Abstract
In [BrPiSe90] Brown, Pieprzyk and Seberry proposed a new encryption primitive, which encrypts and decrypts a 64-bit block of data using a 64-bit key. Furthermore they propose a way to build private versions of LOKI.
In this paper we show first that the keyspace of any LOKI-version is only 260, not 264 as claimed. Therefore there are 15 equivalent keys for every key, that encrypts/decrypts texts the same way. An immediate consequence is, that the proposed Single Block Hash Mode is no good. It is very easy to find collisions.
Secondly we do differential cryptanalysis on LOKI and show that n-round LOKI, nā¤14 is vulnerable to this kind of attack, at least in principle. We show that we cannot find a characteristic with a probability high enough to break LOKI with 16 rounds. However one might find a private LOKI-version, that is vulnerable to a differential attack for n=16.
The main part of this paper was made at the Technical University of Eindhoven, the Netherlands, during my stay there from 1.2.91 to 29.6.91.
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Lawrence Brown, Josef Pieprzyk, Jennifer Seberry. LOKI ā A Cryptographic Primitive for Authentication and Secrecy Applications. Advances in Cryptology ā AUSCRYPT '90. Springer Verlag, Lecture Notes 453, pp. 229ā236, 1990.
Eli Biham, Adi Shamir. Differential Cryptanalysis of DES-like Cryptosystems. Journal of Cryptology 1991.
Eli Biham, Adi Shamir. Differential Cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOC-II, LOKI and Lucifer. Presented at CRYPTO '91.
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Ā© 1993 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Knudsen, L.R. (1993). Cryptanalysis of LOKI. In: Imai, H., Rivest, R.L., Matsumoto, T. (eds) Advances in Cryptology ā ASIACRYPT '91. ASIACRYPT 1991. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 739. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-57332-1_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-57332-1_2
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