Abstract
This paper aims at studying privacy-preserving tests for proximity. In a private proximity test, Alice can verify if she is close to Bob without either party revealing any other information about their location. We propose a system for private proximity testing based on the pre-distribution of data: the so-called commodity-based model. Our system is proven secure in the Universal Composability (UC) framework and uses as the core building block an efficient UC-secure equality testing protocol. To our knowledge this is the first work in the literature that contemplates this problem in the UC framework.
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Tonicelli, R., David, B.M., de Morais Alves, V. (2011). Universally Composable Private Proximity Testing. In: Boyen, X., Chen, X. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6980. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24316-5_16
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