Abstract
Ransomware is currently the leading malware threat propagating throughout today’s networks and is the preeminent attack vector for adversaries aiming to extort a broad array of targets for financial gain. The de facto strategies for combating such maliciousness have long been host-based; however, these strategies are often inconsistently deployed and are typically not supported by devices with more modest computational capacity, such as the Internet of Things (IoT) domain. As a result, host-based techniques often do not scale well. Alternatively, network Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDSs/IPSs) mitigate this issue to some extent by offering a degree of network-level protection, but they too ultimately suffer the same scalability pitfall, as their performance degrades substantially amid higher traffic rates. Moreover, IDSs and IPSs are heavily reliant upon deep packet inspection, which adversaries easily circumvent with encryption. In response to such issues, we present a novel in-network methodology for integrating Random Forests (RFs) into programmable switches for traffic classification tasks, which we leverage to perform line-rate ransomware detection and mitigation. In turn, the Tbps packet processing capability of programmable switches seamlessly allows the proposed methodology to scale to even the busiest networks. Our methodology functions solely on network traffic features that are invariant to encryption. Additionally, our network-based approach can also be instrumented as a secondary defense strategy to host-based approaches that lack full network coverage. The proposed methodology was implemented on an Intel Tofino hardware switch and was shown to fit comfortably within the device’s resource bounds, with room to spare for other essential switch-based applications. In addition, the methodology was empirically evaluated using a number of the most prominent ransomware strains, demonstrating that it is capable of performing both binary or multiclass ransomware traffic classification with a precision and recall of over 0.99. Furthermore, this performance was obtained with as little as three packets from a compromised source. Indeed, such prompt detection can enable the mitigation of both ransomware propagation and the encryption of a victim’s files.
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This material is based on research funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF) grant #2104273.
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Friday, K., Bou-Harb, E., Crichigno, J. (2022). A Learning Methodology for Line-Rate Ransomware Mitigation with P4 Switches. In: Yuan, X., Bai, G., Alcaraz, C., Majumdar, S. (eds) Network and System Security. NSS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13787. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23020-2_7
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