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Poisoning the Kad Network

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Distributed Computing and Networking (ICDCN 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 5935))

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Abstract

Since the demise of the Overnet network, the Kad network has become not only the most popular but also the only widely used peer-to-peer system based on a distributed hash table. It is likely that its user base will continue to grow in numbers over the next few years as, unlike the eDonkey network, it does not depend on central servers, which increases scalability and reliability. Moreover, the Kad network is more efficient than unstructured systems such as Gnutella. However, we show that today’s Kad network can be attacked in several ways by carrying out several (well-known) attacks on the Kad network. The presented attacks could be used either to hamper the correct functioning of the network itself, to censor contents, or to harm other entities in the Internet not participating in the Kad network such as ordinary web servers. While there are simple heuristics to reduce the impact of some of the attacks, we believe that the presented attacks cannot be thwarted easily in any fully decentralized peer-to-peer system without some kind of a centralized certification and verification authority.

Research in part supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF).

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Locher, T., Mysicka, D., Schmid, S., Wattenhofer, R. (2010). Poisoning the Kad Network. In: Kant, K., Pemmaraju, S.V., Sivalingam, K.M., Wu, J. (eds) Distributed Computing and Networking. ICDCN 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5935. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11322-2_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11322-2_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-11321-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-11322-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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