Abstract
The differential power analysis (DPA) enables an adversary to reveal the secret key hidden in a smart card by observing power consumption. The address-bit DPA is a typical example of DPA which analyzes a correlation between addresses of registers and power consumption. In this paper, we propose a practical countermeasure, the randomized addressing countermeasure, against the address-bit DPA which can be applied to the exponentiation part in RSA or ECC with and without pre-computed table. Our countermeasure has almost no overhead for the protection, namely the processing speed is no slower than that without the countermeasure. We also report experimental results of the countermeasure in order to show its effect. Finally, a complete comparison of countermeasures from various view points including the processing speed and the security level is given.
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Itoh, K., Izu, T., Takenaka, M. (2003). A Practical Countermeasure against Address-Bit Differential Power Analysis. In: Walter, C.D., Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds) Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2003. CHES 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2779. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45238-6_30
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45238-6_30
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