Abstract
We show that for infinite transition systems induced by cryptographic protocols in the Rusinowitch/Turuani style certain fundamental branching properties are decidable. As a consequence, we obtain that crucial properties of contract-signing protocols such as balance are decidable.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Amadio, R.M., Lugiez, D., Vanackere, V.: On the symbolic reduction of processes with cryptographic functions. TCS 290(1), 695–740 (2002)
Armando, A., Basin, D., Bouallagui, M., Chevalier, Y., Compagna, L., Mödersheim, S., Rusinowitch, M., Turuani, M., Viganò, L., Vigneron, L.: The AVISS Security Protocol Analysis Tool. In: Brinksma, E., Larsen, K.G. (eds.) CAV 2002. LNCS, vol. 2404, pp. 349–353. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Asokan, N., Shoup, V., Waidner, M.: Asynchronous protocols for optimistic fair exchange. In: Proc. of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pp. 86–99 (1998)
Ben-Or, M., Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Rivest, R.L.: A fair protocol for signing contracts. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 36(1), 40–46 (1990)
Boreale, M.: Symbolic trace analysis of cryptographic protocols. In: Orejas, F., Spirakis, P.G., van Leeuwen, J. (eds.) ICALP 2001. LNCS, vol. 2076, pp. 667–681. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Chadha, R., Kanovich, M.I., Scedrov, A.: Inductive methods and contract-signing protocols. In: CCS 2001, pp. 176–185. ACM Press, New York (2001)
Chadha, R., Kremer, S., Scedrov, A.: Formal analysis of multi-party contract signing. In: CSFW-17, pp. 266–279. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2004)
Comon, H., Shmatikov, V.: Is it possible to decide whether a cryptographic protocol is secure or not? Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology (2002)
Drielsma, P.H., Mödersheim, S.: The ASW protocol revisited: A unified view. In: Workshop on Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis, ARSPA (2004)
Garay, J.A., Jakobsson, M., MacKenzie, P.: Abuse-free optimistic contract signing. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 449–466. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Kähler, D., Küster, R., Wilke, T.: Deciding Properties of Contract-Signing Protocols. Technical Report IFI 0409, CAU Kiel (2004), Available from http://www.informatik.uni-kiel.de/reports/2004/0409.html
Kremer, S., Raskin, J.-F.: Game analysis of abuse-free contract signing. In: Computer Security Foundations Workshop 2002 (CSFW 2002). IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2002)
Meadows, C.: Formal Methods for Cryptographic Protocol Analysis: Emerging Issues and Trends. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication 21(1), 44–54 (2003)
Millen, J.K., Shmatikov, V.: Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis. In: CCS 2001, pp. 166–175. ACM Press, New York (2001)
Rusinowitch, M., Turuani, M.: Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions, composed keys is NP-complete. Theoretical Computer Science 299(1-3), 451–475 (2003)
Shmatikov, V., Mitchell, J.C.: Finite-state analysis of two contract signing protocols. Theoretical Computer Science 283(2), 419–450 (2002)
Zhou, J., Gollmann, D.: A fair non-repudiation protocol. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pp. 55–61. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (1996)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Kähler, D., Küsters, R., Wilke, T. (2005). Deciding Properties of Contract-Signing Protocols. In: Diekert, V., Durand, B. (eds) STACS 2005. STACS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3404. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31856-9_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-31856-9_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24998-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31856-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)