Abstract
Most modern web browsers today sacrifice optimal TLS security for backward compatibility. They apply coarse-grained TLS configurations that support (by default) legacy versions of the protocol that have known design weaknesses, and weak ciphersuites that provide fewer security guarantees (e.g. non Forward Secrecy), and silently fall back to them if the server selects to. This introduces various risks including downgrade attacks such as the POODLE attack [15] that exploits the browsers silent fallback mechanism to downgrade the protocol version in order to exploit the legacy version flaws. To achieve a better balance between security and backward compatibility, we propose a mechanism for fine-grained TLS configurations in web browsers based on the sensitivity of the domain name in the HTTPS request using a whitelisting technique. That is, the browser enforces optimal TLS configurations for connections going to sensitive domains while enforcing default configurations for the rest of the connections. We demonstrate the feasibility of our proposal by implementing a proof-of-concept as a Firefox browser extension. We envision this mechanism as a built-in security feature in web browsers, e.g. a button similar to the “Bookmark” button in Firefox browsers and as a standardised HTTP header, to augment browsers security.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
In our paper, TLS clients are represented by web browsers. We will use the terms client, web browser, or browser interchangeably.
- 3.
- 4.
Throughout the paper, mainstream browsers refer to the following tested versions: Chrome version 63.0.3239.108, Firefox 57.0.2, Internet Explorer 11.125.16299.0, Edge 41.16299.15.0, and Opera 49.0.2725.64.
- 5.
Extended Validation is a passive browser indicator that appears in the address bar only for websites which have strongly verified identity.
- 6.
A proxy (also known as middlebox) is an entity that can be placed between a client and server for various purposes such as interception or packet inspection. It splits the TLS connection between the client and server so that the client and server are in fact connecting to the proxy and not directly to each other.
- 7.
We hypothetically and proactively assume TLS 1.3 is the highest version in our TLS policy levels’ definitions. This will be the case when TLS 1.3 becomes a standard soon. However, in practice (and in our proof-of-concept) the highest possible version is still TLS 1.2.
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Acknowledgment
The authors would like to thank Prof. Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Prof. Andrew Martin for useful feedback, Nicholas Moore for useful discussions on javascript, William Seymour and John Gallacher for proofreading.
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Alashwali, E.S., Rasmussen, K. (2018). On the Feasibility of Fine-Grained TLS Security Configurations in Web Browsers Based on the Requested Domain Name. In: Beyah, R., Chang, B., Li, Y., Zhu, S. (eds) Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. SecureComm 2018. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 255. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01704-0_12
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