On Trigger Detection against Reactive Jamming Attacks: A Localized Solution

Abstract

Reactive jamming attacks have been considered as the most critical and fatally adversarial threats to subvert or disrupt the networks since they attack the broadcast nature of transmission mediums by injecting interfering signals. Existing countermeasures against reactive jamming attacks, i.e. frequency hopping or channel surfing, requires excessive computational capabilities, which are infeasible for low cost resource constraint Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). To overcome the problems for normal lower power sensors, we propose an efficient localized jamming-resistant approach against reactive jamming attacks by identifying trigger nodes whose transmissions invoke the jammer. By constraining the trigger nodes to be receivers only, we can avoid invoking the jammers and completely nullify the reactive jamming attack. The triggers identification approach utilizes a hexagon tiling coloring and sequential Group Testing (GT), which does not demand any sophisticated hardware. Theoretical analyses and simulation results endorse the suitability of our localized algorithm in terms of time and message complexity.