Abstract
This paper considers a secure and practical CRT-based RSA signature implementation against both side channel attacks (including power analysis attack, timing attack, and most specially the recent MRED attack) as well as the various CRT-based fault attacks. Moreover, the proposed countermeasure can resist C safe-error attack which can be mounted in many existing good countermeasures. To resist side-channel attack, a special design of random message blinding is employed. On the other hand, a countermeasure based on the idea of fault diffusion is developed to protect the implementation against the powerful CRT-based fault attacks.
This research has been supported by University IT Research Center Project.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Aumüller, C., Bier, P., Fischer, W., Hofreiter, P., Seifert, J.P.: Fault attacks on RSA with CRT: Concrete results and practical countermeasures. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S., Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2002. LNCS, vol. 2523, pp. 260–275. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
den Boer, B., Lemke, K., Wicke, G.: A DPA attack against the modular reduction within a CRT implementation of RSA. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S., Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2002. LNCS, vol. 2523, pp. 228–243. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Boneh, D., DeMillo, R.A., Lipton, R.J.: One the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults. In: Fumy, W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1997. LNCS, vol. 1233, pp. 37–51. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Joye, M., Lenstra, A.K., Quisquater, J.-J.: Chinese remaindering based cryptosystems in the presence of faults. Journal of Cryptology 12(4), 241–245 (1999)
Lenstra, A.K.: Memo on RSA signature generation in the presence of faults (September 1996)
Novak, R.: SPA-based adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack on RSA implementation. In: Naccache, D., Paillier, P. (eds.) PKC 2002. LNCS, vol. 2274, pp. 252–262. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Okeya, K., Takagi, T.: Security analysis of CRT-based cryptosystems. In: Jakobsson, M., Yung, M., Zhou, J. (eds.) ACNS 2004. LNCS, vol. 3089, pp. 383–397. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Schindler, W.: A timing attack against RSA with the Chinese remainder theorem. In: CHES 1999. LNCS, vol. 1717, pp. 292–302. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Shamir, A.: How to check modular exponentiation. In: Advances in Cryptology, Konstanz, Germany (1997)
Yen, S.-M., Kim, S., Lim, S., Moon, S.-J.: RSA speedup with residue number system immune against hardware fault cryptanalysis. In: Kim, K.-c. (ed.) ICISC 2001. LNCS, vol. 2288, pp. 397–413. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Yen, S.M., Moon, S.J., Ha, J.C.: Permanent fault attack on the parameters of RSA with CRT. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Seberry, J. (eds.) ACISP 2003. LNCS, vol. 2727, pp. 285–296. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Kim, C., Ha, J., Moon, S., Yen, SM., Kim, SH. (2005). A CRT-Based RSA Countermeasure Against Physical Cryptanalysis. In: Yang, L.T., Rana, O.F., Di Martino, B., Dongarra, J. (eds) High Performance Computing and Communications. HPCC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3726. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11557654_64
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11557654_64
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-29031-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32079-1
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)