Abstract
We introduce resource allocation techniques for a problem where (i) the agents express requests for obtaining item bundles as compact edge-weighted directed acyclic graphs (each path in such graphs is a bundle whose valuation is the sum of the weights of the traversed edges), and (ii) the agents do not bid on the exact same items but may bid on conflicting items, that cannot be both assigned. This setting is motivated by real applications such as Earth observation slot allocation, virtual network functions, or multi-agent path finding. We study several allocation techniques and analyze their performances on an orbit slot ownership allocation problem.
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Notes
- 1.
A Nash equilibrium is an allocation in which the modification of a path for a single agent does not improve its associated utility.
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Maqrot, S., Roussel, S., Picard, G., Pralet, C. (2022). Bundle Allocation with Conflicting Preferences Represented as Weighted Directed Acyclic Graphs. In: Dignum, F., Mathieu, P., Corchado, J.M., De La Prieta, F. (eds) Advances in Practical Applications of Agents, Multi-Agent Systems, and Complex Systems Simulation. The PAAMS Collection. PAAMS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13616. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18192-4_23
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