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Combining Intruder Theories

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Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 3580))

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Abstract

Most of the decision procedures for symbolic analysis of protocols are limited to a fixed set of algebraic operators associated with a fixed intruder theory. Examples of such sets of operators comprise XOR, multiplication/exponentiation, abstract encryption/decryption. In this paper we give an algorithm for combining decision procedures for arbitrary intruder theories with disjoint sets of operators, provided that solvability of ordered intruder constraints, a slight generalization of intruder constraints, can be decided in each theory. This is the case for most of the intruder theories for which a decision procedure has been given. In particular our result allows us to decide trace-based security properties of protocols that employ any combination of the above mentioned operators with a bounded number of sessions.

Supported by IST-2001-39252 AVISPA, ACI SATIN, ACI-Jeune Chercheur JC9005.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IRIT Université Paul Sabatier, France

    Yannick Chevalier

  2. LORIA-INRIA-Lorraine, France

    Michaël Rusinowitch

Authors
  1. Yannick Chevalier
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  2. Michaël Rusinowitch
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. CITI / Departamento de Informática, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal

    Luís Caires

  2. Dipartimento di Informatica, Sistemi e Produzione, Università di Roma “Tor Vergata”, via del Politecnico 1, 00133, Roma, Italy

    Giuseppe F. Italiano

  3. Departamento de Informatica, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2829-516, Caparica, Portugal

    Luís Monteiro

  4. Ecole Polytechnique, Rue de Saclay, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France

    Catuscia Palamidessi

  5. Computer Science Department, Google Inc. and Columbia University, 1214 Amsterdam Avenue, NY 10027, New York, USA

    Moti Yung

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Chevalier, Y., Rusinowitch, M. (2005). Combining Intruder Theories. In: Caires, L., Italiano, G.F., Monteiro, L., Palamidessi, C., Yung, M. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3580. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11523468_52

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11523468_52

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-27580-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31691-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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