Abstract
We design and analyze a simple optimistic fair non-repudia- tion protocol. Our protocol is considerably simpler and more efficient than current proposals, due mainly to the avoidance of using session labels. We model-check both safety and liveness properties. The safety properties are verified using a standard intruder, and the liveness properties using an intruder that respects the resilient communication channels assumption. Finally, to provide further confidence in the protocol, several vulnerabilities on weaker versions of our protocol are exposed.
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Cederquist, J., Corin, R., Dashti, M.T. (2005). On the Quest for Impartiality: Design and Analysis of a Fair Non-repudiation Protocol. In: Qing, S., Mao, W., López, J., Wang, G. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3783. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11602897_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11602897_3
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