Abstract
We develop a formal model of facility location games with group externalities in one dimension: there is a set of agents on an interval [0, L], a facility will be built to serve both the individual activities and the group activities. Some agents are interested in individual activities, while others like group activities. The goal is to design a mechanism that is non-manipulable and respects unanimity while (approximately) optimizing an objective function. We consider two social objectives, the social utility and the minimum utility. We prove that some previous mechanisms cannot handle this scenario. For each objective, we discuss about different ways of manipulation, and show both upper bounds and lower bounds of approximation ratios for deterministic truthful mechanisms.
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Acknowledgements
The work described in this paper was supported by a grant from Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. CityU 11200518). We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very useful feedback.
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Zhou, H. (2022). Facility Location Games with Group Externalities. In: Zhang, Y., Miao, D., Möhring, R. (eds) Computing and Combinatorics. COCOON 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13595. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22105-7_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22105-7_28
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