Abstract
Electronic cash (e-cash) permits secure e-payments by providing security and anonymity similar to real cash. Several protocols have been proposed to meet security and anonymity properties of e-cash. However, there are no general formal definitions that allow the automatic verification of e-cash protocols. In this paper, we propose a formal framework to define and verify security properties of e-cash protocols. To this end, we model e-cash protocols in the applied \(\pi \)-calculus, and we formally define five relevant security properties. Finally, we validate our framework by analyzing, using the automatic tool ProVerif, four e-cash protocols: the online and the offline Chaum protocols, the Digicash protocol, and the protocol by Petersen and Poupard.
This research was conducted with the support of the “Digital trust” Chair from the University of Auvergne Foundation.
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Notes
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DigiCash declared bankruptcy in 1998, and was sold to Blucora.
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Dreier, J., Kassem, A., Lafourcade, P. (2016). Automated Verification of e-Cash Protocols. In: Obaidat, M., Lorenz, P. (eds) E-Business and Telecommunications. ICETE 2015. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 585. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30222-5_11
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