Abstract
Log files are the primary source of information when the past operation of a computing system needs to be determined. Keeping correct and accurate log files is important for after-the-fact forensics, as well as for system administration, maintenance, and auditing. Therefore, a line of research has emerged on how to cryptographically protect the integrity of log files even against intruders who gain control of the logging machine.
We contribute to this line of research by devising a scheme where one can verify integrity not only of the log file as a whole, but also of excerpts. This is helpful in various scenarios, including cloud provider auditing.
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Notes
- 1.
Erasure of secret keys must be complete and irrecoverable to guarantee security, i.e., the secret keys must actually be overwritten or destroyed, instead of just removing (file) pointers or links to the secret key.
- 2.
Note that \(M = \langle m_0, \ldots , m_{l-1}\rangle \ne m_0 \mathop {\Vert }\ldots \mathop {\Vert }m_{l-1}\), i.e. we consider the log entries in M to be distinguishable.
- 3.
This restriction is without loss of generality, since the adversary knows \(sk_{i_\mathrm {BreakIn}}\) after this query and can thus create signatures as well as all subsequent secret keys by itself. Also, triggering the \(\mathrm {NextEpoch}\) oracle after the \(\mathrm {BreakIn}\) oracle would have no consequences on the outcome of the game.
- 4.
LogFAS [26] offers such a capability.
- 5.
This is an upper case \(\nu \).
- 6.
Again, this restriction is without loss of generality, see Footnote 3 on page 7.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Jörn Müller-Quade and my colleagues and friends Alexander Koch, Tobias Nilges and Bernhard Löwe for helpful discussions and remarks. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their comments. This work was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) as part of the MisPel program under grant no. 13N12063. The views expressed herein are the author’s responsibility and do not necessarily reflect those of BMBF.
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Hartung, G. (2016). Secure Audit Logs with Verifiable Excerpts. In: Sako, K. (eds) Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2016. CT-RSA 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9610. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_11
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