Abstract
We present in this paper an incentive-compatible distributed optimization method applied to social choice problems. The method works by computing and collecting VCG taxes in a distributed fashion. This introduces a certain resilience to manipulation from the problem solving agents. An extension of this method sacrifices Pareto-optimality in favor of budget-balance: the solutions chosen are not optimal anymore, but the advantage is that the self interested agents pay the taxes between themselves, thus producing no tax surplus. This eliminates unwanted incentives for the problem solving agents, ensuring their faithfulness.
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Petcu, A., Faltings, B. (2005). Incentive Compatible Multiagent Constraint Optimization. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_71
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_71
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0
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