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Resource Based Cooperative Games: Optimization, Fairness and Stability

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Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 11059))

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Abstract

We study the class of resource-based coalitional games. We provide efficient algorithms to compute solution concepts for weighted voting games, threshold task games and r-weighted voting games; in particular, we compute approximately optimal coalition structures, and present non-trivial bounds on the cost of stability for these classes; in particular, we improve upon the bounds given in [2] for weighted voting games.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In the original work defining the cost of stability [2], the cost of stability is defined as \(V^* - OPT (G)\). Subsequent works (e.g. [7, 19]) utilize the definition we use here.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computing, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

    Ta Duy Nguyen & Yair Zick

Authors
  1. Ta Duy Nguyen
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  2. Yair Zick
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Correspondence to Ta Duy Nguyen .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Peking University, Beijing, China

    Xiaotie Deng

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Nguyen, T.D., Zick, Y. (2018). Resource Based Cooperative Games: Optimization, Fairness and Stability. In: Deng, X. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11059. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_21

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-99660-8

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