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A Framework for Formal Analysis of Privacy on SSO Protocols

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Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm 2017)

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Abstract

Single Sign-on (SSO) protocols, which allow a website to authenticate its users via accounts registered with another website, are forming the basis of user identity management in contemporary websites. Given the critical role they are playing in safeguarding the privacy-sensitive web services and user data, SSO protocols deserve a rigorous formal verification. In this work, we provide a framework facilitating formal modeling of SSO protocols and analysis of their privacy property. Our framework incorporates a formal model of the web infrastructure (e.g., network and browsers), a set of attacker models (e.g., malicious IDP) and a formalization of the privacy property with respect to SSO protocols. Our analysis has identified a new type of attack that allows malicious participants to learn which websites the victim users have logged in to.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For simple reference to the same information in different figures, we use the following format ((k), line \( x_j \)) to represent the step k in Fig. 3, line \(x_j\) in Fig. 5 (when \(x_j\) is a \( q_j \)) or Fig. 6 (when \(x_j\) is a \(p_j\)).

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Acknowledgment

This research is supported by the National Research Foundation, Singapore (No. NRF2015NCR-NCR003-003).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

    Kailong Wang, Naipeng Dong & Jin Song Dong

  2. Singapore Institute of Technology, Singapore, Singapore

    Guangdong Bai

  3. Griffith University, Nathan, Australia

    Jin Song Dong

Authors
  1. Kailong Wang
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  2. Guangdong Bai
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  3. Naipeng Dong
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  4. Jin Song Dong
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Guangdong Bai .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

    Xiaodong Lin

  2. University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada

    Ali Ghorbani

  3. University at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York, USA

    Kui Ren

  4. Pennsylvania State University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA

    Sencun Zhu

  5. Anhui Normal University, Wuhu, China

    Aiqing Zhang

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© 2018 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Wang, K., Bai, G., Dong, N., Dong, J.S. (2018). A Framework for Formal Analysis of Privacy on SSO Protocols. In: Lin, X., Ghorbani, A., Ren, K., Zhu, S., Zhang, A. (eds) Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. SecureComm 2017. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 238. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78813-5_41

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78813-5_41

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-78812-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-78813-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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