Abstract
In 2012, Lv et al. proposed a new three-party authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocol using one-time key which aims to achieve more efficiency with the same security level of other existing 3PAKE protocols. Lv et al. claimed that their proposed 3PAKE protocol is secure against various known attacks. However, this paper points out Lv et al.’s 3PAKE protocol is still vulnerable to off-line dictionary attacks unlike their claim.
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Yoon, EJ. (2013). On the Security of Lv et al.’s Three-Party Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Using One-Time Key. In: Guyot, V. (eds) Advanced Infocomm Technology. ICAIT 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7593. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38227-7_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38227-7_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-38226-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-38227-7
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