Abstract
Cooperation is an important speciality of human behaviour. Unlike most creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again. These patterns of cooperation can be explained by the theory of indirect reciprocity. That is to say, cooperation appears because it confers the image of a valuable community member. In a sense, to discriminate a valuable member is prerequisite for cooperation. By analytic model and computer simulations in this paper, we show the essence of cooperation mechanism consists of discriminators and punishment. In particular, we show that discriminators of different grades have dissimilar effects.
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Du, P., Li, Y., Xu, W. (2005). Cooperation Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Discrimination. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_77
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_77
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