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Sicherheit relativ definieren

Das Real/Ideal-Paradigma in der Kryptographie

  • Schwerpunkt
  • Kryptographie - Aktuelle Entwicklungen
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Datenschutz und Datensicherheit - DuD Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Zusammenfassung

In der modernen Kryptographie wird „Sicherheit“ mathematisch definiert. Einer der etablierten Ansätze, Sicherheit zu definieren, ist die „Simulationsbasierte Sicherheit“, bei der Sicherheit keine absolute Größe ist, sondern durch Vergleich mit fiktionalen, ideal sicheren kryptographischen Protokollen definiert wird. Dieser Artikel stellt neue Entwicklungen vor.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Karlsruhe, Deutschland

    Brandon Broadnax, Jeremias Mechler, Jörn Müller-Quade, Matthias Nagel & Jochen Rill

Authors
  1. Brandon Broadnax
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  2. Jeremias Mechler
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  3. Jörn Müller-Quade
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  4. Matthias Nagel
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  5. Jochen Rill
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Brandon Broadnax.

Additional information

Jörn Müller-Quade ist Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Kryptographie und Sicherheit am KIT, Sprecher des Kompetenzzentrums für angewandte Sicherheitstechnologie (KASTEL) und Direktor am Forschungszentrum Informatik (FZI).

Matthias Nagel studierte Mathematik und Informatik an der TH Karlsruhe. Nach seinem Studium arbeitete er zunächst am Fraunhofer IOSB und kehrte 2015 ans KIT zurück.

Brandon Broadnax studierte Mathematik am KIT. Seit 2013 is er wissenschfticher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl von Prof. Müller-Quade. Zu seinen Forschungsschwerpunkten gehören Sicherheitsmodelle für kryptographische Protokolle.

Jochen Rill studierte Informatik am KIT. Seit 2013 ist er wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Forschungszentrum Informatik in Karlsruhe. Seine Forschungsschwerpunkte sind beweisbare Sicherheit und Sicherheitsmodelle.

Jeremias Mechler studierte Informatik am KIT. Neben seinem Studium war er am Lehrstuhl von Prof. Müller-Quade am Institut für Theoretische Informatik beschäftigt.

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Broadnax, B., Mechler, J., Müller-Quade, J. et al. Sicherheit relativ definieren. Datenschutz Datensich 41, 24–28 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11623-017-0720-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11623-017-0720-4

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