Abstract
We discuss generic formal requirements for reasoning about two party key distribution protocols, using a language developed for specifying security requirements for security protocols. Typically earlier work has considered formal analysis of already developed protocols. Our goal is to present sets of formal requirements for various contexts which can be applied at the design stage as well as to existing protocols. We use a protocol analysis tool we have developed to determine whether or not a specific protocol has met some of the requirements we specified. We show how this process uncovered a flaw in the protocol and helped us refine our requirements.
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© 1995 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Syverson, P., Meadows, C. (1995). Formal requirements for key distribution protocols. In: De Santis, A. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT'94. EUROCRYPT 1994. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 950. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0053447
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0053447
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