Better Understanding of Corporate Misconduct*, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1299–1300 (1990). For a fascinating take on corporate culpability and cognitive science, see, Mihailis E. Diamantis, *Corporate Criminal Minds*, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049 (2016).

255. See Laufer, *supra* note 2, at 70–72.

mary act—an act that is owned or authored by the corporation. Primary action may be identified through an objective test where it is determined that given the size, complexity, formality, functionality, decision-making process, and structure of the corporate organization, it is reasonable to conclude that the agents' acts are the actions of the corporation. This reasonableness test is a threshold assessment that serves to separate those cases in which primary corporate acts have occurred, from those appropriately considered as individual non-corporate acts (or secondary acts). Constructive corporate fault replaces vicarious liability with a constructive test of primary corporate action.

Any reasonable departure from corporate vicarious liability, it seems, would be preferred by modern progressives. Principles of vicarious fault are simply too difficult and costly to apply to agents of large and powerful corporations. The larger the organization, the more likely that the agent's acts and intents are attenuated; the more likely that there are relevant policies, procedures, and training that further disconnect the wrongdoing from the corporation's diligence; the more likely that corporations will engage in "reverse whistleblowing"; and the more likely that for reasons of sheer size and steady base-rates of deviance, vicarious fault would apply to far too many agents to be both reasonable and practical.²⁵⁶

B. *Taming the Giant Corporation?*

Targeting and taming giant corporations excites progressives of both old and new stripes. There are many good reasons to attend to iconic companies of great scale, from their market and political power, to the lasting effects of their ethical and legal violations.²⁵⁷ The largest private sector actors powerfully influence both regulation and any attribution of

256. See Laufer, *supra* note 5, at 657–58, for a discussion of corporate scapegoating (called "reverse whistleblowing") by deflecting blame to low-level employees.

257. See NADER, *supra* note 137, at 7. There is a long history to the progressive's concern with big business. See, e.g., MCGERR, *supra* note 19, at 151 ("The rise of large-scale corporations was unsettling, even frightening. Big business, as one newspaper warned, could well "lead to one of the greatest upheavals that has been witnessed in modern history."); see also Charles A. Moore, *Taming the Giant Corporation? Some Cautionary Remarks on the Determinability of Corporate Crime*, 33 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 379 (1987).

criminal responsibility.²⁵⁸ Corporations are deft at undermining legislative efforts to limit industry self-regulation and firm self-governance. What remains of corporate crime reforms often has as much to do with the exercise of corporate power as with the congressional intent behind the legislation.²⁵⁹ Corporate political influence is a longstanding and sustained concern of progressives.²⁶⁰

Classic research by Marshall Clinard and Peter Yeager in 1979 revealed that wrongdoing is generously distributed in the largest companies.²⁶¹ Many years of employee surveys from large firms confirm high base rates, much of which is washed through non-reporting or management inertia, if not inaction.²⁶² Giant corporations also benefit significantly from a multi-tier system of corporate criminal justice, one in which the only companies generally prosecuted to conviction are the small ones wherein owners had direct knowledge of the illegalities.²⁶³ Larger corporations are often diverted from the criminal process into deferred prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, and corporate integrity agreements.²⁶⁴ A small number of the largest corporations, those that offer something quite important or strategic—or whose existence is systemically important—are simply too big to indict, prosecute, take to trial, and convict.²⁶⁵ Nowhere is this more apparent than in the torpor to bring criminal cases against the largest financial institutions for wrongdoing during the subprime mortgage crisis.²⁶⁶

258. Thomas M. Jones, *Corporate Governance: Who Controls the Large Corporation*, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1261 (1979).

259. See Laufer, *supra* note 2, at 7; Vikramaditya S. Khanna, *Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis*, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 95, 104 (2004).

260. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, *The Mind and Heart of Progressive Legal Thought*, 81 IOWA L. REV. 149 (1995).

261. CLINARD & YEAGER, *supra* note 73.

262. Laufer, *supra* note 2, at 144.

263. Laufer, *Corporate Liability*, *supra* note 41, at 1344.

264. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, *TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS* (2014) (an excellent treatment of the challenges associated with prosecuting and not prosecuting some of the most powerful corporation).

265. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN STAFF OF THE COMM. ON FIN. SERVICES, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, *TOO BIG TO JAIL: INSIDE THE OBAMA JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION NOT TO HOLD WALL STREET ACCOUNTABLE* (2016).

266. Sharon E. Foster, *Too Big to Prosecute: Collateral Consequences, Systemic Institutions and the Rule of Law*, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 655 (2015).

There is an obvious and justifiable attraction to think of business crimes and organizational wrongdoing as the province of giant corporations. Part of the lure comes from very real concerns over concentrated resources, the sheer power and scale on which to do wrong, boundless capabilities to deflect and defend any accusation, access to extant regulatory strategy, and the difficulty of obtaining inculpatory evidence given the complexity of the corporate form. The other part of the lure is the sheer scale of their economies in comparison to other, different kinds of economies.

There is some risk, though, in uncritically accepting archetypal images of the largest private sector institutions, especially when conceiving corporate crime policy. At times, too little reflection is given to the variety of iconic images of corporations that do wrong. It is not only that there are many different types of corporations, many different kinds of corporate cultures, and sustained base rates of deviance in all.²⁶⁷ It is not that big businesses who do wrong are less deserving of blame. The real risk is that such images make too convincing a case that regulatory attention should focus only on giant corporations and that all giant corporations are, in progressive terminology, evil. It is unfortunate that old and modern progressives are guilty of seducing and being seduced by symbolic imagery, as much as big business and government functionaries.

The near-exclusive focus by progressives on the giants of industry is also not justified by any evidence of greater rates of deviance in the largest corporations. On the contrary, in small to medium sized enterprises (“SMEs”), those with few resources to commit to compliance policies and programs, the rates of wrongdoing are likely as high, if not higher.²⁶⁸ Cer-

267. For a fascinating exploration of base rates of misconduct, see MARK EGAN, GREGOR MATVOS, & AMIT SERU, *THE MARKET FOR FINANCIAL ADVISOR MISCONDUCT* (Apr. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Chicago Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics).

268. See, Donald F. Kuratko, Jeffrey S. Hornsby & Douglas W. Naffziger, *Crime and Small Business: An Exploratory Study of Cost and Prevention Issues in U.S. Firms*, 38 J. OF SMALL BUS. MGMT. 1 (2000); Michael L. Ettredge, Karla Johnstone, Mary Stone, & Qian Wang, *The Effects of Firm Size, Corporate Governance Quality, and Bad News on Disclosure Compliance*, 16 REV. OF ACCT. STUD., 866 (2011); Giampaolo Gabbi, Paola Musile Tanzi, & Loris Nadotti, *Firm Size and Compliance Costs Asymmetries in the Investment Services*, 19 J. OF FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 58 (2011); Darryl K. Brown, *The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate Crime Enforcement*, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521 (2003).

tainly, regulatory disclosure requirements decrease appreciably in SMEs, in particular in the nearly 30 million small businesses in the United States.²⁶⁹

Images that target and tame giant corporate wrongdoing, on occasion, carry the neoconservative and neoliberal baggage of over-criminalization.²⁷⁰ The time is long overdue for modern progressives to reposition the policing of all corporate crimes as a problem of under-criminalization and under-enforcement.²⁷¹ After all, the use of the criminal law against corporations both large *and* small remains a very rare event in the criminal justice system.

Modern progressives are left with several avenues for justice, and one can hope that this movement will transcend objections and follow in the footsteps of both history and tradition. Progressive proposals for federal chartering of the largest and most powerful corporations suggest that this transcendence is possible.²⁷² The case for federal chartering is premised on the failure of individual accountability, the unparalleled impact of big businesses on markets, the failure of state chartering laws to reign in corporate abuses, marked failures of corporate disclosures, and market concentration that prevents fair competition.²⁷³ The chartering proposals, while unsuccessful, offered modern progressives a powerful vector for a more ambitious reform agenda.

269. For a fascinating discussion of the challenges of self-regulation and wrongdoing in small businesses, see Robyn Fairman & Charlotte Yapp, *Enforced Self-Regulation, Prescription, and Conceptions of Compliance within Small Businesses: The Impact of Enforcement*, 27 L. & POL'Y 491 (2005).

270. See Erik Luna, *Overextending the Criminal Law*, in *GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING* (Gene Healy ed., 2004).

271. Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, *Overenforcement*, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1778 (2005); Stuart Green, *Is There Too Much Criminal Law?* 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 737 (2009) (reviewing DOUGLAS HOUSAK, *OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW* (2008)); Sara Sun Beale, *The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization*, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 778 (2005).

272. RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN, & JOEL SELIGMAN, *TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION: HOW THE LARGEST CORPORATIONS CONTROL OUR LIVES* (1976) (discussing the design and prospects of federal chartering).

273. *Id.*

CONCLUSION

If the century-old-history of corporate criminal law is any guide, our regulatory destiny is bounded by a repeated episodic pattern. Start with a period of regulatory laxity, followed by a period of “unprecedented” corporate scandals, leading to a time of heightened regulatory scrutiny and then on to legislative reforms.²⁷⁴ The reforms will usually be followed by targeted lobbying and legislative amendments, ending, once again, with an uncertain time of regulatory laxity. That there is no modern progressive account of corporate criminal law is a missed opportunity to disrupt the regularity of this century old pattern of recurring scandals and reforms. Such disruption might ensure the integrity and longevity of corporate crime reforms, shift the priority given to corporate criminal law enforcement and prosecution, push lawmakers toward enacting greater accountability for corporate wrongdoing and, all along, promote the proper measure of social controls with a commitment to science.

Modern progressives inherit the tradition of using science to fashion a fair and just sociology of social control. Raising a progressive voice at this convergence of compliance science and disruptive technology, methods, and standards, would countenance the founding ideas of progressivism. There is also immeasurable value in hearing a loud progressive voice when the politics of the moment place at risk many of the regulatory reforms of the past two decades.

This is a time when the voices of modern progressives should compete with the stalwart advocates, corporate libertarians, and those of other ideologies in defining compliance constructs and principles. The days of faint speech at the margins should be over. Entering a more robust debate over corporate accountability is no short order given the boundaries

274. Laufer *supra* note 2 at 43 (“With a certain sense of regulatory bravado, names of some of the most respected companies on Wall Street are now held out as deviant and deserving of criminal sanctions. If history is any guide, though, this period of active regulation will see a change, a regulatory shift that accommodates economic prosperity brought about by new forms of business innovation and risk taking. One day, perhaps not so long from now, the inevitability of regulatory laxity will bring about waves of seemingly unprecedented scandals that will surprise and shock us all, again.”); *see also* Sally S. Simpson, *Cycles of Illegality: Antitrust Violations in Corporate America*, 65 *SOCIAL FORCES* 943 (1987) (suggesting some comparable patterns).

around disciplinary methods, journals, and intellectual exchanges. To have impact on the content and contours of corporate criminal law, proponents must speak in ways that engage policy makers as active partners in this competition.²⁷⁵

The good news is that modern progressives know that there is an inevitability to the development of increasingly integrated regulatory instruments, an inevitability to more sophisticated enterprise wide systems, an inevitability to the widespread adoption of plural and decentered non-state regulatory solutions, and an inevitability to some kind of fair and just international regulatory regime. And modern progressives are uniquely positioned to understand what the inevitability of progress might mean for the future of corporate criminal justice.²⁷⁶

275. Daniel S. Nagin & Cody W. Telep, *Procedural Justice and Legal Compliance*, 13 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 1 (2017) (reviewing the translation of research on compliance); Robert J. Sampson, Christopher Winship, & Carly Knight, *Overview of: "Translating Causal Claims: Principles and Strategies for Policy-Relevant Criminology"*, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 585 (2013).

276. The future prospects of a science of corporate criminal justice was recently discussed at the National Academy of Sciences. See *What Does Science Offer Corporate Criminal Justice*, Planning Meeting, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES COMMITTEE ON LAW AND JUSTICE & ZICKLIN CENTER OF THE WHARTON SCHOOL (2015). Claims about the inevitability of the progress of science are made with an appreciation for positions other than that of the inevitabilist. See, e.g., Ian Hacking, *How Inevitable are the Results of Successful Science?*, 67 PHIL. SCI. 558 (2000); Katherina Kinzel, *State of the Field: Are the Results of Science Contingent or Inevitable?*, 52 STUD. IN HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 55 (2015); Lena Soler, *Are the Results of Our Science Contingent or Inevitable?* 39 STUD. IN THE HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 221 (2008); Lena Soler, *Revealing the Analytical Structure and Some Intrinsic Major Difficulties of the Contingentist/Inevitabilist Issue*, 39 STUD. IN THE HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 230 (2008); Howard Sankey, *Scientific Realism and the Inevitability of Science*, 39 STUD. IN HIST. & PHIL. SCI. 259 (2008).