Abstract
Cost spanning tree problems concern the construction of a tree which provides a connection with the source for every node of the network. In this paper, we address cost sharing problems associated to these situations when the agents located at the nodes act in a non-cooperative way. A class of strategies is proposed which produce minimum cost spanning trees and, at the same time, are strong Nash equilibria for a non-cooperative game associated to the problem. They are also subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
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Fernández, F.R., Hinojosa, M.A., Mármol, A.M. et al. Opportune moment strategies for a cost spanning tree game. Math Meth Oper Res 70, 451–463 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-008-0279-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-008-0279-9