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Challenges in the Automated Verification of Security Protocols

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Automated Reasoning (IJCAR 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 5195))

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Abstract

The application area of security protocols raises several problems that are relevant to automated deduction. We describe in this note some of these challenges.

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Alessandro Armando Peter Baumgartner Gilles Dowek

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Comon-Lundh, H. (2008). Challenges in the Automated Verification of Security Protocols. In: Armando, A., Baumgartner, P., Dowek, G. (eds) Automated Reasoning. IJCAR 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5195. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71070-7_34

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71070-7_34

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