Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                
Skip to main content

Advertisement

Springer Nature Link
Log in

Introduction to the special issue “Experiments on conflicts and conflict resolution”

  • Introduction
  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This special issue brings together a series of eight articles dealing with experiments on conflict and conflict resolution. The papers presented here originate from a workshop on experiments on conflict held in Rennes, France, in May 2012. The aim of the special issue is threefold: (i) investigating the main determinants of conflicts, (ii) measuring the consequences of conflicts in terms of social welfare losses, and (iii) presenting and discussing different mechanisms and institutions as well as their limitations to reduce and/or prevent conflicts. All papers included here—whether they address interpersonal, intra group or inter groups conflicts—share the same methodology, namely experimental economics.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Another potential reason for defection is the fear of being a sucker, i.e., cooperating while the other party will defect.

  2. It should be noticed however that conflicts of interest are not necessarily always bad for an organization. This may be the case for instance when conflicts rhyme with inter individual or inter group competition that provides strong incentives to innovate and to outperform (e.g. Lazear and Rosen 1981). Conflicts of interest become detrimental to an organization or a society only when such competition induces important collective welfare losses and/or when it leads the individuals (or groups) to engage in destructive and unethical activities to win the contest.

  3. This paper has already been published in a previous issue of this journal: Galeotti and Zizzo (2014), “What happens if you single out? An experiment,” Social Choice and Welfare 43 (3), p. 703–729.

References

  • Abbink K, Brandts J, Herrmann B, Orzen H (2010) Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in experimental contest games. Am Econ Rev 100:420–447

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Abbink K, Herrmann B (2011) The moral costs of nastiness. Econ Inq 49(2):631–633

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Abbink K, Sadrieh A (2009) The pleasure of being nasty. Econ Lett 105:306–308

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arce DG, Bakshi S, Croson R, Eckel C, Fatas E, Kass M (2011) Counterterror strategies in a lab. Public Choice 149(3):465–478

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Binswanger H, Deininger K, Feder G (1993) Power, distortions, revolt and reform in agricultural land relations. In: Behrman J, Srinivasan TN (eds) Handbook of development economics, vol. 3. Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam

  • Bolle F, Tan JHW, Zizzo DJ (2014) Vendettas. Am Econ J Microecon 6(2):93–130

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brockett CD (1992) Measuring political violence and land inequality in Central America. Am Political Sci Rev 86(1):169–178

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Charness G, Grosskopf B (2001) Relative payoffs and happiness. J Econ Behav Organ 45(3):301–328

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Charness G, Rabin M (2002) Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Q J Econ 117(3):817–869

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Charness G, Masclet D, Villeval M-C (2014) The dark side of competition for status. Manag Sci 60(1):38–55

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chowdhury SM, Sheremeta RM (2010) The equivalence of contests. Economic Science Institute Working Papers 10-07, Chapman University

  • Collier P, Hoeffler A (2004) Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxf Econ Pap 56:563–595

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Collier P, Hoeffler A, Soderbom M (2004) On the duration of civil war. J Peace Res 41:253–273

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cramer C (2005) Inequality and conflict—a review of an age-old concern. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Programme Paper 11

  • Dohmen T, Falk A, Fliessbach K, Sunde U, Weber B (2011) Relative versus absolute income, joy of winning, and gender: brain imaging evidence. J Public Econ 95(3/4):279–285

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duesenberry J (1949) Income, saving and the theory of consumer behavior. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Fehr E, Gaechter S (2000) Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Am Econ Rev 90(4):980–994

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fisher RJ (2000) Intergroup conflict. In: Deutsch M, Coleman PT (eds) The handbook of conflict resolution: theory and practice. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, pp 166–184

    Google Scholar 

  • Frank R (1985) The demand for unobservable and other nonpositional goods. Am Econ Rev 75(1):101–116

    Google Scholar 

  • Gächter S, Renner E, Sefton M (2008) The long-run benefits of punishment. Science 322:1510

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gurr T (2000) People versus states: minorities at risk in the newcentury. Institute of Peace Press, Washington

    Google Scholar 

  • Harbring C, Irlenbusch B (2008) How many winners are good to have? On tournaments with sabotage. J Econ Behav Organ 65:682–702

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Herrmann B, Thöni C, Gächter S (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319:1362–1367

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Isaac M, McCue D, Plott C (1985) Public goods provision in an experimental environment. J Public Econ 26:51–74

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Isaac M, Walker J (1988) Group size effects in public goods provision: the voluntary contributions mechanism. Q J Econ 103:179–199

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keser C (1996) Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy. Econ Lett 50:359–366

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lazear E (1989) Pay equality and industrial politics. J Political Econ 97(3):561–580

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lazear E, Rosen S (1981) Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. J Political Econ 89:841–864

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lei V, Masclet D, Vesely F (2014) Competition vs. communication: an experimental study on restoring trust. J Econ Behav Organ 108:94–107

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schock K (1996) A conjectural model of political conflict: the impact of political opportunities on the relationship between economic inequality and violent political conflict. J Confl Resolut 40:98–133

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tullock G (1980) Efficient rent seeking. In: Buchanan JM, Tollison RD, Tuliock G (eds) Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A and M University Press, College Station, pp 97–112

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomas KW (1992) Conflict and negotiation processes in organizations. In: Dunnette MD, Hough LM (eds) Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology, 2nd edn, vol 3. Consulting Psychologists Press, Palo Alto, pp 652–717

  • Veblen T (1949) The theory of the leisure class. George Allen and Unwin, London. [Originally published 1899 by Macmillan, New York]

  • Varian H (1994) A solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well-informed. Am Econ Rev 84(5):1278–1293

    Google Scholar 

  • Weede E (1981) Income inequality, and domestic violence. J Confl Resolut 25:639–654

    Google Scholar 

  • Zizzo D, Oswald AJ (2001) Are people willing to pay to reduce others’ incomes? Ann Econ Stat 63–64:39–62

    Google Scholar 

  • Zizzo D (2003) Money burning and rank egalitarianism with random dictators. Econ Lett 81(2):263–266

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank all the anonymous reviewers of the papers considered for this special issue. We would also like to thank Marc Fleurbaey and Vincent Merlin for comments and support. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed here are those of the authors who are solely responsible for the analysis and conclusions.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, CREM, CNRS, University of Rennes 1, 7 place Hoche, 35065, Rennes, France

    David Masclet

  2. CIRANO, Montreal, Canada

    David Masclet

  3. Department of Economics and Management, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, 76128, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Clemens Puppe

Authors
  1. David Masclet
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Clemens Puppe
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Clemens Puppe.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Masclet, D., Puppe, C. Introduction to the special issue “Experiments on conflicts and conflict resolution”. Soc Choice Welf 45, 479–488 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0925-0

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0925-0

Keywords

Search

Navigation