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Provably Secure Three-Party Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange from RLWE

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Information Security Practice and Experience (ISPEC 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11879))

Abstract

Three-party key exchange, where two clients aim to agree a session key with the help of a trusted server, is prevalent in present-day systems. In this paper, we present a practical and secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol over ideal lattices. Aside from hash functions our protocol does not rely on external primitives in the construction and the security of our protocol is directly relied on the Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) assumption. Our protocol attains provable security. A proof-of-concept implementation shows our protocol is indeed practical.

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Acknowledgments

This article is supported by The National Key Research and Development Program of China (Grant No. 2017YFA0303903), National Cryptography Development Fund (No. MMJJ20170121), and Zhejiang Province Key R&D Project (No. 2017C01062). Authors thank Aijun Ge for discussions and the anonymous ISPEC’19 reviewers for helpful comments.

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Correspondence to Keting Jia .

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Liu, C., Zheng, Z., Jia, K., You, Q. (2019). Provably Secure Three-Party Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange from RLWE. In: Heng, SH., Lopez, J. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11879. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34339-2_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34339-2_4

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-34338-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-34339-2

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