Abstract
We present a new secret-prefix MAC (Message Authentication Code) based on hash functions. Just like the well-known HMAC algorithm, the new MAC can utilize current hash functions without modifying their Merkle-Damgård implementations. Indeed, the new MAC is almost the same as HMAC except that the second call to the secret key, which is made at the finalization stage, is omitted. In this way we not only increase efficiency over HMAC but also reduce the cost of managing the key, as the new MAC invokes a key only once at the initialization stage, and the rest of the process depends solely on incoming data. We give a rigorous security proof of the new MAC algorithm. Like HMAC, our new MAC is proven to be a secure PRF (Pseudo-Random Function) based on a reasonable assumption about the underlying compression function. In theory our assumption is neither stronger nor weaker than the PRF-type compression-function requirement for the PRF security of HMAC. In practice our assumption looks somewhat similar to the PRF-type requirement for the security of HMAC.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bellare, M., Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Keying hash functions for message authentication. In: Koblitz, N. (ed.) CRYPTO 1996. LNCS, vol. 1109, pp. 1–15. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., Canetti, R.: HMAC: Keyed-hashing for message authentication, RFC2104 (1997)
JTC1: Information technology—Security techniques—Message Authentication Codes (MACs)—Part 2: Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function, ISO/IEC 9797-2:2002 (2002)
Merkle, R.C.: One way hash functions and DES. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 428–446. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)
Damgård, I.: A design principle for hash functions. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 416–427. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)
Bellare, M.: New proofs for NMAC and HMAC: Security without collision resistance. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 602–619. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Bellare, M., Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Pseudorandom functions revisited: The cascade construction and its concrete security. In: The 37th FOCS, pp. 514–523. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (1996)
Hirose, S., Park, J.H., Yun, A.: A simple variant of the Merkle-Damgård scheme with a permutation. In: Kurosawa, K. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4833, pp. 113–129. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Bellare, M., Kohno, T.: A theoretical treatment of related-key attacks: RKA-PRPs, RKA-PRFs, and applications. In: Biham, E. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2656, pp. 491–506. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
den Boer, B., Bosselaers, A.: Collisions for the compressin function of MD5. In: Helleseth, T. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1993. LNCS, vol. 765, pp. 293–304. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)
Contini, S., Yin, Y.L.: Forgery and partial key-recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using hash collisions. In: Lai, X., Chen, K. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2006. LNCS, vol. 4284, pp. 37–53. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
NIST: Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS 180-2 (2004)
NIST: Announcing request for candidate algorithm nominations for a new cryptographic hash algorithm (SHA 3) family, Federal Register Notice, vol. 72(212) (2007)
Coron, J.S., Dodis, Y., Malinaud, C., Puniya, P.: Merkle-Damgård revisited: How to construct a hash function. In: Shoup, V. (ed.) CRYPTO 2005. LNCS, vol. 3621, pp. 430–448. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., Peeters, M., Van Assche, G.: On the indifferentiability of the sponge construction. In: Smart, N.P. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2008. LNCS, vol. 4965, pp. 181–197. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Bellare, M., Ristenpart, T.: Multi-property-preserving hash domain extension and the EMD transform. In: Lai, X., Chen, K. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2006. LNCS, vol. 4284, pp. 299–314. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Tsudik, G.: Message authentication with one-way hash functions. In: INFOCOM 1992, pp. 2055–2059 (1992)
Kaliski, B., Robshaw, M.: Message authentication with MD5. CryptoBytes 1(1), 5–8 (1995)
Patel, S.: An efficient MAC for short messages. In: Nyberg, K., Heys, H.M. (eds.) SAC 2002. LNCS, vol. 2595, pp. 353–368. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Yasuda, K.: “Sandwich” is indeed secure: How to authenticate a message with just one hashing. In: Pieprzyk, J., Ghodosi, H., Dawson, E. (eds.) ACISP 2007. LNCS, vol. 4586, pp. 355–369. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Yasuda, K.: Boosting Merkle-Damgård hashing for message authentication. In: Kurosawa, K. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4833, pp. 216–231. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Preneel, B., van Oorschot, P.C.: MDx-MAC and building fast MACs from hash functions. In: Coppersmith, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 1995. LNCS, vol. 963, pp. 1–14. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)
Fischlin, M.: Security of NMAC and HMAC based on non-malleability. In: Malkin, T. (ed.) CT-RSA 2008. LNCS, vol. 4964, pp. 138–154. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Wegman, M.N., Carter, L.: New hash functions and their use in authentication and set equality. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 22(3), 265–279 (1981)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Yasuda, K. (2009). HMAC without the “Second” Key. In: Samarati, P., Yung, M., Martinelli, F., Ardagna, C.A. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5735. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04474-8_35
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04474-8_35
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-04473-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-04474-8
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)