Abstract
The application of formal methods in secure operating system experiences a procedure of development and maturity with the eminence and development of secure operating system itself. According to Common Criteria and United States Department of Defenses Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), high security level secure operating system should introduce formal methods in the process development and evaluation. Security in Mind Operating System (SECIMOS) is a customizable secure operating system developed by Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Science. In this work, we formally model the security policies using Z specification language and informally proved the correspondence between policies and top level functionalities. As a result, we summarize the gist to choose a formal description language for modeling a secure operating system and possibility of use Isabelle/HOL as a formal tool.
This work is jointly supported by National Basic Research Program of China (973) under Grant No. G1999035802, National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 60373054 and National High-Tech Research and Development Program of China (863) under Grant No. 2002AA141080.
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Zhou, Z., Liang, B., Jiang, L., Shi, W., He, Y. (2005). A Formal Description of SECIMOS Operating System. In: Gorodetsky, V., Kotenko, I., Skormin, V. (eds) Computer Network Security. MMM-ACNS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3685. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11560326_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11560326_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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