Abstract
In this paper we propose actor-networks as a formal model of computation in heterogenous networks of computers, humans and their devices, where these new procedures run; and we introduce Procedure Derivation Logic (PDL) as a framework for reasoning about security in actor-networks, as an extension of our previous Protocol Derivation Logic. Both formalisms are geared towards graphic reasoning. We illustrate its workings by analysing a popular form of two-factor authentication.
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Pavlovic, D., Meadows, C. (2012). Actor-Network Procedures. In: Ramanujam, R., Ramaswamy, S. (eds) Distributed Computing and Internet Technology. ICDCIT 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7154. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28073-3_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28073-3_2
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