Abstract
Strong security notions often introduce strong constraints on the construction of cryptographic schemes: semantic security implies probabilistic encryption, while the resistance to existential forgeries requires redundancy in signature schemes. Some paddings have thus been designed in order to provide these minimal requirements to each of them, in order to achieve secure primitives.
A few years ago, Coron et al. suggested the design of a common construction, a universal padding, which one could apply for both encryption and signature. As a consequence, such a padding has to introduce both randomness and redundancy, which does not lead to an optimal encryption nor an optimal signature.
In this paper, we refine this notion of universal padding, in which a part can be either a random string in order to introduce randomness or a zero-constant string in order to introduce some redundancy. This helps us to build, with a unique padding, optimal encryption and optimal signature: first, in the random-permutation model, and then in the random-oracle model. In both cases, we study the concrete sizes of the parameters, for a specific security level: The former achieves an optimal bandwidth.
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Chevallier-Mames, B., Phan, D.H., Pointcheval, D. (2005). Optimal Asymmetric Encryption and Signature Paddings. In: Ioannidis, J., Keromytis, A., Yung, M. (eds) Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ACNS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3531. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11496137_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11496137_18
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