Abstract
The correctness of an authentication protocol is based on, among others, the relation between nonces and data that is established in the course of execution of the protocol. In this paper, we formulate an inference system that derives the secrecy of nonces and the relation that binds nonces and data. It is easy to show the correctness of a protocol by directly deriving the binding relation using the inference rules. Depending on situations, it is also possible to extend the inference system by simply adding new inference rules. We give some example protocols whose correctness can only be shown using some conditions on nonces that are formulated as additional inference rules.
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Hagiya, M., Takemura, R., Takahashi, K., Saito, T. (2003). Verification of Authentication Protocols Based on the Binding Relation. In: Okada, M., Pierce, B.C., Scedrov, A., Tokuda, H., Yonezawa, A. (eds) Software Security — Theories and Systems. ISSS 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2609. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36532-X_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36532-X_19
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