Abstract
We argue that threshold trust is not an option in most of the real-life electronic auctions. We then propose two new cryptographic Vickrey auction schemes that involve, apart from the bidders and the seller S, an auction authority A so that unless 5 and A collude the outcome of auctions will be correct, and moreover, S will not get any information about the bids, while A will learn bid statistics. Further extensions make it possible to decrease damage that colluding S and A can do, and to construct (m + l)st price auction schemes. The communication complexity between the S and A in medium-size auctions is at least one order of magnitude less than in the Naor-Pinkas-Sumner scheme.
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Lipmaa, H., Asokan, N., Niemi, V. (2003). Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust. In: Blaze, M. (eds) Financial Cryptography. FC 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2357. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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