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Resistance of the Point Randomisation Countermeasure for Pairings Against Side-Channel Attack

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E-Business and Telecommunications (ICETE 2017)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 990))

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Abstract

Pairing-based cryptography (PBC) has been significantly studied over the last decade, both in the areas of computational performance and in establishing security and privacy protocols. PBC implementations on embedded devices are exposed to physical attacks such as side channel attacks. Such attacks which are able to recover the secret input used in some PBC-based schemes are our main focus in this paper. Various countermeasures have consequently been proposed in the literature. The present paper provides an updated review of the state of the art countermeasures against side channel attacks against PBC implementations. We especially focus on a technique based on point blinding using randomization. Furthermore, we propose a collision based side-channel attack against an implementation embedding the point randomization countermeasure. This raises questions about the validation of countermeasures for complex cryptographic schemes such as PBC. We also discuss about ways of defeat our attack. This article is in part an extension of the paper [20] published at Secrypt 2017.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported in part by the EUREKA Catrene programme under contract CAT208 MobiTrust and by a French DGA-MRIS scholarship.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Aix-Marseille Université, 163 Avenue de Luminy, 13009, Marseille, France

    Damien Jauvart

  2. Mines Saint-Étienne, 880, route de Mimet, 13541, Gardanne Cedex, France

    Nadia El Mrabet

  3. CEA LETI, 17 rue des Martyrs, 38054, Grenoble Cedex 9, France

    Jacques J. A. Fournier

  4. Laboratoire de Mathématiques de Versailles, UVSQ, CNRS, Université Paris-Saclay, 78035, Versailles, France

    Louis Goubin

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  1. Damien Jauvart
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  4. Louis Goubin
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Damien Jauvart .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan

    Mohammad S. Obaidat

  2. King Juan Carlos University, Madrid, Madrid, Spain

    Enrique Cabello

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Jauvart, D., El Mrabet, N., Fournier, J.J.A., Goubin, L. (2019). Resistance of the Point Randomisation Countermeasure for Pairings Against Side-Channel Attack. In: Obaidat, M., Cabello, E. (eds) E-Business and Telecommunications. ICETE 2017. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 990. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11039-0_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11039-0_8

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