Forms of Reasoning in the Design Science Research Process

Abstract

Several models for the conduct of design science research (DSR) in information systems (IS) have been suggested. There has, however, been little academic investigation of the basic forms of reasoning underlying these models, namely: deduction, induction and abduction. We argue that a more thorough investigation of these reasoning logics allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the DSR models and the building of information systems design theories (ISDTs). In particular, the question of whether prescriptive design knowledge can be ‘theory driven” by descriptive kernel theory can be addressed. First, we show that it is important to distinguish between a context of discovery and a context of justification in theory building and to consider the fundamental forms of reasoning in this light. We present an idealized model of the hypothetico-deductive method, showing how progress is achieved in science. This model includes the contexts of discovery and justification and the matching forms of reasoning. Second, we analyze frameworks for IS DSR and ISDT in comparison with this idealized model. This analysis suggests that few frameworks explicitly refer to the underlying forms of reasoning. Illustrative case studies with first-hand accounts of how IS DSR occurs in practice lend support to the conception of the idealized model. We conclude that work on methodological models for IS DSR and ISDT building would be given a firmer base and some differences in opinion resolved if there was explicit reflection on the underlying contexts of both discovery and justification and the forms of reasoning implicated, as in our idealized model.