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Security Games Applied to Real-World: Research Contributions and Challenges

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Moving Target Defense II

Part of the book series: Advances in Information Security ((ADIS,volume 100))

Abstract

The goal of this chapter is to introduce a challenging real-world problem for researchers in multiagent systems and beyond, where our collective efforts may have a significant impact on activities in the real-world. The challenge is in applying game theory for security: our goal is not only to introduce the problem, but also to provide exemplars of initial successes of deployed systems in this problem arena. Furthermore, we present key ideas and algorithms for solving and understanding the characteristics large-scale real-world security games, and then present some key open research challenges in this area.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The deployed application of Protect uses a quantal response model whereas the multiple attacker branch-and-price algorithm computes SSE as originally defined [41]. Here, by the Protect domain, we refer to the security domain where defender has to execute patrols that are bounded by their tour length.

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Acknowledgements

This research is supported by MURI grant W911NF-11-1-0332, ONR grant N00014-08-1-0733 and by the United States Department of Homeland Security through the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) under grant number 2010-ST-061-RE0001. All opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Department of Homeland Security.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, 90089, USA

    Manish Jain, Bo An & Milind Tambe

Authors
  1. Manish Jain
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  2. Bo An
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  3. Milind Tambe
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Correspondence to Manish Jain .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Secure Information Systems, George Mason University, Fairfax, 22030-4444, Virginia, USA

    Sushil Jajodia

  2. Center for Secure Information Systems, George Mason University, University Drive, Fairfax, 22030-4422, Virginia, USA

    Anup K. Ghosh

  3. Inst. Advanced Computer Studies, Dept. Computer Science, University of Maryland, Paint Branch Dr, College Park, 20742, Maryland, USA

    V.S. Subrahmanian

  4. The MITRE Corporation, Colshire Drive 7515, McLean, 22102-7508, Virginia, USA

    Vipin Swarup

  5. Computing & Information Sci Div, Triangle Park, 27709-2211, North Carolina, USA

    Cliff Wang

  6. Fudan University, Shanghai, 200433, China, People's Republic

    X. Sean Wang

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Jain, M., An, B., Tambe, M. (2013). Security Games Applied to Real-World: Research Contributions and Challenges. In: Jajodia, S., Ghosh, A., Subrahmanian, V., Swarup, V., Wang, C., Wang, X. (eds) Moving Target Defense II. Advances in Information Security, vol 100. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5416-8_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5416-8_2

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