Abstract
This paper provides a single broad model for the analysis of a range of issues underlying a market for Grid services. The demand and the supply sides of such a market are being treated separately and the relation between the two sides is being studied. We provide numerical results in order to derive conclusions about the viability of a market for Grid services. Underlying our model are parameters such as the cost technologies, the random processes driving demand and supply and the size of the market. We study the effect of the model’s parameters, such as risk aversion or the durability of resources, on the system’s behavior, eg. on the clearing price or volume of trade.
Work partially supported by the EU-funded research project GRIDECON, FP6 - 2005 - IST5 - 033634.
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Mason, R., Courcoubetis, C., Miliou, N. (2009). A Framework for Analyzing the Economics of a Market for Grid Services. In: Altmann, J., Buyya, R., Rana, O.F. (eds) Grid Economics and Business Models. GECON 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5745. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03864-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03864-8_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-03863-1
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