Abstract
The Kalyna block cipher has recently been established as the Ukranian encryption standard in June, 2015. It was selected in a Ukrainian National Public Cryptographic Competition running from 2007 to 2010. Kalyna supports block sizes and key lengths of 128, 256 and 512 bits. Denoting variants of Kalyna as Kalyna-b / k, where b denotes the block size and k denotes the keylength, the design specifies \(k \in \{b, 2b\}\). In this work, we re-evaluate the security bound of some reduced round Kalyna variants, specifically Kalyna-128 / 256 and Kalyna-256 / 512 against key recovery attacks in the single key model. We first construct new 6-round distinguishers and then use these distinguishers to demonstrate 9-round attacks on these Kalyna variants. These attacks improve the previous best 7-round attacks on the same.
Our 9-round attack on Kalyna-128/256 has data, time and memory complexity of \(2^{105}\), \(2^{245.83}\) and \(2^{226.86}\) respectively. For our 9-round attack on Kalyna-256/512, the data/time/memory complexities are \(2^{217}\), \(2^{477.83}\) and \(2^{451.45}\) respectively. The attacks presented in this work are the current best on Kalyna. We apply multiset attack - a variant of meet-in-the-middle attack to achieve these results.
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Notes
- 1.
In Fig. 1, byte 3 in states \(W_3\), \(X_4\), \(Y_4\) and \(Z_4\) have not been colored grey for a purpose which will be cleared when we reach Observation 2.
- 2.
Note that the probability of randomly having a match is \(2^{-467.6}\) and not \(2^{-505.17}\) since the number of ordered sequences associated to a multiset is not constant [6].
- 3.
The details of this distinguisher will be provided in the extended version of this paper.
- 4.
The complete details of this attack will be provided in the extended version of this paper.
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Akshima, Chang, D., Ghosh, M., Goel, A., Sanadhya, S.K. (2016). Single Key Recovery Attacks on 9-Round Kalyna-128/256 and Kalyna-256/512. In: Kwon, S., Yun, A. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2015. ICISC 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9558. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30840-1_8
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