Abstract
Fishburn (Aggregation and revelation of preferences. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp 201–218, 1979) proved that majority rule on any proper permutation closed \(j\hbox {-rich}\) ballot space is the only social choice function satisfying faithfulness, consistency, cancellation, and neutrality. Alós-Ferrer (Soc Choice Welf 27:621–625, 2006) showed that neutrality was not needed for Fishburn’s result as long as the ballot space has no restriction on ballot sizes. In this paper, we show that the Alós-Ferrer result can be extended to a much larger class of ballot spaces.
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Notes
This type of ballot restriction goes back to the concept of “voting system” introduced by Brams and Fishburn (1978).
Alós-Ferrer (2006) points out that such a function is implicitly anonymous.
Alós-Ferrer assumes \(\mathcal {B}=\mathbb {P}(X){\setminus }\{X,\emptyset \}\). However, in a footnote, he points out that his result remains unchanged if \(\mathcal {B} = P_{ne}(X)\).
This argument is similar to the argument given for Step 1 on page 624 in Alós-Ferrer (2006).
A different example for the case of \(m = 4\) is given in Leach (2019).
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Appendix
Appendix
To prove Theorem 4 we will assume that \(m \ge 4\), \({\mathcal B}\) is a j-rich ballot space for some \(j \ge 3\), and \(f: {\mathbb {N}}_0^{{\mathcal B}} \rightarrow P_{ne}(X)\) is a social choice rule satisfying faithfulness, consistency, and cancellation. We want to show that f is majority rule, i.e.,
for any profile \(\pi \). This proof will involve the following notation. For each alternative \(x_i\in X\), let the profile \(\rho _{x_i}\) be the profile that consists of each of the j sized ballots containing \(x_i\). That is,
For example, if \(X = \{x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4\}\) and \(j = 3\), then
In this case,
In the general case,
for all \(t \ne i\). It follows from consistency and faithfulness that \(f(\rho _{x_i}) = \{x_i\}\). For any nonempty subset I of \(\{1, \ldots , m\}\) let
If \(|I| = k\), then
for all \(i \in I\) and
for all \(t \in \{1, \ldots , m\} {\setminus } I\). Therefore,
We want to show that \(f(\rho _I) = B_I\) as well. The next lemma shows that this equality holds when \(|I| = j\) or \(j - 1\).
Lemma 1
If \(|I| \in \{j, j - 1\}\), then
Proof
Assume \(|I| = j\) and note that \(B_I \in {\mathcal B}\) since \({\mathcal B}\) is \(j\hbox {-rich}\). Let \(\alpha \) and \(\beta \) be the positive integers satisfying
for some \(i \in I\) and \(j \in \{1, \ldots , m\} {\setminus } I\). Notice that \(\alpha > \beta \). Next, let
and observe that \(f(\widehat{\rho }) = X\) by cancellation. Let \(\gamma \) be the positive integer
for any \(x \in X\). We now compare the two profiles:
For any \(x_i \in B_I\),
and
Next, for any \(x_j \in X {\setminus } B_I\),
and
We now know that
for all \(x \in X\). Let \(I' = \{1, \ldots , m\} {\setminus } I\) and observe that
Therefore,
for all \(x \in X\). Using the previous equation and fact that
for all \(x \in X\) it follows that
for all \(x \in X\) as well. Since f satisfies cancellation we get
Therefore, using consistency (many times) we get
Finally, since f is faithful, \(f(\rho _I) = f(B_I) = B_I\) and we’re done with the first part of the proof of Lemma 1.
Now assume \(|I| = j - 1\) and, as above, let \(I' = \{1, \ldots , m\} {\setminus } I\). Using consistency and the first part of this lemma we get
Note that
By consistency and cancellation,
Hence \(f(\rho _I) = B_I\).
We are now ready to use Lemma 1 to complete the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4
Assume that the set
is nonempty. So D is the set of profiles where the functions f and \(F_M\) disagree. Choose \(\rho \in D\) such that \(|F_M(\rho )|\) is maximal. This means that if \(\pi \) is a profile such that \(|F_M(\pi )| > |F_M(\rho )|\), then \(f(\pi ) = F_M(\pi )\). Since f is cancellative and \(\rho \in D\) it follows that \(F_M(\rho ) \ne X\). So
Assume that there exists \(x \in f(\rho )\) such that \(x \not \in F_M(\rho )\). We may assume that \(x = x_1\). Let
and note that \(\ell > 0\). Next, let
where
Then
and
for all \(i \ne 1\). If \(v(x_i, \rho ) = \text {max}\ v(\rho ) = [\ell + v(x_1, \rho )]\), then
It follows that
By our choice of \(\rho \) and the fact that \(|F_M(\widehat{\rho })| > |F_M(\rho )|\) it follows that
On the other hand, by consistency,
Since \(F_M(\rho )\ \cup \{x_1\} \ne \{x_1\}\) we get a contradiction. It now follows that \(f(\rho ) \subset F_M(\rho )\).
Since \(f(\rho ) \subset F_M(\rho )\) and \(f(\rho ) \ne F_M(\rho )\), there exists \(y \in F_M(\rho ) {\setminus } f(\rho )\). Let \(x \in X {\setminus } F_M(\rho )\) and \(z \in f(\rho )\). We may assume that \(x = x_1\), \(y = x_2\), and \(z = x_3\). As above, let
and note that \(\ell > 0\). We now introduce the profile
By our choice of \(\rho \) we know that
Using consistency and Lemma 1,
Using consistency and the fact that \(x_2, x_3 \in F_M(\rho )\) we get
Next, using consistency and Lemma 1, we get
Since \(x_3 \in f(\rho ) = f(\alpha \rho )\) and \(x_3 \in f\left( \ell [ \rho _{x_1} + \cdots + \rho _{x_j} ]\right) \) it follows that
Since \(x_2 \not \in f(\rho ) = f(\alpha \rho )\) it follows from the previous equation that \(x_2 \not \in f(\mu )\). But this contradicts the fact that \(\{x_2, x_3\} \subseteq f(\mu )\). This final contradiction shows that the set \(D = \{ \pi \in {\mathbb {N}}_0 : f(\pi ) \ne F_M(\pi )\}\) must be the empty set. Hence \(f = F_M\) and we’re done.
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Leach, T., Powers, R.C. Majority rule on j-rich ballot spaces. Soc Choice Welf 54, 639–655 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01223-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01223-4