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On consistent solutions for strategic games

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Abstract.

Nash equilibria for strategic games were characterized by Peleg and Tijs (1996) as those solutions satisfying the properties of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality.

 There are other solutions, like the ɛ-Nash equilibria, which enjoy nice properties and appear to be interesting substitutes for Nash equilibria when their existence cannot be guaranteed. They can be characterized using an appropriate substitute of one-person rationality. More generally, we introduce the class of “personalized” Nash equilibria and we prove that it contains all of the solutions characterized by consistency and converse consistency.

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Received January 1996/Final version December 1996

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Patrone, F., Pieri, G., Tijs, S. et al. On consistent solutions for strategic games. Game Theory 27, 191–200 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050065

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050065