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Proxy Manipulation for Better Outcomes

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Multi-Agent Systems (EUMAS 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 13442))

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Abstract

This paper offers a framework for the study of strategic behavior in proxy voting, where non-active voters delegate their votes to active voters. It further studies how proxy voting affects the strategic behavior of non-active voters and proxies (active voters) under complete and partial information. We focus on the median voting rule for single-peaked preferences. Our results show strategyproofness with respect to non-active voters. Furthermore, while strategyproofness does not extend to proxies, we show that under mild restrictions strategic behavior can lead to socially optimal outcomes. For partial information settings, our results show that while convergence is guaranteed, it may be sub-optimal.

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Acknowledgement

This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (ISF; Grant No. 2539/20).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel

    Gili Bielous & Reshef Meir

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  1. Gili Bielous
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  2. Reshef Meir
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Correspondence to Gili Bielous .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany

    Dorothea Baumeister

  2. University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany

    Jörg Rothe

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Bielous, G., Meir, R. (2022). Proxy Manipulation for Better Outcomes. In: Baumeister, D., Rothe, J. (eds) Multi-Agent Systems. EUMAS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13442. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20614-6_5

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-20613-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-20614-6

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