Abstract
Discount auctions is a market mechanism for buying heterogeneous items in a single auction. The bidders are suppliers and a bid consists of individual cost for each of the items and a non-decreasing discount function defined over the number of items. The winner determination problem faced by the buyer is to determine the winning suppliers and their corresponding winning items. We show that this problem is \({\cal NP}\)-hard upon reduction from the set covering problem. The problem has an embedded network structure, which is exploited to develop heuristics and an exact branch and bound algorithm. Computational experiments were performed to evaluate the proposed algorithms.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Rothkopf, M.H., Park, S.: An elementary introduction to auctions. Interfaces 31, 83–97 (2001)
Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., Steinberg, R.: Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press, Cambridge (2005)
Rothkopf, M.H., Pekec, A., Harstad, R.: Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions. Management Science 44, 1131–1147 (1998)
Mishra, D.: Auction design for multi-item procurement. PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Wisconsin (2004)
Kameshwaran, S., Benyoucef, L., Xie, X.: Discount auctions for procuring heterogeneous items. In: Proceedings of Seventh International Conference on Electronic Commerce, ICEC 2005 (2005)
Eso, M., Ghosh, S., Kalagnanam, J., Ladanyi, L.: Bid evaluation in procurement auctions with piece-wise linear supply curves. Research Report RC 22219, IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, NJ, USA (2001)
Garey, M.R., Johnson, D.S.: Computers and Intractability. Freeman, New York (1979)
Pisinger, D., Toth, P.: Knapsack problems. In: Du, D.Z., Pardalos, P.M. (eds.) Handbook of Combinatorial Optimization, pp. 299–428. Kluwer Academic Publications, Dordrecht (1998)
Bichler, M., Kalagnanam, J.: Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions. European Journal of Operations Research 160 (2005)
Chandru, V., Rao, M.R.: Integer programming. In: Atallah, M.J. (ed.) Handbook of Algorithms and Theory of Computing, pp. 32.1–32.45. CRC Press, Boca Raton (1999)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Kameshwaran, S., Benyoucef, L., Xie, X. (2005). Winner Determination in Discount Auctions. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_88
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_88
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32293-1
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)