Abstract
In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability.
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Turnovec, F. (2016). Manipulability of Voting Procedures: Strategic Voting and Strategic Nomination. In: Nguyen, N., Kowalczyk, R., Mercik, J. (eds) Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9760. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_9
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