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New Rectangle Attack Against SKINNY Block Cipher

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Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications (WASA 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 12939))

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Abstract

The issue of security and privacy plays an important role in the wireless networks and directly affects the wide application of wireless network systems. In order to protect the confidentiality of data for wireless networks, especially for the wireless sensor networks, a series of lightweight ciphers have been proposed in recent years. SKINNY, a family of lightweight block cipher, is designed in such scenario with competitive performance and security guarantees. SKINNY-128-256 is a widely used version as underlying primitive in NIST’s Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) project. In this paper, we consider the security of SKINNY-128-256 under related-tweakey rectangle attack. Based on an 18-round related-tweakey boomerang distinguisher composed of two 9-round differential characteristics, a 23-round related-tweakey rectangle attack is proposed by expanding forward for 3-round and extending backwards for 2-round. Our attack utilize the incompleted diffusion property of MixColumns operation of SKINNY to reduce the times of exhaustive key search. To the best of our knowledge, this attack efficiently reduces the costs compared to the currently known attacks on 23-round SKINNY-128-256, especially the data complexity is considerably less than the existing results.

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Acknowledgement

This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61772547, 61802438, 61902428, 61602514) and the National Cryptography Development Fund (No. MMJJ20170125).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. PLA SSF Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou, China

    Jiyan Zhang, Ting Cui & Chenhui Jin

Authors
  1. Jiyan Zhang
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  2. Ting Cui
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  3. Chenhui Jin
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, China

    Zhe Liu

  2. Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

    Fan Wu

  3. Missouri University of Science and Technology, Rolla, MO, USA

    Sajal K. Das

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Zhang, J., Cui, T., Jin, C. (2021). New Rectangle Attack Against SKINNY Block Cipher. In: Liu, Z., Wu, F., Das, S.K. (eds) Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications. WASA 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12939. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86137-7_43

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86137-7_43

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-86136-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-86137-7

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