Abstract
We present here the results of a playful research on how to measure the strength of a key schedule algorithm, with applications to PRESENT, including its two variants with 80 and 128 bit keys. We do not claim to have discovered any devastating weakness, but believe that some of the results presented, albeit controversial, could be of interest for other researchers investigating this cipher, notably for those working in impossible differentials and related key or slide attacks. Furthermore, in the case of PRESENT, key schedule features shown here may be exploited to attack some of the PRESENT-based hash functions. We carried out a probabilistic metaheuristic search for semi-equivalent keys, annihilators and entropy minima, and proposed a simple way of combining these results into a single value with a straightforward mathematical expression that could help in abstracting resistance to the set of presented analysis. Surprisingly, PRESENT− 128 seems weaker than PRESENT− 80 in the light of this new measure.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Kirkpatrick, S., Gelatt, C.D., Vecchi, M.P.: Optimization by Simulated Annealing. Science 220(4598), 671–680 (1983)
Borghoff, J., Knudsen, L.R., Matusiewicz, K.: Analysis of Trivium by a Simulated Annealing Variant. In: Proceedings of Ecrypt II Workshop on Tools for Cryptanalysis (2010)
Knudsen, L.R., Meier, W.: Cryptanalysis of an Identification Scheme Based on the Permuted Perceptron Problem. In: Stern, J. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1999. LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 363–374. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Clark, J.A., Jacob, J.L.: Fault Injection and a Timing Channel on an Analysis Technique. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 181–196. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Kuman, M., Yadav, P., Kumari, M.: Flaws in Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round PRESENT, http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/407
Bogdanov, A., Leander, G., Paar, C., et al.: Hash Functions and RFID Tags: Mind the Gap, pp. 283–299 (2008)
Bogdanov, A.A., Knudsen, L.R., Leander, G., Paar, C., Poschmann, A., Robshaw, M.J.B., Seurin, Y., Vikkelsoe, C.: PRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher. In: Paillier, P., Verbauwhede, I. (eds.) CHES 2007. LNCS, vol. 4727, pp. 450–466. Springer, Heidelberg (2007), http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74735-2_31
Anderson, R., Biham, E., Knudsen, L.: Serpent: A proposal for the Advanced Encryption Standard. In: First Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Conference (1998)
Wang, M.: Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round PRESENT. In: Vaudenay, S. (ed.) AFRICACRYPT 2008. LNCS, vol. 5023, pp. 40–49. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Özen, O., Varıcı, K., Tezcan, C., Kocair, Ç.: Lightweight Block Ciphers Revisited: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round PRESENT and HIGHT. In: Boyd, C., González Nieto, J. (eds.) ACISP 2009. LNCS, vol. 5594, pp. 90–107. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Albrecht, M., Cid, C.: Algebraic Techniques in Differential Cryptanalysis. In: Dunkelman, O. (ed.) FSE 2009. LNCS, vol. 5665, pp. 193–208. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Collard, B., Standaert, F.-X.: A Statistical Saturation Attack against the Block Cipher PRESENT. In: Fischlin, M. (ed.) CT-RSA 2009. LNCS, vol. 5473, pp. 195–210. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Ohkuma, K.: Weak Keys of Reduced-Round PRESENT for Linear Cryptanalysis. In: Jacobson Jr., M.J., Rijmen, V., Safavi-Naini, R. (eds.) SAC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5867, pp. 249–265. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
De Cannière, C., Dunkelman, O., Knežević, M.: KATAN and KTANTAN — A Family of Small and Efficient Hardware-Oriented Block Ciphers. In: Clavier, C., Gaj, K. (eds.) CHES 2009. LNCS, vol. 5747, pp. 272–288. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Hernandez-Castro, J.C., Peris-Lopez, P., Aumasson, JP. (2012). On the Key Schedule Strength of PRESENT. In: Garcia-Alfaro, J., Navarro-Arribas, G., Cuppens-Boulahia, N., de Capitani di Vimercati, S. (eds) Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneus Security. DPM SETOP 2011 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7122. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28879-1_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28879-1_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-28878-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-28879-1
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)