Abstract
Most of the recent works on algorithmic mechanism design exploit the solution concept of dominant strategy equilibria. Such work designs a proper payment scheme so that selfish agents maximize their utility by truthfully revealing their types. It has been pointed out that these truthful mechanisms, the famous among them being the VCG mechanisms, often incur high payments and fruglity ratios. In this work, we exploit the solution concept of Nash implementation to overcome this problem. Our mechanisms induce a set of Nash equilibria so that selfish agents have incentive to act based on a Nash equilibrium. We prove that our mechanisms enjoy substantial advantages over the truthful mechanisms in terms of payment and frugality.
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Huang, CC., Kao, MY., Li, XY., Wang, W. (2007). Using Nash Implementation to Achieve Better Frugality Ratios. In: Tokuyama, T. (eds) Algorithms and Computation. ISAAC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4835. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77120-3_34
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77120-3_34
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